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arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
/* Pseudo Random Number Generator
Update copyright dates with scripts/update-copyrights
2024-01-01 18:12:26 +00:00
Copyright (C) 2022-2024 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
#include <errno.h>
#include <not-cancel.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
static void
arc4random_getrandom_failure (void)
{
__libc_fatal ("Fatal glibc error: cannot get entropy for arc4random\n");
}
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
void
__arc4random_buf (void *p, size_t n)
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
{
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
static int seen_initialized;
stdlib: Fix __getrandom_nocancel type and arc4random usage (BZ #29638) Using an unsigned type prevents the fallback to be used if kernel does not support getrandom syscall. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu. Reviewed-by: Wilco Dijkstra <Wilco.Dijkstra@arm.com>
2022-09-29 19:15:20 +00:00
ssize_t l;
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
int fd;
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
if (n == 0)
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
return;
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
for (;;)
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
{
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
l = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__getrandom_nocancel (p, n, 0));
if (l > 0)
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
{
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
if ((size_t) l == n)
return; /* Done reading, success. */
p = (uint8_t *) p + l;
n -= l;
continue; /* Interrupted by a signal; keep going. */
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
}
stdlib: fix arc4random fallback to /dev/urandom (BZ 31612) The __getrandom_nocancel used by __arc4random_buf uses INLINE_SYSCALL_CALL (which returns -1/errno) and the loop checks for the return value instead of errno to fallback to /dev/urandom. The malloc code now uses __getrandom_nocancel_nostatus, which uses INTERNAL_SYSCALL_CALL, so there is no need to use the variant that does not set errno (BZ#29624). Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu. Reviewed-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
2024-04-05 13:27:29 +00:00
else if (l < 0 && errno == ENOSYS)
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
break; /* No syscall, so fallback to /dev/urandom. */
arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
}
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
if (atomic_load_relaxed (&seen_initialized) == 0)
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
{
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
/* Poll /dev/random as an approximation of RNG initialization. */
struct pollfd pfd = { .events = POLLIN };
pfd.fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (
__open64_nocancel ("/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY));
if (pfd.fd < 0)
arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__poll_infinity_nocancel (&pfd, 1)) < 0)
arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
if (__close_nocancel (pfd.fd) < 0)
arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
atomic_store_relaxed (&seen_initialized, 1);
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
}
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (
__open64_nocancel ("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY));
if (fd < 0)
arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
for (;;)
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
{
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
l = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__read_nocancel (fd, p, n));
if (l <= 0)
arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
if ((size_t) l == n)
break; /* Done reading, success. */
p = (uint8_t *) p + l;
n -= l;
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
}
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
if (__close_nocancel (fd) < 0)
arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
}
libc_hidden_def (__arc4random_buf)
weak_alias (__arc4random_buf, arc4random_buf)
uint32_t
__arc4random (void)
{
uint32_t r;
arc4random: simplify design for better safety Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time. This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can work together on optimizing that. This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all together. Future improvements may include userspace learning more from the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16 MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic issues for users of this function. This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it replaces moves too fast without considering security implications, whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace. getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly, as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all ancient kernels, though it does to all kernels supported by glibc (≥3.2), so generally it's the best approximation we can do. The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however, choose a conservative approach for implementing it. Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
2022-07-26 19:58:22 +00:00
__arc4random_buf (&r, sizeof (r));
stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417) The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache. It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy, and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer. To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback. The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if arc4random is not called it is not touched). Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe (the per thread state is not updated atomically). The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a stream of zeros. This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random does. The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer, where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation (1976), for solving the general case. The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit. It optimizes the internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable and then sampling byte per byte. Depending of the upper bound requested, it might lead to better CPU utilization. Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu. Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439 [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
2022-07-21 13:04:59 +00:00
return r;
}
libc_hidden_def (__arc4random)
weak_alias (__arc4random, arc4random)
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