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Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-crypto/development' into all_sh-mbedcrypto

Browse Source 
Merge the work on all.sh that was done on mbedtls-2.14.0 with the
changes from mbedtls-2.14.0 to the current tip of mbed-crypto/development.

There is a merge conflict in test/scripts/all.sh, which is the only
file that was modified in the all.sh work branch. I resolved it by
taking the copy from the all.sh branch and applying the changes
between mbedtls-2.14.0 and mbedtls-2.16.0. As evidenced by
`git diff mbedtls-2.14.0 d668baebc5e1709f4118aba3802d9af0ee4e4d83`,
many of the commits in
`git log mbedtls-2.14.0 d668baebc5e1709f4118aba3802d9af0ee4e4d83`
cancelled each other or were redundant with parallel commits that had
also occured via another branch included in mbedtls-2.14.0, leaving
the following differences:

* Removal of one unimportant blank line.
* The changes from db2b8db715
  "psa: Add storage implementation for files", to turn off
  PSA storage when MBEDTLS_FS_IO is turned off, which I manually
  replayed.
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2019-01-05 10:27:47 +01:00
commit 51585384b9
112 changed files with 37615 additions and 811 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

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Note: This is just a template, so feel free to use/remove the unnecessary things
<!--
************************************** WARNING **************************************
The ciarcom bot parses this header automatically. Any deviation from the
template may cause the bot to automatically correct this header or may result in a
warning message, requesting updates.
Please ensure that nothing follows the Issue request type section, all
issue details are within the Description section and no changes are made to the
template format (as detailed below).
*************************************************************************************
-->
### Description
- Type: Bug | Enhancement\Feature Request | Question
- Priority: Blocker | Major | Minor
---------------------------------------------------------------
## Bug
<!--
Required
Add detailed description of what you are reporting.
Good example: https://os.mbed.com/docs/latest/reference/workflow.html
Things to consider sharing:
- What target does this relate to?
- What toolchain (name + version) are you using?
- What tools (name + version - is it mbed-cli, online compiler or IDE) are you using?
- What is the SHA of Mbed OS (git log -n1 --oneline)?
- Steps to reproduce. (Did you publish code or a test case that exhibits the problem?)
-->
**OS**
Mbed OS|linux|windows|
**mbed TLS build:**
Version: x.x.x or git commit id
OS version: x.x.x
Configuration: please attach config.h file where possible
Compiler and options (if you used a pre-built binary, please indicate how you obtained it):
Additional environment information:
### Issue request type
**Peer device TLS stack and version**
OpenSSL|GnuTls|Chrome|NSS(Firefox)|SecureChannel (IIS/Internet Explorer/Edge)|Other
Version:
<!--
Required
Please add only one X to one of the following types. Do not fill multiple types (split the issue otherwise.)
Please note this is not a GitHub task list, indenting the boxes or changing the format to add a '.' or '*' in front
of them would change the meaning incorrectly. The only changes to be made are to add a description text under the
description heading and to add a 'x' to the correct box.
-->
[ ] Question
[ ] Enhancement
[ ] Bug
**Expected behavior**
**Actual behavior**
**Steps to reproduce**
----------------------------------------------------------------
## Enhancement\Feature Request
**Justification - why does the library need this feature?**
**Suggested enhancement**
-----------------------------------------------------------------
## Question
**Please first check for answers in the [Mbed TLS knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb), and preferably file an issue in the [Mbed TLS support forum](https://forums.mbed.com/c/mbed-tls)**

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Notes:
* Pull requests cannot be accepted until:
- The submitter has [accepted the online agreement here with a click through](https://developer.mbed.org/contributor_agreement/)
or for companies or those that do not wish to create an mbed account, a slightly different agreement can be found [here](https://www.mbed.com/en/about-mbed/contributor-license-agreements/)
- The PR follows the [mbed TLS coding standards](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards)
* This is just a template, so feel free to use/remove the unnecessary things
## Description
A few sentences describing the overall goals of the pull request's commits.
## Status
**READY/IN DEVELOPMENT/HOLD**
## Requires Backporting
When there is a bug fix, it should be backported to all maintained and supported branches.
Changes do not have to be backported if:
- This PR is a new feature\enhancement
- This PR contains changes in the API. If this is true, and there is a need for the fix to be backported, the fix should be handled differently in the legacy branch
Yes | NO
Which branch?
## Migrations
If there is any API change, what's the incentive and logic for it.
YES | NO
## Additional comments
Any additional information that could be of interest
## Todos
- [ ] Tests
- [ ] Documentation
- [ ] Changelog updated
- [ ] Backported
## Steps to test or reproduce
Outline the steps to test or reproduce the PR here.

