Merge pull request #815 from ARMmbed/mbedtls-2.26.0-rc0-pr
Mbedtls 2.26.0 rc0 pr
This commit is contained in:
commit
1c4e78421e
111
ChangeLog
111
ChangeLog
@ -1,5 +1,116 @@
|
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mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
|
||||
|
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= mbed TLS 2.26.0 branch released 2021-03-08
|
||||
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API changes
|
||||
* Renamed the PSA Crypto API output buffer size macros to bring them in line
|
||||
with version 1.0.0 of the specification.
|
||||
* The API glue function mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa() now takes the curve size
|
||||
in bits rather than bytes, with an additional flag to indicate if the
|
||||
size may have been rounded up to a whole number of bytes.
|
||||
* Renamed the PSA Crypto API AEAD tag length macros to bring them in line
|
||||
with version 1.0.0 of the specification.
|
||||
|
||||
Default behavior changes
|
||||
* In mbedtls_rsa_context objects, the ver field was formerly documented
|
||||
as always 0. It is now reserved for internal purposes and may take
|
||||
different values.
|
||||
|
||||
New deprecations
|
||||
* PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE, PSA_HASH_SIZE, PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE,
|
||||
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE and
|
||||
PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN have been renamed, and the old names
|
||||
deprecated.
|
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* PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH and PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH
|
||||
have been renamed, and the old names deprecated.
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||||
|
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Features
|
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* The PSA crypto subsystem can now use HMAC_DRBG instead of CTR_DRBG.
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CTR_DRBG is used by default if it is available, but you can override
|
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this choice by setting MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE at compile time.
|
||||
Fix #3354.
|
||||
* Automatic fallback to a software implementation of ECP when
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ECP_xxx_ALT accelerator hooks are in use can now be turned off
|
||||
through setting the new configuration flag MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK.
|
||||
* The PSA crypto subsystem can now be configured to use less static RAM by
|
||||
tweaking the setting for the maximum amount of keys simultaneously in RAM.
|
||||
MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT sets the maximum number of volatile keys that
|
||||
can exist simultaneously. It has a sensible default if not overridden.
|
||||
* Partial implementation of the PSA crypto driver interface: Mbed TLS can
|
||||
now use an external random generator instead of the library's own
|
||||
entropy collection and DRBG code. Enable MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG
|
||||
and see the documentation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for details.
|
||||
* Applications using both mbedtls_xxx and psa_xxx functions (for example,
|
||||
applications using TLS and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) can now use the PSA
|
||||
random generator with mbedtls_xxx functions. See the documentation of
|
||||
mbedtls_psa_get_random() for details.
|
||||
* In the PSA API, the policy for a MAC or AEAD algorithm can specify a
|
||||
minimum MAC or tag length thanks to the new wildcards
|
||||
PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC and
|
||||
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG.
|
||||
|
||||
Security
|
||||
* Fix a security reduction in CTR_DRBG when the initial seeding obtained a
|
||||
nonce from entropy. Applications were affected if they called
|
||||
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(), if they called
|
||||
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() with a size that was 3/2 times the key
|
||||
length, or when the entropy module uses SHA-256 and CTR_DRBG uses AES-256.
|
||||
In such cases, a random nonce was necessary to achieve the advertised
|
||||
security strength, but the code incorrectly used a constant instead of
|
||||
entropy from the nonce.
|
||||
Found by John Stroebel in #3819 and fixed in #3973.
|
||||
* Fix a buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when calculating
|
||||
|A| - |B| where |B| is larger than |A| and has more limbs (so the
|
||||
function should return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE). Only
|
||||
applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected:
|
||||
all calls inside the library were safe since this function is
|
||||
only called with |A| >= |B|. Reported by Guido Vranken in #4042.
|
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* Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in
|
||||
mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd
|
||||
value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the largest
|
||||
supported size.
|
||||
Found by Daniel Otte, reported in #4093 and fixed in #4094.
|
||||
* Fix a stack buffer overflow with mbedtls_net_poll() and
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mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() when given a file descriptor that is
|
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beyond FD_SETSIZE. Reported by FigBug in #4169.
|
||||
* Guard against strong local side channel attack against base64 tables by
|
||||
making access aceess to them use constant flow code.
|
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|
||||
Bugfix
|
||||
* Fix use-after-scope error in programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c and ssl_server2.c
|
||||
* Fix memory leak that occured when calling psa_close_key() on a
|
||||
wrapped key with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined.
|
||||
* Fix an incorrect error code if an RSA private operation glitched.
