glibc/sysdeps/tile/stackguard-macros.h

#include <bits/wordsize.h>

#ifdef __tilegx__
# if __WORDSIZE == 64
#  define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -16; ld %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
#  define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -24; ld %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
# else
#  define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -8; ld4s %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
#  define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -12; ld4s %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
# endif
#else
# define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -8; lw %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
# define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -12; lw %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })
#endif
tile: support tilegx32 in stackguard-macros.h 2012-05-17 18:51:36 +00:00			`#include <bits/wordsize.h>`

tile: support stackguard-macros.h header 2012-05-11 20:11:04 +00:00			`#ifdef __tilegx__`
tile: support tilegx32 in stackguard-macros.h 2012-05-17 18:51:36 +00:00			`# if __WORDSIZE == 64`
			`# define STACK_CHK_GUARD \`
tile: support stackguard-macros.h header 2012-05-11 20:11:04 +00:00			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -16; ld %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })`
BZ #15754: CVE-2013-4788 The pointer guard used for pointer mangling was not initialized for static applications resulting in the security feature being disabled. The pointer guard is now correctly initialized to a random value for static applications. Existing static applications need to be recompiled to take advantage of the fix. The test tst-ptrguard1-static and tst-ptrguard1 add regression coverage to ensure the pointer guards are sufficiently random and initialized to a default value. 2013-09-23 04:52:09 +00:00			`# define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \`
			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -24; ld %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })`
tile: support tilegx32 in stackguard-macros.h 2012-05-17 18:51:36 +00:00			`# else`
			`# define STACK_CHK_GUARD \`
			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -8; ld4s %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })`
BZ #15754: CVE-2013-4788 The pointer guard used for pointer mangling was not initialized for static applications resulting in the security feature being disabled. The pointer guard is now correctly initialized to a random value for static applications. Existing static applications need to be recompiled to take advantage of the fix. The test tst-ptrguard1-static and tst-ptrguard1 add regression coverage to ensure the pointer guards are sufficiently random and initialized to a default value. 2013-09-23 04:52:09 +00:00			`# define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \`
			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -12; ld4s %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })`
tile: support tilegx32 in stackguard-macros.h 2012-05-17 18:51:36 +00:00			`# endif`
tile: support stackguard-macros.h header 2012-05-11 20:11:04 +00:00			`#else`
			`# define STACK_CHK_GUARD \`
			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -8; lw %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })`
BZ #15754: CVE-2013-4788 The pointer guard used for pointer mangling was not initialized for static applications resulting in the security feature being disabled. The pointer guard is now correctly initialized to a random value for static applications. Existing static applications need to be recompiled to take advantage of the fix. The test tst-ptrguard1-static and tst-ptrguard1 add regression coverage to ensure the pointer guards are sufficiently random and initialized to a default value. 2013-09-23 04:52:09 +00:00			`# define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \`
			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("addi %0, tp, -12; lw %0, %0" : "=r" (x)); x; })`
tile: support stackguard-macros.h header 2012-05-11 20:11:04 +00:00			`#endif`