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endif()
include_directories(include/)
include_directories(library/)
if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
find_package(ZLIB)

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mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS 2.xx.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
Changes
* Add unit tests for AES-GCM when called through mbedtls_cipher_auth_xxx()
from the cipher abstraction layer. Fixes #2198.
= mbed TLS 2.14.0 branch released 2018-11-19
Security

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install: no_test
mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/include/mbedtls
cp -rp include/mbedtls $(DESTDIR)/include
mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/include/psa
cp -rp include/psa $(DESTDIR)/include
mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/lib
cp -RP library/libmbedtls.* $(DESTDIR)/lib

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README for Mbed TLS
===================
# Mbed Crypto library
Configuration
-------------
The Mbed cryptography library is a reference implementation of the cryptography interface of the Arm Platform Security Architecture (PSA). This is a preview release of Mbed Crypto, provided for evaluation purposes only.
Mbed TLS should build out of the box on most systems. Some platform specific options are available in the fully documented configuration file `include/mbedtls/config.h`, which is also the place where features can be selected. This file can be edited manually, or in a more programmatic way using the Perl script `scripts/config.pl` (use `--help` for usage instructions).
Mbed Crypto is distributed under the Apache License, version 2.0. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for the full text of the license.
Compiler options can be set using conventional environment variables such as `CC` and `CFLAGS` when using the Make and CMake build system (see below).
## PSA cryptography API
Compiling
---------
Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a holistic set of threat models, security analyses, hardware and firmware architecture specifications, and an open source firmware reference implementation. PSA provides a recipe, based on industry best practice, that allows security to be consistently designed in, at both a hardware and firmware level.
There are currently three active build systems used within Mbed TLS releases:
The PSA cryptography API provides access to a set of cryptographic primitives. It has a dual purpose. First, it can be used in a PSA-compliant platform to build services, such as secure boot, secure storage and secure communication. Second, it can also be used independently of other PSA components on any platform.
- GNU Make
- CMake
- Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 or later)
The design goals of the PSA cryptography API include:
The main systems used for development are CMake and GNU Make. Those systems are always complete and up-to-date. The others should reflect all changes present in the CMake and Make build system, although features may not be ported there automatically.
* The API distinguishes caller memory from internal memory, which allows the library to be implemented in an isolated space for additional security. Library calls can be implemented as direct function calls if isolation is not desired, and as remote procedure calls if isolation is desired.
* The structure of internal data is hidden to the application, which allows substituting alternative implementations at build time or run time, for example, in order to take advantage of hardware accelerators.
* All access to the keys happens through handles, which allows support for external cryptoprocessors that is transparent to applications.
* The interface to algorithms is generic, favoring algorithm agility.
* The interface is designed to be easy to use and hard to accidentally misuse.
The Make and CMake build systems create three libraries: libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, and libmbedtls. Note that libmbedtls depends on libmbedx509 and libmbedcrypto, and libmbedx509 depends on libmbedcrypto. As a result, some linkers will expect flags to be in a specific order, for example the GNU linker wants `-lmbedtls -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto`. Also, when loading shared libraries using dlopen(), you'll need to load libmbedcrypto first, then libmbedx509, before you can load libmbedtls.
## Mbed Crypto implementation
### Make
Mbed Crypto is a reference implementation of the PSA cryptography API. It is written in portable C.
We require GNU Make. To build the library and the sample programs, GNU Make and a C compiler are sufficient. Some of the more advanced build targets require some Unix/Linux tools.
## Documentation
We intentionally only use a minimum of functionality in the makefiles in order to keep them as simple and independent of different toolchains as possible, to allow users to more easily move between different platforms. Users who need more features are recommended to use CMake.
Since the Mbed Crypto library is a reference implementation of the PSA cryptography API, the library's API documentation is the PSA cryptography API specification. The PSA cryptography API specification consists of the following documents:
In order to build from the source code using GNU Make, just enter at the command line:
* The [PSA Cryptography API overview](docs/PSA_Crypto_API_Overview.pdf).
* The [PSA Cryptography API detailed function reference](docs/PSA_Crypto_API_Reference.pdf), which you can also browse in [HTML format](docs/html/modules.html).
make
## Compiling
In order to run the tests, enter:
You need the following tools to build the library with the provided makefiles:
make check
* GNU Make or a build tool that CMake supports.
* A C99 toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver).
* Python 2 or Python 3 (either will work) to generate the test code.
* Perl to run the tests.