|
||||
* Fix a memory leak in an error case in psa_generate_derived_key_internal().
|
||||
* Fix a resource leak in CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
|
||||
is enabled, on platforms where initializing a mutex allocates resources.
|
||||
This was a regression introduced in the previous release. Reported in
|
||||
#4017, #4045 and #4071.
|
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* Ensure that calling mbedtls_rsa_free() or mbedtls_entropy_free()
|
||||
twice is safe. This happens for RSA when some Mbed TLS library functions
|
||||
fail. Such a double-free was not safe when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C was
|
||||
enabled on platforms where freeing a mutex twice is not safe.
|
||||
* Fix a resource leak in a bad-arguments case of mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()
|
||||
when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled on platforms where initializing
|
||||
a mutex allocates resources.
|
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* Fixes a bug where, if the library was configured to include support for
|
||||
both the old SE interface and the new PSA driver interface, external keys were
|
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not loaded from storage. This was fixed by #3996.
|
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* This change makes 'mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints'
|
||||
consistent with RFC 5280 4.2.1.9 which says: "Conforming CAs MUST
|
||||
include this extension in all CA certificates that contain public keys
|
||||
used to validate digital signatures on certificates and MUST mark the
|
||||
extension as critical in such certificates." Previous to this change,
|
||||
the extension was always marked as non-critical. This was fixed by
|
||||
#3698.
|
||||
|
||||
Changes
|
||||
* A new library C file psa_crypto_client.c has been created to contain
|
||||
the PSA code needed by a PSA crypto client when the PSA crypto
|
||||
implementation is not included into the library.
|
||||
* On recent enough versions of FreeBSD and DragonFlyBSD, the entropy module
|
||||
now uses the getrandom syscall instead of reading from /dev/urandom.
|
||||
|
||||
= mbed TLS 2.25.0 branch released 2020-12-11
|
||||
|
||||
API changes
|
||||
|
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Bugfix
|
||||
* Fix a resource leak in CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
|
||||
is enabled, on platforms where initializing a mutex allocates resources.
|
||||
This was a regression introduced in the previous release. Reported in
|
||||
#4017, #4045 and #4071.
|
@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Bugfix
|
||||
* Fix a memory leak in an error case in psa_generate_derived_key_internal().
|
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Changes
|
||||
* On recent enough versions of FreeBSD and DragonFlyBSD, the entropy module
|
||||
now uses the getrandom syscall instead of reading from /dev/urandom.
|
@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Security
|
||||
* Fix a security reduction in CTR_DRBG when the initial seeding obtained a
|
||||
nonce from entropy. Applications were affected if they called
|
||||
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(), if they called
|
||||
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() with a size that was 3/2 times the key
|
||||
length, or when the entropy module uses SHA-256 and CTR_DRBG uses AES-256.
|
||||
In such cases, a random nonce was necessary to achieve the advertised
|
||||
security strength, but the code incorrectly used a constant instead of
|
||||
entropy from the nonce.
|
||||
Found by John Stroebel in #3819 and fixed in #3973.
|
@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Security
|
||||
* Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in
|
||||
mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd
|
||||
value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the largest
|
||||
supported size.
|
||||
Found by Daniel Otte, reported in #4093 and fixed in #4094.
|
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
API changes
|
||||
* The API glue function mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa() now takes the curve size
|
||||
in bits rather than bytes, with an additional flag to indicate if the
|
||||
size may have been rounded up to a whole number of bytes.
|
@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Features
|
||||
* Partial implementation of the PSA crypto driver interface: Mbed TLS can
|
||||
now use an external random generator instead of the library's own
|
||||
entropy collection and DRBG code. Enable MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG
|
||||
and see the documentation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for details.
|
||||
* Applications using both mbedtls_xxx and psa_xxx functions (for example,
|
||||
applications using TLS and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) can now use the PSA
|
||||
random generator with mbedtls_xxx functions. See the documentation of
|
||||
mbedtls_psa_get_random() for details.
|
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Security
|
||||
* Fix a buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when calculating
|
||||
|A| - |B| where |B| is larger than |A| and has more limbs (so the
|
||||
function should return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE). Only
|
||||
applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected:
|
||||
all calls inside the library were safe since this function is
|
||||
only called with |A| >= |B|. Reported by Guido Vranken in #4042.
|
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Security
|
||||
* Fix a stack buffer overflow with mbedtls_net_poll() and
|
||||
mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() when given a file descriptor that is
|
||||
beyond FD_SETSIZE. Reported by FigBug in #4169.
