glibc/sysdeps/ia64/stackguard-macros.h

#include <stdint.h>

#define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("adds %0 = -8, r13;; ld8 %0 = [%0]" : "=r" (x)); x; })

#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
  ({ uintptr_t x; asm ("adds %0 = -16, r13;; ld8 %0 = [%0]" : "=r" (x)); x; })
ia64: add split-out settings into dedicated files Logic specific to ia64 used to live in the main tree in common files. Now that we can't do that (with #ifdef and such), we need to add that logic into dedicated overriding files. Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> 2012-04-17 02:52:56 +00:00			`#include <stdint.h>`

			`#define STACK_CHK_GUARD \`
			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("adds %0 = -8, r13;; ld8 %0 = [%0]" : "=r" (x)); x; })`
BZ #15754: CVE-2013-4788 The pointer guard used for pointer mangling was not initialized for static applications resulting in the security feature being disabled. The pointer guard is now correctly initialized to a random value for static applications. Existing static applications need to be recompiled to take advantage of the fix. The test tst-ptrguard1-static and tst-ptrguard1 add regression coverage to ensure the pointer guards are sufficiently random and initialized to a default value. 2013-09-23 04:52:09 +00:00
			`#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \`
			`({ uintptr_t x; asm ("adds %0 = -16, r13;; ld8 %0 = [%0]" : "=r" (x)); x; })`