glibc/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-execstack.c
Ulrich Drepper f9a06dc1b5 Update.
2004-04-20  Jakub Jelinek  <jakub@redhat.com>

	* sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/shm_open.c (shm_unlink): Change EPERM into
	EACCES.

2004-04-20  Jakub Jelinek  <jakub@redhat.com>

	* stdio-common/vfscanf.c (_IO_vfscanf): Revert last %% whitespace
	handling change.
	* stdio-common/tst-sscanf.c (int_tests): Adjust.

	* nis/nss-nis.c: Include stdlib.h.

	* sysdeps/sparc/sparc32/dl-machine.h (elf_machine_rela): Shut up a
	warning.
	* sysdeps/sparc/sparc64/memcmp.S (memcmp): Remove BP_SYM () from
	libc_hidden_builtin_def.

2004-04-20  Jim Meyering  <jim@meyering.net>

	* misc/error.c (error_tail): Don't leak upon realloc failure.

2004-04-20  Martin Schwidefsky  <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

	* sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-execstack.c (_dl_make_stack_executable):
	Use RETURN_ADDRESS instead of __builtin_return_address.
2004-04-20 18:58:56 +00:00

166 lines
4.8 KiB
C

/* Stack executability handling for GNU dynamic linker. Linux version.
Copyright (C) 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
License along with the GNU C Library; if not, write to the Free
Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA
02111-1307 USA. */
#include <ldsodefs.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <libintl.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stackinfo.h>
#include <caller.h>
#include "kernel-features.h"
int
internal_function
_dl_make_stack_executable (void **stack_endp)
{
/* This gives us the highest/lowest page that needs to be changed. */
uintptr_t page = ((uintptr_t) *stack_endp
& -(intptr_t) GLRO(dl_pagesize));
/* Challenge the caller. */
if (__builtin_expect (__check_caller (RETURN_ADDRESS (0),
allow_ldso|allow_libpthread) != 0, 0)
|| __builtin_expect (*stack_endp != __libc_stack_end, 0))
return EPERM;
#if _STACK_GROWS_DOWN
/* Newer Linux kernels support a flag to make our job easy. */
# ifdef PROT_GROWSDOWN
# if __ASSUME_PROT_GROWSUPDOWN == 0
static bool no_growsdown;
if (! no_growsdown)
# endif
{
if (__builtin_expect (__mprotect ((void *) page, GLRO(dl_pagesize),
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC
|PROT_GROWSDOWN) == 0, 1))
goto return_success;
# if __ASSUME_PROT_GROWSUPDOWN == 0
if (errno == EINVAL)
no_growsdown = true;
else
# endif
return errno;
}
# endif
/* There is always a hole in the address space below the bottom of the
stack. So when we make an mprotect call that starts below the bottom
of the stack, it will include the hole and fail with ENOMEM.
We start with a random guess at how deep the stack might have gotten
so as to have extended the GROWSDOWN mapping to lower pages. */
# if __ASSUME_PROT_GROWSUPDOWN == 0
size_t size = GLRO(dl_pagesize) * 8;
page = page + GLRO(dl_pagesize) - size;
while (1)
{
if (__mprotect ((void *) page, size,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) == 0)
/* We got this chunk changed; loop to do another chunk below. */
page -= size;
else
{
if (errno != ENOMEM) /* Unexpected failure mode. */
return errno;
if (size == GLRO(dl_pagesize))
/* We just tried to mprotect the top hole page and failed.
We are done. */
break;
/* Our mprotect call failed because it started below the lowest
stack page. Try again on just the top half of that region. */
size /= 2;
page += size;
}
}
# endif
#elif _STACK_GROWS_UP
/* Newer Linux kernels support a flag to make our job easy. */
# ifdef PROT_GROWSUP
# if __ASSUME_PROT_GROWSUPDOWN == 0
static bool no_growsup;
if (! no_growsup)
# endif
{
if (__mprotect ((void *) page, GLRO(dl_pagesize),
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC|PROT_GROWSUP) == 0)
goto return_success;
# if __ASSUME_PROT_GROWSUPDOWN == 0
if (errno == EINVAL)
no_growsup = true;
else
# endif
return errno;
}
# endif
/* There is always a hole in the address space above the top of the
stack. So when we make an mprotect call that spans past the top
of the stack, it will include the hole and fail with ENOMEM.
We start with a random guess at how deep the stack might have gotten
so as to have extended the GROWSUP mapping to higher pages. */
# if __ASSUME_PROT_GROWSUPDOWN == 0
size_t size = GLRO(dl_pagesize) * 8;
while (1)
{
if (__mprotect ((void *) page, size,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) == 0)
/* We got this chunk changed; loop to do another chunk below. */
page += size;
else
{
if (errno != ENOMEM) /* Unexpected failure mode. */
return errno;
if (size == GLRO(dl_pagesize))
/* We just tried to mprotect the lowest hole page and failed.
We are done. */
break;
/* Our mprotect call failed because it extended past the highest
stack page. Try again on just the bottom half of that region. */
size /= 2;
}
}
# endif
#else
# error "Define either _STACK_GROWS_DOWN or _STACK_GROWS_UP"
#endif
return_success:
/* Clear the address. */
*stack_endp = NULL;
/* Remember that we changed the permission. */
GL(dl_stack_flags) |= PF_X;
return 0;
}
rtld_hidden_def (_dl_make_stack_executable)