|
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Features
|
||||
* Automatic fallback to a software implementation of ECP when
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ECP_xxx_ALT accelerator hooks are in use can now be turned off
|
||||
through setting the new configuration flag MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK.
|
@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Bugfix
|
||||
* Fix use-after-scope error in programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c and ssl_server2.c
|
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
API changes
|
||||
* Renamed the PSA Crypto API AEAD tag length macros to bring them in line
|
||||
with version 1.0.0 of the specification.
|
||||
|
||||
New deprecations
|
||||
* PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH and PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH
|
||||
have been renamed, and the old names deprecated.
|
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Changes
|
||||
* A new library C file psa_crypto_client.c has been created to contain
|
||||
the PSA code needed by a PSA crypto client when the PSA crypto
|
||||
implementation is not included into the library.
|
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Features
|
||||
* The PSA crypto subsystem can now use HMAC_DRBG instead of CTR_DRBG.
|
||||
CTR_DRBG is used by default if it is available, but you can override
|
||||
this choice by setting MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE at compile time.
|
||||
Fix #3354.
|
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Features
|
||||
* In the PSA API, the policy for a MAC or AEAD algorithm can specify a
|
||||
minimum MAC or tag length thanks to the new wildcards
|
||||
PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC and
|
||||
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG.
|
@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
||||
API changes
|
||||
* Renamed the PSA Crypto API output buffer size macros to bring them in line
|
||||
with version 1.0.0 of the specification.
|
||||
|
||||
New deprecations
|
||||
* PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE, PSA_HASH_SIZE, PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE,
|
||||
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE and
|
||||
PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN have been renamed, and the old names
|
||||
deprecated.
|
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Features
|
||||
* The PSA crypto subsystem can now be configured to use less static RAM by
|
||||
tweaking the setting for the maximum amount of keys simultaneously in RAM.
|
||||
MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT sets the maximum number of volatile keys that
|
||||
can exist simultaneously. It has a sensible default if not overridden.
|
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Bugfix
|
||||
* Fix memory leak that occured when calling psa_close_key() on a
|
||||
wrapped key with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined.
|
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Bugfix
|
||||
* Ensure that calling mbedtls_rsa_free() or mbedtls_entropy_free()
|
||||
twice is safe. This happens for RSA when some Mbed TLS library functions
|
||||
fail. Such a double-free was not safe when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C was
|
||||
enabled on platforms where freeing a mutex twice is not safe.
|
||||
* Fix a resource leak in a bad-arguments case of mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()
|
||||
when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled on platforms where initializing
|
||||
a mutex allocates resources.
|
||||
|
||||
Default behavior changes
|
||||
* In mbedtls_rsa_context objects, the ver field was formerly documented
|
||||
as always 0. It is now reserved for internal purposes and may take
|
||||
different values.
|
@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
|
||||
Bugfix
|
||||
* Fix an incorrect error code if an RSA private operation glitched.
|
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @mainpage mbed TLS v2.25.0 source code documentation
|
||||
* @mainpage mbed TLS v2.26.0 source code documentation
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was
|
||||
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in
|
||||
|
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ DOXYFILE_ENCODING = UTF-8
|
||||
# identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need
|
||||
# to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces.
|
||||
|
||||
PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.25.0"
|
||||
PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.26.0"