The tests need Perl to be built and run. If you don't have Perl installed, you can skip building the tests with:
If you have a C compiler, such as GCC or Clang, just run `make` in the top-level directory to build the library, a set of unit tests and some sample programs.
make no_test
To select a different compiler, set the `CC` variable to the name or path of the compiler and linker (default: `cc`), and set `AR` to a compatible archiver (default: `ar`). For example:
```
make CC=arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc AR=arm-linux-gnueabi-ar
```
The provided makefiles pass options to the compiler that assume a GCC-like command-line syntax. To use a different compiler, you may need to pass different values for `CFLAGS`, `WARNINGS_CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS`.
You'll still be able to run a much smaller set of tests with:
To run the unit tests on the host machine, run `make test` from the top-level directory. If you are cross-compiling, copy the test executable from the `tests` directory to the target machine.
programs/test/selftest
### Compiling as a subproject
In order to build for a Windows platform, you should use `WINDOWS_BUILD=1` if the target is Windows but the build environment is Unix-like (for instance when cross-compiling, or compiling from an MSYS shell), and `WINDOWS=1` if the build environment is a Windows shell (for instance using mingw32-make) (in that case some targets will not be available).
Mbed Crypto supports being built as a subproject of Mbed TLS. Mbed TLS can use Mbed Crypto for its cryptography implementation by using Mbed Crypto as a subproject.
Setting the variable `SHARED` in your environment will build shared libraries in addition to the static libraries. Setting `DEBUG` gives you a debug build. You can override `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` by setting them in your environment or on the make command line; compiler warning options may be overridden separately using `WARNING_CFLAGS`. Some directory-specific options (for example, `-I` directives) are still preserved.
From the Mbed TLS project repository, CMake can be invoked as follows to build Mbed TLS using Mbed Crypto's `libmbedcrypto`.
```
mkdir cmake
cd cmake
cmake .. -DUSE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1
make -j
make test
```
Please note that setting `CFLAGS` overrides its default value of `-O2` and setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` overrides its default value (starting with `-Wall -W`), so if you just want to add some warning options to the default ones, you can do so by setting `CFLAGS=-O2 -Werror` for example. Setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` is useful when you want to get rid of its default content (for example because your compiler doesn't accept `-Wall` as an option). Directory-specific options cannot be overriden from the command line.
When building Mbed Crypto as a subproject of Mbed TLS, the Mbed TLS
configuration file (config.h) is used, and not the Mbed Crypto configuration
file.
Depending on your platform, you might run into some issues. Please check the Makefiles in `library/`, `programs/` and `tests/` for options to manually add or remove for specific platforms. You can also check [the Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb) for articles on your platform or issue.
## Example programs
In case you find that you need to do something else as well, please let us know what, so we can add it to the [Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb).
The `programs/` subdirectory contains sample programs that use the library. Please note that the goal of these sample programs is to demonstrate specific features of the library, and the code may need to be adapted to build a real-world application.
### CMake
## Upcoming features
In order to build the source using CMake in a separate directory (recommended), just enter at the command line:
Future releases of this library will include:
mkdir /path/to/build_dir && cd /path/to/build_dir
cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source
make
* A driver programming interface, which makes it possible to use hardware accelerators instead of the default software implementation for chosen algorithms.
* Support for external keys to be stored and manipulated exclusively in a separate cryptoprocessor.
* A configuration mechanism to compile only the algorithms you need for your application.
* A wider set of cryptographic algorithms.
In order to run the tests, enter:
make test
The test suites need Perl to be built. If you don't have Perl installed, you'll want to disable the test suites with:
cmake -DENABLE_TESTING=Off /path/to/mbedtls_source
If you disabled the test suites, but kept the programs enabled, you can still run a much smaller set of tests with:
programs/test/selftest
To configure CMake for building shared libraries, use:
cmake -DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=On /path/to/mbedtls_source
There are many different build modes available within the CMake buildsystem. Most of them are available for gcc and clang, though some are compiler-specific:
- `Release`. This generates the default code without any unnecessary information in the binary files.
- `Debug`. This generates debug information and disables optimization of the code.
- `Coverage`. This generates code coverage information in addition to debug information.
- `ASan`. This instruments the code with AddressSanitizer to check for memory errors. (This includes LeakSanitizer, with recent version of gcc and clang.) (With recent version of clang, this mode also instruments the code with UndefinedSanitizer to check for undefined behaviour.)
- `ASanDbg`. Same as ASan but slower, with debug information and better stack traces.
- `MemSan`. This instruments the code with MemorySanitizer to check for uninitialised memory reads. Experimental, needs recent clang on Linux/x86\_64.
- `MemSanDbg`. Same as MemSan but slower, with debug information, better stack traces and origin tracking.
- `Check`. This activates the compiler warnings that depend on optimization and treats all warnings as errors.
