glibc/sysdeps/x86_64/64
Adhemerval Zanella 9c96c87d60 elf: Ignore GLIBC_TUNABLES for setuid/setgid binaries
The tunable privilege levels were a retrofit to try and keep the malloc
tunable environment variables' behavior unchanged across security
boundaries.  However, CVE-2023-4911 shows how tricky can be
tunable parsing in a security-sensitive environment.

Not only parsing, but the malloc tunable essentially changes some
semantics on setuid/setgid processes.  Although it is not a direct
security issue, allowing users to change setuid/setgid semantics is not
a good security practice, and requires extra code and analysis to check
if each tunable is safe to use on all security boundaries.

It also means that security opt-in features, like aarch64 MTE, would
need to be explicit enabled by an administrator with a wrapper script
or with a possible future system-wide tunable setting.

Co-authored-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar  <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
Reviewed-by: DJ Delorie <dj@redhat.com>
2023-11-21 16:15:42 -03:00
..
dl-tunables.list elf: Ignore GLIBC_TUNABLES for setuid/setgid binaries 2023-11-21 16:15:42 -03:00
Implies-after
Makefile ld.so: Always use MAP_COPY to map the first segment [BZ #30452] 2023-06-30 10:42:42 -07:00
tst-map-32bit-1a.c hurd: Implement prefer_map_32bit_exec tunable 2023-04-24 22:48:35 +02:00
tst-map-32bit-1b.c hurd: Implement prefer_map_32bit_exec tunable 2023-04-24 22:48:35 +02:00
tst-map-32bit-2.c ld.so: Always use MAP_COPY to map the first segment [BZ #30452] 2023-06-30 10:42:42 -07:00
tst-map-32bit-mod-2.c ld.so: Always use MAP_COPY to map the first segment [BZ #30452] 2023-06-30 10:42:42 -07:00
tst-map-32bit-mod.c hurd: Implement prefer_map_32bit_exec tunable 2023-04-24 22:48:35 +02:00