|
||||
|
||||
# The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number.
|
||||
# This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or
|
||||
|
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
|
||||
* Major, Minor, Patchlevel
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 25
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 26
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@ -45,9 +45,9 @@
|
||||
* MMNNPP00
|
||||
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02190000
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.25.0"
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.25.0"
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021A0000
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.26.0"
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.26.0"
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -196,15 +196,15 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
|
||||
|
||||
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
|
||||
add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
|
||||
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.25.0 SOVERSION 6)
|
||||
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.26.0 SOVERSION 6)
|
||||
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
|
||||
|
||||
add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
|
||||
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.25.0 SOVERSION 1)
|
||||
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.26.0 SOVERSION 1)
|
||||
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
|
||||
|
||||
add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
|
||||
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.25.0 SOVERSION 13)
|
||||
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.26.0 SOVERSION 13)
|
||||
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
|
||||
endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
|
||||
|
||||
|
131
library/base64.c
131
library/base64.c
@ -65,6 +65,99 @@ static const unsigned char base64_dec_map[128] =
|
||||
|
||||
#define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Constant flow conditional assignment to unsigned char
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( unsigned char * dest, const unsigned char * const src,
|
||||
unsigned char condition )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
|
||||
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
|
||||
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
|
||||
#pragma warning( push )
|
||||
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFF or 0 */
|
||||
unsigned char mask = ( condition | -condition );
|
||||
mask >>= 7;
|
||||
mask = -mask;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
|
||||
#pragma warning( pop )
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
*dest = ( ( *src ) & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Constant flow conditional assignment to uint_32
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( uint32_t * dest, const uint32_t src,
|
||||
uint32_t condition )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
|
||||
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
|
||||
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
|
||||
#pragma warning( push )
|
||||
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFFFFFFFF or 0 */
|
||||
uint32_t mask = ( condition | -condition );
|
||||
mask >>= 31;
|
||||
mask = -mask;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
|
||||
#pragma warning( pop )
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
*dest = ( src & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Constant flow check for equality
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_eq( size_t in_a, size_t in_b )
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t difference = in_a ^ in_b;
|
||||
|
||||
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
|
||||
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
|
||||
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
|
||||
#pragma warning( push )
|
||||
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
difference |= -difference;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
|
||||
#pragma warning( pop )
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* cope with the varying size of size_t per platform */
|
||||
difference >>= ( sizeof( difference ) * 8 - 1 );
|
||||
|
||||
return (unsigned char) ( 1 ^ difference );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Constant flow lookup into table.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( const unsigned char * const table,
|
||||
const size_t table_size, const size_t table_index )
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
unsigned char result = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for( i = 0; i < table_size; ++i )
|
||||
{
|
||||
mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( &result, &table[i], mbedtls_base64_eq( i, table_index ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Encode a buffer into base64 format
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -105,10 +198,17 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
|
||||
C2 = *src++;
|
||||
C3 = *src++;
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F];
|
||||
*p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F];
|
||||
*p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C2 & 15) << 2) + (C3 >> 6)) & 0x3F];
|
||||
*p++ = base64_enc_map[C3 & 0x3F];
|
||||
*p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
|
||||
( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
|
||||
( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
|
||||
( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
|
||||
( C3 & 0x3F ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( i < slen )
|
||||
@ -116,11 +216,15 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
|
||||
C1 = *src++;
|
||||
C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0;
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F];
|
||||
*p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F];
|
||||
*p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
|
||||
( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
|
||||
( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) );
|
||||
|
||||
if( ( i + 1 ) < slen )
|
||||
*p++ = base64_enc_map[((C2 & 15) << 2) & 0x3F];
|
||||
*p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ),
|
||||
( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ) );
|
||||
else *p++ = '=';
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = '=';
|
||||
@ -141,6 +245,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
|
||||
size_t i, n;
|
||||
uint32_t j, x;
|
||||
unsigned char *p;
|
||||
unsigned char dec_map_lookup;
|
||||
|
||||
/* First pass: check for validity and get output length */
|
||||
for( i = n = j = 0; i < slen; i++ )
|
||||
@ -171,10 +276,12 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
|
||||
if( src[i] == '=' && ++j > 2 )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
|
||||
|
||||
if( src[i] > 127 || base64_dec_map[src[i]] == 127 )
|
||||
dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), src[i] );
|
||||
|
||||
if( src[i] > 127 || dec_map_lookup == 127 )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
|
||||
|
||||
if( base64_dec_map[src[i]] < 64 && j != 0 )
|
||||
if( dec_map_lookup < 64 && j != 0 )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER );
|
||||
|
||||
n++;
|
||||
@ -204,8 +311,10 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
|
||||
if( *src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ' )
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
j -= ( base64_dec_map[*src] == 64 );
|
||||
x = ( x << 6 ) | ( base64_dec_map[*src] & 0x3F );
|
||||
dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), *src );
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( &j, j - 1, mbedtls_base64_eq( dec_map_lookup, 64 ) );
|
||||
x = ( x << 6 ) | ( dec_map_lookup & 0x3F );
|
||||
|
||||
if( ++n == 4 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -151,6 +151,20 @@ base64_encode_hex:"0102030405060708":"AQIDBAUGBwg=":13:0