Switching build modes in CMake is simple. For debug mode, enter at the command line:
cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug /path/to/mbedtls_source
To list other available CMake options, use:
cmake -LH
Note that, with CMake, you can't adjust the compiler or its flags after the
initial invocation of cmake. This means that `CC=your_cc make` and `make
CC=your_cc` will *not* work (similarly with `CFLAGS` and other variables).
These variables need to be adjusted when invoking cmake for the first time,
for example:
CC=your_cc cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source
If you already invoked cmake and want to change those settings, you need to
remove the build directory and create it again.
Note that it is possible to build in-place; this will however overwrite the
provided Makefiles (see `scripts/tmp_ignore_makefiles.sh` if you want to
prevent `git status` from showing them as modified). In order to do so, from
the Mbed TLS source directory, use:
cmake .
make
If you want to change `CC` or `CFLAGS` afterwards, you will need to remove the
CMake cache. This can be done with the following command using GNU find:
find . -iname '*cmake*' -not -name CMakeLists.txt -exec rm -rf {} +
You can now make the desired change:
CC=your_cc cmake .
make
Regarding variables, also note that if you set CFLAGS when invoking cmake,
your value of CFLAGS doesn't override the content provided by cmake (depending
on the build mode as seen above), it's merely prepended to it.
### Microsoft Visual Studio
The build files for Microsoft Visual Studio are generated for Visual Studio 2010.
The solution file `mbedTLS.sln` contains all the basic projects needed to build the library and all the programs. The files in tests are not generated and compiled, as these need a perl environment as well. However, the selftest program in `programs/test/` is still available.
Example programs
----------------
We've included example programs for a lot of different features and uses in [`programs/`](programs/README.md). Most programs only focus on a single feature or usage scenario, so keep that in mind when copying parts of the code.
Tests
-----
Mbed TLS includes an elaborate test suite in `tests/` that initially requires Perl to generate the tests files (e.g. `test\_suite\_mpi.c`). These files are generated from a `function file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.function`) and a `data file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.data`). The `function file` contains the test functions. The `data file` contains the test cases, specified as parameters that will be passed to the test function.
For machines with a Unix shell and OpenSSL (and optionally GnuTLS) installed, additional test scripts are available:
- `tests/ssl-opt.sh` runs integration tests for various TLS options (renegotiation, resumption, etc.) and tests interoperability of these options with other implementations.
- `tests/compat.sh` tests interoperability of every ciphersuite with other implementations.
- `tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl` test builds in various reduced configurations.
- `tests/scripts/key-exchanges.pl` test builds in configurations with a single key exchange enabled
- `tests/scripts/all.sh` runs a combination of the above tests, plus some more, with various build options (such as ASan, full `config.h`, etc).
Configurations
--------------
We provide some non-standard configurations focused on specific use cases in the `configs/` directory. You can read more about those in `configs/README.txt`
Porting Mbed TLS
----------------
Mbed TLS can be ported to many different architectures, OS's and platforms. Before starting a port, you may find the following Knowledge Base articles useful:
- [Porting Mbed TLS to a new environment or OS](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS)
- [What external dependencies does Mbed TLS rely on?](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/what-external-dependencies-does-mbedtls-rely-on)
- [How do I configure Mbed TLS](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/compiling-and-building/how-do-i-configure-mbedtls)
Contributing
------------
We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. There are some requirements we need to fulfill in order to be able to integrate contributions:
- All contributions, whether large or small require a Contributor's License Agreement (CLA) to be accepted. This is because source code can possibly fall under copyright law and we need your consent to share in the ownership of the copyright.
- We would ask that contributions conform to [our coding standards](https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards), and that contributions should be fully tested before submission.
- As with any open source project, contributions will be reviewed by the project team and community and may need some modifications to be accepted.
To accept the Contributor’s Licence Agreement (CLA), individual contributors can do this by creating an Mbed account and [accepting the online agreement here with a click through](https://os.mbed.com/contributor_agreement/). Alternatively, for contributions from corporations, or those that do not wish to create an Mbed account, a slightly different agreement can be found [here](https://www.mbed.com/en/about-mbed/contributor-license-agreements/). This agreement should be signed and returned to Arm as described in the instructions given.
### Making a Contribution
1. [Check for open issues](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues) or [start a discussion](https://forums.mbed.com/c/mbed-tls) around a feature idea or a bug.
2. Fork the [Mbed TLS repository on GitHub](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls) to start making your changes. As a general rule, you should use the "development" branch as a basis.
