Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/419' into development-restricted
Resolved simple conflicts caused by the independent addition of calls to mbedtls_zeroize with sometimes whitespace or comment differences.
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commit
41e974178f
@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ Security
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being leaked to memory after release.
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* Fix dhm_check_range() failing to detect trivial subgroups and potentially
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leaking 1 bit of the private key. Reported by prashantkspatil.
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* Make mbedtls_mpi_read_binary constant-time with respect to
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the input data. Previously, trailing zero bytes were detected
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and omitted for the sake of saving memory, but potentially
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leading to slight timing differences.
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Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group.
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* Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent
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after keypair generation.
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Features
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* Allow comments in test data files.
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@ -683,6 +683,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
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*
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* \return 0 if successful,
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* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
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*
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* \note The bytes obtained from the PRNG are interpreted
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* as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can
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* be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA.
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*/
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int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n ) {
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volatile mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
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}
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/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
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static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
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volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
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}
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@ -676,16 +677,20 @@ cleanup:
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int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
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{
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int ret;
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size_t i, j, n;
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size_t i, j;
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size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen );
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for( n = 0; n < buflen; n++ )
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if( buf[n] != 0 )
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break;
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/* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
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if( X->n != limbs )
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{
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mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
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mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen - n ) ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
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for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > n; i--, j++ )
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for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ )
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X->p[j / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i - 1]) << ((j % ciL) << 3);
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cleanup:
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@ -1887,7 +1892,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -1953,7 +1953,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
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{
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/* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
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int count = 0;
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unsigned char rnd[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
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/*
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* Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA):
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@ -1964,8 +1963,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
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*/
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do
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{
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, rnd, n_size ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( d, rnd, n_size ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
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/*
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