|
||||
Base64 encode hex #4
|
||||
base64_encode_hex:"01020304050607":"AQIDBAUGBw==":13:0
|
||||
|
||||
# Rotate the bytes around so that they end up at each offset modulo 3 in
|
||||
# successive test cases.
|
||||
Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #0
|
||||
base64_encode_hex:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjJCUmJygpKissLS4vMDEyMzQ1Njc4OTo7PD0+P0BBQkNERUZHSElKS0xNTk9QUVJTVFVWV1hZWltcXV5fYGFiY2RlZmdoaWprbG1ub3BxcnN0dXZ3eHl6e3x9fn+AgYKDhIWGh4iJiouMjY6PkJGSk5SVlpeYmZqbnJ2en6ChoqOkpaanqKmqq6ytrq+wsbKztLW2t7i5uru8vb6/wMHCw8TFxsfIycrLzM3Oz9DR0tPU1dbX2Nna29zd3t/g4eLj5OXm5+jp6uvs7e7v8PHy8/T19vf4+fr7/P3+/w==":345:0
|
||||
|
||||
Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #1
|
||||
base64_encode_hex:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff00":"AQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMkJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzNDU2Nzg5Ojs8PT4/QEFCQ0RFRkdISUpLTE1OT1BRUlNUVVZXWFlaW1xdXl9gYWJjZGVmZ2hpamtsbW5vcHFyc3R1dnd4eXp7fH1+f4CBgoOEhYaHiImKi4yNjo+QkZKTlJWWl5iZmpucnZ6foKGio6SlpqeoqaqrrK2ur7CxsrO0tba3uLm6u7y9vr/AwcLDxMXGx8jJysvMzc7P0NHS09TV1tfY2drb3N3e3+Dh4uPk5ebn6Onq6+zt7u/w8fLz9PX29/j5+vv8/f7/AA==":345:0
|
||||
|
||||
Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #2
|
||||
base64_encode_hex:"02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff0001":"AgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3ODk6Ozw9Pj9AQUJDREVGR0hJSktMTU5PUFFSU1RVVldYWVpbXF1eX2BhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3h5ent8fX5/gIGCg4SFhoeIiYqLjI2Oj5CRkpOUlZaXmJmam5ydnp+goaKjpKWmp6ipqqusra6vsLGys7S1tre4ubq7vL2+v8DBwsPExcbHyMnKy8zNzs/Q0dLT1NXW19jZ2tvc3d7f4OHi4+Tl5ufo6err7O3u7/Dx8vP09fb3+Pn6+/z9/v8AAQ==":345:0
|
||||
|
||||
Base64 encode all valid output characters at all offsets
|
||||
base64_encode_hex:"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":261:0
|
||||
|
||||
Base64 decode hex #1
|
||||
base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBwgJ":"010203040506070809":9:0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -166,6 +180,9 @@ base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBw==":"01020304050607":7:0
|
||||
Base64 decode hex #5 (buffer too small)
|
||||
base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBw==":"01020304050607":6:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
|
||||
|
||||
Base64 decode all valid input characters at all offsets
|
||||
base64_decode_hex:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":195:0
|
||||
|
||||
Base64 Selftest
|
||||
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
|
||||
base64_selftest:
|
||||
|
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
||||
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/base64.h"
|
||||
#include <test/constant_flow.h>
|
||||
/* END_HEADER */
|
||||
|
||||
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
|
||||
@ -13,13 +14,22 @@ void mbedtls_base64_encode( char * src_string, char * dst_string,
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char src_str[1000];
|
||||
unsigned char dst_str[1000];
|
||||
size_t len;
|
||||
size_t len, src_len;
|
||||
|
||||
memset(src_str, 0x00, 1000);
|
||||
memset(dst_str, 0x00, 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
strncpy( (char *) src_str, src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 );
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( dst_str, dst_buf_size, &len, src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ) ) == result );
|
||||
src_len = strlen( (char *) src_str );
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_CF_SECRET( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) );
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( dst_str, dst_buf_size, &len, src_str, src_len) == result );
|
||||
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) );
|
||||
|
||||
/* dest_str will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering
|
||||
CF failures by unmarking it. */
|
||||
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst_str, len );
|
||||
|
||||
if( result == 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) dst_str, dst_string ) == 0 );
|
||||
@ -57,7 +67,14 @@ void base64_encode_hex( data_t * src, char * dst, int dst_buf_size,
|
||||
|
||||
res = mbedtls_test_zero_alloc( dst_buf_size );
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_CF_SECRET( src->x, src->len );
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( res, dst_buf_size, &len, src->x, src->len ) == result );
|
||||
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src->x, src->len );
|
||||
|
||||
/* res will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering
|
||||
CF failures by unmarking it. */
|
||||
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( res, len );
|
||||
|
||||
if( result == 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT( len == strlen( dst ) );
|
||||
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
Check compiletime library version
|
||||
check_compiletime_version:"2.25.0"
|
||||
check_compiletime_version:"2.26.0"
|
||||
|
||||
Check runtime library version
|
||||
check_runtime_version:"2.25.0"
|
||||
check_runtime_version:"2.26.0"
|
||||
|
||||
Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
|
||||
check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user