3. Write a test which shows that the bug was fixed or that the feature works as expected.
4. Send a pull request and bug us until it gets merged and published. Contributions may need some modifications, so work with us to get your change accepted. We will include your name in the ChangeLog :)
## Feedback welcome
Arm welcomes feedback on the design of the API. If you think something could be improved, please open an issue on our Github repository. Alternatively, if you prefer to provide your feedback privately, please email us at [`mbed-crypto@arm.com`](mailto:mbed-crypto@arm.com). All feedback received by email is treated confidentially.

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## Getting started with Mbed Crypto
### What is Mbed Crypto?
Mbed Crypto is an open source cryptographic library that supports a wide range of cryptographic operations, including:
* Key management
* Hashing
* Symmetric cryptography
* Asymmetric cryptography
* Message authentication (MAC)
* Key generation and derivation
* Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
The Mbed Crypto library is a reference implementation of the cryptography interface of the Arm Platform Security Architecture (PSA). It is written in portable C.
The Mbed Crypto library is distributed under the Apache License, version 2.0.
#### Platform Security Architecture (PSA)
Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a holistic set of threat models,
security analyses, hardware and firmware architecture specifications, and an open source firmware reference implementation. PSA provides a recipe, based on industry best practice, that allows security to be consistently designed in, at both a hardware and firmware level. Part of the API provided by PSA is the cryptography interface, which provides access to a set of primitives.
### Using Mbed Crypto
* [Getting the Mbed Crypto library](#getting-the-mbed-crypto-library)
* [Building the Mbed Crypto library](#building-the-mbed-crypto-library)
* [Using the Mbed Crypto library](#using-the-mbed-crypto-library)
* [Importing a key](#importing-a-key)
* [Signing a message using RSA](#signing-a-message-using-RSA)
* [Encrypting or decrypting using symmetric ciphers](#encrypting-or-decrypting-using-symmetric-ciphers)
* [Hashing a message](#hashing-a-message)
* [Deriving a new key from an existing key](#deriving-a-new-key-from-an-existing-key)
* [Generating a random value](#generating-a-random-value)
* [Authenticating and encrypting or decrypting a message](#authenticating-and-encrypting-or-decrypting-a-message)
* [Generating and exporting keys](#generating-and-exporting-keys)
* [More about the Mbed Crypto library](#more-about-the-mbed-crypto-library)
### Getting the Mbed Crypto library
Mbed Crypto releases are available in the [public Github repository]( https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto).
### Building the Mbed Crypto library
You need the following tools to build the library with the provided makefiles:
* GNU Make.
* A C toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver).
* Python 2 or Python 3 (either works) to generate the test code.
* Perl to run the tests.
If you have a C compiler such as GCC or Clang, just run `make` in the top-level directory to build the library, a set of unit tests and some sample programs.
To select a different compiler, set the `CC` variable to name or path of the compiler and linker (default: `cc`) and set `AR` to a compatible archiver (default: `ar`), such as:
```
make CC=arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc AR=arm-linux-gnueabi-ar
```
The provided makefiles pass options to the compiler that assume a GCC-like command line syntax. To use a different compiler, you may need to pass different values for `CFLAGS`, `WARNINGS_CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS`.
To run the unit tests on the host machine, run `make test` from the top-level directory. If you are cross-compiling, copy the test executable from the `tests` directory to the target machine.
### Using the Mbed Crypto library
To use the Mbed Crypto APIs, call `psa_crypto_init()` before calling any other API. This initializes the library.
### Importing a key
To use a key for cryptography operations in Mbed Crypto, you need to first import it into a key slot. Each slot can store only one key at a time. The slot where the key is stored must be unoccupied, and valid for a key of the chosen type.
Prerequisites to importing keys:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
Importing a key and checking key information:
1. Import a key pair into key slot `1`.
1. Test the information stored in this slot:
```C
int key_slot = 1;
uint8_t *data = "KEYPAIR_KEY_DATA";
size_t data_size;
psa_key_type_t type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY;
size_t got_bits;
psa_key_type_t got_type;
size_t expected_bits = data_size;
psa_key_type_t type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA;
size_t export_size = data_size;
psa_crypto_init();
/* Import the key */
status = psa_import_key(key_slot, type, data, data_size);
/* Test the key information */
status = psa_get_key_information(slot, &got_type, &got_bits);
/* Destroy the key */
psa_destroy_key(key_slot);
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
```
### Signing a message using RSA
Mbed Crypto provides support for encrypting, decrypting, signing and verifying messages using public key signature algorithms (such as RSA or ECDSA).
Prerequisites to working with the asymmetric cipher API:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
* Configure the key policy accordingly:
* `PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN` to allow signing.
* `PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY` to allow signature verification.
