pthread_getspecific, pthread_setspecific): Format with
@deftypefun, and add @safety note.
* manual/signal.texi: Move comments that analyze the above
functions to their home place.
Fixes to address issues from BZ #15022 resolution, as follows:
* TLS updates to csu/libc-tls.c -- we now have a proper main map, so
there's no longer a need to create a separate fake one to keep TLS
structures,
* random updates to elf/dl-close.c -- LM_ID_BASE is now a valid name
space ID for static executables as well, so assert that we don't
unload the main map. Similarly dl_nns isn't supposed to be 0 for
static executables anymore,
* actual BZ #16046 fix to elf/dl-iteratephdr.c -- the dl_iterate_phdr
special function for static executables isn't needed anymore, provided
that l_phdr and l_phnum members of the main map have been properly
initialized (done in _dl_non_dynamic_init in elf/dl-support.c now),
* ld.so.cache loader update to elf/dl-load.c --
GL(dl_ns)[LM_ID_BASE]._ns_loaded is now always initialized in static
executables so can become the fallback loader map to check for
DF_1_NODEFLIB, provided that the l_flags_1 member of the main map has
been properly initialized (done in elf/dl-support.c now); this also
ensures previous semantics elsewhere in elf/dl-load.c,
* matching updates to elf/dl-support.c -- to complement the two fixes
above.
When i386 and x86-64 mathinline.h was merged into a single mathinline.h,
"gcc -m32" enables x87 inline functions on x86-64 even when -mfpmath=sse
and SSE2 is enabled. It is a regression on x86-64. We should check
__SSE2_MATH__ instead of __x86_64__ when disabling x87 inline functions.
The netgroups file parsing code tries to access the character before
the newline in parsed lines to see if it is a backslash (\). This
results in an access before the block allocated for the line if the
line is blank, i.e. does not have anything other than the newline
character. This doesn't seem like it will cause any crashes because
the byte belongs to the malloc metadata block and hence access to it
will always succeed.
There could be an invalid alteration in code flow where a blank line
is seen as a continuation due to the preceding byte *happening* to be
'\\'. This could be done by interposing malloc, but that's not really
a security problem since one could interpose getnetgrent_r itself and
achieve a similar 'exploit'.
The possibility of actually exploiting this is remote to impossible
since it also requires the previous line to end with a '\\', which
would happen only on invalid configurations.
