AuroraMiddleware/libtomcrypt
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

trim trailing spaces

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Steffen Jaeckel 2013-10-02 01:02:58 +02:00
parent 3eae4b42fb
commit a667a93d52
2 changed files with 36 additions and 36 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

28
src/pk/asn1/der/sequence/der_decode_sequence_ex.c
View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
LTC_ARGCHK(in != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(list != NULL);
/* get blk size */
if (inlen < 2) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
/* mark all as unused */
for (i = 0; i < (int)outlen; i++) {
list[i].used = 0;
}
}
/* ok read data */
inlen = blksize;
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
data = list[i].data;
if (!ordered && list[i].used == 1) { continue; }
if (type == LTC_ASN1_EOL) {
if (type == LTC_ASN1_EOL) {
break;
}
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
goto LBL_ERR;
}
break;
case LTC_ASN1_INTEGER:
z = inlen;
if ((err = der_decode_integer(in + x, z, data)) != CRYPT_OK) {
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
if ((err = der_length_short_integer(((unsigned long*)data)[0], &z)) != CRYPT_OK) {
goto LBL_ERR;
}
break;
case LTC_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
}
z = 2;
break;
case LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER:
z = inlen;
if ((err = der_decode_object_identifier(in + x, z, data, &size)) != CRYPT_OK) {
@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
goto LBL_ERR;
}
break;
case LTC_ASN1_SETOF:
case LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
/* detect if we have the right type */
@ -274,24 +274,24 @@ int der_decode_sequence_ex(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
x += z;
inlen -= z;
list[i].used = 1;
if (!ordered) {
if (!ordered) {
/* restart the decoder */
i = -1;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < (int)outlen; i++) {
if (list[i].used == 0) {
err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
goto LBL_ERR;
}
}
err = CRYPT_OK;
}
err = CRYPT_OK;
LBL_ERR:
return err;
}
}
#endif
/* $Source$ */

44
src/pk/dh/dh_sys.c
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
@file dh_sys.c
DH Crypto, Tom St Denis
*/
/**
Encrypt a short symmetric key with a public DH key
@param in The symmetric key to encrypt
@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ LBL_ERR:
@return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
dh_key *key)
{
unsigned char *shared_secret, *skey;
@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
/* get public key */
LOAD32L(x, in+y);
/* now check if the imported key will fit */
if (inlen < x) {
err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
} else {
inlen -= x;
}
y += 4;
if ((err = dh_import(in+y, x, &pubkey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
goto LBL_ERR;
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
/* load in the encrypted key */
LOAD32L(keysize, in+y);
/* will the out fit as part of the input */
if (inlen < keysize) {
err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int dh_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
} else {
inlen -= keysize;
}
if (keysize > *outlen) {
err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
goto LBL_ERR;
@ -275,27 +275,27 @@ LBL_ERR:
return err;
}
/* perform an ElGamal Signature of a hash
/* perform an ElGamal Signature of a hash
*
* The math works as follows. x is the private key, M is the message to sign
1. pick a random k
2. compute a = g^k mod p
3. compute b = (M - xa)/k mod p
4. Send (a,b)
Now to verify with y=g^x mod p, a and b
1. compute y^a * a^b = g^(xa) * g^(k*(M-xa)/k)
= g^(xa + (M - xa))
= g^M [all mod p]
2. Compare against g^M mod p [based on input hash].
3. If result of #2 == result of #1 then signature valid
3. If result of #2 == result of #1 then signature valid
*/
/**
Sign a message digest using a DH private key
Sign a message digest using a DH private key
@param in The data to sign
@param inlen The length of the input (octets)
@param out [out] The destination of the signature
@ -338,16 +338,16 @@ int dh_sign_hash(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
/* make up a random value k,
* since the order of the group is prime
* we need not check if gcd(k, r) is 1
* we need not check if gcd(k, r) is 1
*/
if (prng_descriptor[wprng].read(buf, sets[key->idx].size, prng) !=
if (prng_descriptor[wprng].read(buf, sets[key->idx].size, prng) !=
(unsigned long)(sets[key->idx].size)) {
err = CRYPT_ERROR_READPRNG;
goto LBL_ERR;
}
/* init bignums */
if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &b, &k, &m, &p, &g, &p1, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &b, &k, &m, &p, &g, &p1, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
goto LBL_ERR;
}
@ -369,13 +369,13 @@ int dh_sign_hash(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
if ((err = mp_mulmod(a, key->x, p1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* tmp = xa */
if ((err = mp_submod(m, tmp, p1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* tmp = M - xa */
if ((err = mp_mulmod(k, tmp, p1, b)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* b = (M - xa)/k */
/* check for overflow */
if ((unsigned long)(PACKET_SIZE + 4 + 4 + mp_unsigned_bin_size(a) + mp_unsigned_bin_size(b)) > *outlen) {
err = CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
goto LBL_ERR;
}
/* store header */
y = PACKET_SIZE;
@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ LBL_ERR:
@return CRYPT_OK if succsessful (even if signature is invalid)
*/
int dh_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen,
int *stat, dh_key *key)
{
void *a, *b, *p, *g, *m, *tmp;
@ -441,18 +441,18 @@ int dh_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
/* check initial input length */
if (siglen < PACKET_SIZE+4+4) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
}
/* header ok? */
if ((err = packet_valid_header((unsigned char *)sig, PACKET_SECT_DH, PACKET_SUB_SIGNED)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
/* get hash out of packet */
y = PACKET_SIZE;
/* init all bignums */
if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &p, &b, &g, &m, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
if ((err = mp_init_multi(&a, &p, &b, &g, &m, &tmp, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}