* Have a valid key in the key slot.
To sign a given message `payload` using RSA:
1. Set the key policy of the chosen key slot by calling `psa_key_policy_set_usage()` with the `PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN` parameter and the algorithm `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW`.
This allows the key in the key slot to be used for RSA signing.
1. Import the key into the key slot by calling `psa_import_key()`. You can use an already imported key instead of importing a new one.
1. Call `psa_asymmetric_sign()` and get the output buffer that contains the signature:
```C
psa_status_t status;
int key_slot = 1;
unsigned char key[] = "RSA_KEY";
unsigned char payload[] = "ASYMMETRIC_INPUT_FOR_SIGN";
psa_key_policy_t policy;
unsigned char signature[PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE] = {0};
size_t signature_length;
status = psa_crypto_init();
/* Import the key */
psa_key_policy_init(&policy);
psa_key_policy_set_usage(&policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN,
PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW);
status = psa_set_key_policy(key_slot, &policy);
status = psa_import_key(key_slot, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR,
key, sizeof(key));
/* Sing message using the key */
status = psa_asymmetric_sign(key_slot, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW,
payload, sizeof(payload),
signature, sizeof(signature),
&signature_length);
/* Destroy the key */
psa_destroy_key(key_slot);
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
```
### Encrypting or decrypting using symmetric ciphers
Mbed Crypto provides support for encrypting and decrypting messages using various symmetric cipher algorithms (both block and stream ciphers).
Prerequisites to working with the symmetric cipher API:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
* Configure the key policy accordingly (`PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT` to allow encryption or `PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT` to allow decryption).
* Have a valid key in the key slot.
Encrypting a message with a symmetric cipher:
1. Allocate an operation (`psa_cipher_operation_t`) structure to pass to the cipher functions.
1. Call `psa_cipher_encrypt_setup` to initialize the operation structure and specify the algorithm and the key to be used.
1. Call either `psa_cipher_generate_iv` or `psa_cipher_set_iv` to generate or set the initialization vector (IV). We recommended `psa_cipher_generate_iv`, unless you require a specific IV value.
1. Call `psa_cipher_update` one or more times, passing either the whole or only a fragment of the message each time.
1. Call `psa_cipher_finish` to end the operation and output the encrypted message.
Encrypting random data using an AES key in cipher block chain (CBC) mode with no padding (assuming all prerequisites have been fulfilled):
```c
psa_key_slot_t key_slot = 1;
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING;
psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
size_t block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
unsigned char input[block_size];
unsigned char iv[block_size];
size_t iv_len;
unsigned char output[block_size];
size_t output_len;
/* generate some random data to be encrypted */
psa_generate_random(input, sizeof(input));
/* encrypt the key */
psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&operation, key_slot, alg);
psa_cipher_generate_iv(&operation, iv, sizeof(iv), &iv_len);
psa_cipher_update(&operation, input, sizeof(input),
output, sizeof(output),
&output_len);
psa_cipher_finish(&operation,
output + output_len, sizeof(output) - output_len,
&output_len);
/* Clean up cipher operation context */
psa_cipher_abort(&operation);
```
Decrypting a message with a symmetric cipher:
1. Allocate an operation (`psa_cipher_operation_t`) structure to pass to the cipher functions.
1. Call `psa_cipher_decrypt_setup` to initialize the operation structure and to specify the algorithm and the key to be used.
1. Call `psa_cipher_set_iv` with the IV for the decryption.
1. Call `psa_cipher_update` one or more times passing either the whole or only a fragment of the message each time.
1. Call `psa_cipher_finish` to end the operation and output the decrypted message.
Decrypting encrypted data using an AES key in CBC mode with no padding
(assuming all prerequisites have been fulfilled):
```c
psa_key_slot_t key_slot = 1;
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING;
psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
size_t block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
unsigned char input[block_size];
unsigned char iv[block_size];
size_t iv_len;
unsigned char output[block_size];
size_t output_len;
/* setup input data */
fetch_iv(iv, sizeof(iv)); /* fetch the IV used when the data was encrypted */
fetch_input(input, sizeof(input)); /* fetch the data to be decrypted */
/* encrypt the encrypted data */
psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&operation, key_slot, alg);
psa_cipher_set_iv(&operation, iv, sizeof(iv));
psa_cipher_update(&operation, input, sizeof(input),
output, sizeof(output),
&output_len);
psa_cipher_finish(&operation,
output + output_len, sizeof(output) - output_len,
&output_len);
/* Clean up cipher operation context */
psa_cipher_abort(&operation);
```
#### Handling cipher operation contexts
Once you've initialized the operation structure with a successful call to `psa_cipher_encrypt_setup` or `psa_cipher_decrypt_setup`, you can terminate the operation at any time by calling `psa_cipher_abort`.
