Merge fix for branch SSL client overread
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commit
511526720c
@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ Bugfix
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* Fix documentation and implementation missmatch for function arguments of
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mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Found by cmiatpaar. #602
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* Guarantee that P>Q at RSA key generation. Found by inestlerode. #558
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* Fix potential byte overread when verifying malformed SERVER_HELLO in
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ssl_parse_hello_verify_request() for DTLS. Found by Guido Vranken.
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Changes
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* Extended test coverage of special cases, and added new timing test suite.
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@ -1355,6 +1355,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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cookie_len = *p++;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
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if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
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( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) );
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mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
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}
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mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
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ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len );
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