The call to `psa_cipher_abort` frees any resources associated with the operation (except for the operation structure itself). An implicit call to `psa_cipher_abort` occurs when any of these conditions occur:
* A call to `psa_cipher_generate_iv`, `psa_cipher_set_iv` or `psa_cipher_update` has failed (returning any status other than `PSA_SUCCESS`).
* Either a successful or failed call to `psa_cipher_finish`.
Once `psa_cipher_abort` has been called (either implicitly by the implementation or explicitly by the user), the operation structure is invalidated and may not be reused for the same operation. However, the operation structure may be reused for a different operation by calling either `psa_cipher_encrypt_setup` or `psa_cipher_decrypt_setup` again.
For an operation that has been initialized successfully (by a successful call to `psa_cipher_encrypt_setup` or `psa_cipher_decrypt_setup`) it is imperative that at some time `psa_cipher_abort` is called.
Multiple sequential calls to `psa_cipher_abort` on an operation that has already been terminated (either implicitly or explicitly) are safe and have no effect.
### Hashing a message
Mbed Crypto lets you compute and verify hashes using various hashing algorithms.
The current implementation supports the following hash algorithms: `MD2`, `MD4`, `MD5`, `RIPEMD160`, `SHA-1`, `SHA-224`, `SHA-256`, `SHA-384`, and `SHA-512`.
Prerequisites to working with the hash APIs:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
To calculate a hash:
1. Allocate an operation structure (`psa_hash_operation_t`) to pass to the hash functions.
1. Call `psa_hash_setup` to initialize the operation structure and specify the hash algorithm.
1. Call `psa_hash_update` one or more times, passing either the whole or only a fragment of the message each time.
1. Call `psa_hash_finish` to calculate the hash, or `psa_hash_verify` to compare the computed hash with an expected hash value.
Calculate the `SHA-256` hash of a message:
```c
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
psa_hash_operation_t operation;
unsigned char input[] = { 'a', 'b', 'c' };
unsigned char actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
size_t actual_hash_len;
/* Compute hash of message */
psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg);
psa_hash_update(&operation, input, sizeof(input));
psa_hash_finish(&operation, actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), &actual_hash_len);
/* Clean up hash operation context */
psa_hash_abort(&operation);
```
Verify the `SHA-256` hash of a message:
```c
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
psa_hash_operation_t operation;
unsigned char input[] = { 'a', 'b', 'c' };
unsigned char expected_hash[] = {
0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde,
0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c,
0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad
};
size_t expected_hash_len = PSA_HASH_SIZE(alg);
/* Verify message hash */
psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg);
psa_hash_update(&operation, input, sizeof(input));
psa_hash_verify(&operation, expected_hash, expected_hash_len);
```
The API provides the macro `PSA_HASH_SIZE`, which returns the expected hash length (in bytes) for the specified algorithm.
#### Handling hash operation contexts
Once the operation structure has been successfully initialized by a successful call to `psa_hash_setup`, it's possible to terminate the operation at any time by calling `psa_hash_abort`. The call to `psa_hash_abort` frees any resources associated with the operation (except for the operation structure itself).
An implicit call to `psa_hash_abort` occurs when any of these conditions occur:
1. A call to `psa_hash_update` has failed (returning any status other than `PSA_SUCCESS`).
1. Either a successful or failed call to `psa_hash_finish`.
1. Either a successful or failed call to `psa_hash_verify`.
Once `psa_hash_abort` has been called (either implicitly by the implementation or explicitly by the user), the operation structure is invalidated and may not be reused for the same operation. However, the operation structure may be reused for a different operation by calling `psa_hash_setup` again.
For an operation that has been initialized successfully (by a successful call to `psa_hash_setup`) it is imperative that at some time `psa_hash_abort` is called.
Multiple sequential calls to `psa_hash_abort` on an operation that has already been terminated (either implicitly or explicitly) is safe and has no effect.
### Generating a random value
Mbed Crypto can generate random data.
Prerequisites to random generation:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
Generate a random, ten-byte piece of data:
1. Generate random bytes by calling `psa_generate_random()`:
```C
psa_status_t status;
uint8_t random[10] = { 0 };
psa_crypto_init();
status = psa_generate_random(random, sizeof(random));
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
```
### Deriving a new key from an existing key
Mbed Crypto provides a key derivation API that lets you derive new keys from existing ones. Key derivation is based upon the generator abstraction. A generator must first be initialized and set up (provided with a key and optionally other data) and then derived data can be read from it either to a buffer or directly imported into a key slot.
Prerequisites to working with the key derivation APIs:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
* Configure the key policy for the key used for derivation (`PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE`)
* The key type must be `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE`.
Deriving a new AES-CTR 128-bit encryption key into a given key slot using HKDF with a given key, salt and label:
1. Set the key policy for key derivation by calling `psa_key_policy_set_usage()` with `PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE` parameter, and the algorithm `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)`.
1. Import the key into the key slot by calling `psa_import_key()`. You can skip this step and the previous one if the key has already been imported into a known key slot.
1. Set up the generator using the `psa_key_derivation` function providing a key slot containing a key that can be used for key derivation and a salt and label (Note: salt and label are optional).
1. Initiate a key policy to for the derived key by calling `psa_key_policy_set_usage()` with `PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT` parameter and the algorithm `PSA_ALG_CTR`.
1. Set the key policy to the derived key slot.
1. Import a key from generator into the desired key slot using (`psa_generator_import_key`).
1. Clean up generator.
At this point the derived key slot holds a new 128-bit AES-CTR encryption key derived from the key, salt and label provided:
```C
psa_key_slot_t base_key = 1;
psa_key_slot_t derived_key = 2;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
unsigned char key[] = {
0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
0x0b };
unsigned char salt[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c };
unsigned char label[] = { 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6,
0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9 };
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
psa_crypto_generator_t generator = PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT;
size_t derived_bits = 128;
size_t capacity = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(derived_bits);
status = psa_crypto_init();
/* Import a key for use in key derivation, if such a key has already been imported you can skip this part */
psa_key_policy_init(&policy);
psa_key_policy_set_usage(&policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg);
status = psa_set_key_policy(base_key, &policy);
status = psa_import_key(base_key, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, key, sizeof(key));
/* Derive a key into a key slot*/
status = psa_key_derivation(&generator, base_key, alg, salt, sizeof(salt),
label, sizeof(label), capacity);
psa_key_policy_set_usage(&policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, PSA_ALG_CTR);
psa_set_key_policy(derived_key, &policy);
psa_generator_import_key(derived_key, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, derived_bits, &generator);
/* Clean up generator and key */
psa_generator_abort(&generator);
/* as part of clean up you may want to clean up the keys used by calling:
* psa_destroy_key( base_key ); or psa_destroy_key( derived_key ); */
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
```
### Authenticating and encrypting or decrypting a message
Mbed Crypto provides a simple way for authenticate and encrypt with associated data (AEAD) supporting `PSA_ALG_CCM` algorithm.
Prerequisites to working with the AEAD ciphers APIs:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
* The key policy for the key used for derivation must be configured accordingly (`PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT` or `PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT`).
To authenticate and encrypt a message:
```C
int slot = 1;
psa_status_t status;
unsigned char key[] = { 0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3, 0xC4, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0xC7,
0xC8, 0xC9, 0xCA, 0xCB, 0xCC, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xCF };
unsigned char nonce[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B };
unsigned char additional_data[] = { 0xEC, 0x46, 0xBB, 0x63, 0xB0, 0x25, 0x20,
0xC3, 0x3C, 0x49, 0xFD, 0x70 };
unsigned char input_data[] = { 0xB9, 0x6B, 0x49, 0xE2, 0x1D, 0x62, 0x17, 0x41,
0x63, 0x28, 0x75, 0xDB, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x92, 0x43,
0xD2, 0xD7, 0xC2 };
unsigned char *output_data = NULL;
size_t output_size = 0;
size_t output_length = 0;
size_t tag_length = 16;
output_size = sizeof(input_data) + tag_length;
output_data = malloc(output_size);
status = psa_crypto_init();
psa_key_policy_init(&policy);
psa_key_policy_set_usage(&policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, PSA_ALG_CCM);
status = psa_set_key_policy(slot, &policy);
status = psa_import_key(slot, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key, sizeof(key));
status = psa_aead_encrypt(slot, PSA_ALG_CCM,
nonce, sizeof(nonce),
additional_data, sizeof(additional_data),
input_data, sizeof(input_data),
output_data, output_size,
&output_length);
psa_destroy_key(slot);
mbedtls_free(output_data);
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
```
To authenticate and decrypt a message:
```C
int slot = 1;
psa_status_t status;
unsigned char key[] = {
0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3, 0xC4, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0xC7,
0xC8, 0xC9, 0xCA, 0xCB, 0xCC, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xCF
};
unsigned char nonce[] = { 0xEC, 0x46, 0xBB, 0x63, 0xB0, 0x25, 0x20, 0xC3,
0x3C, 0x49, 0xFD, 0x70
};
unsigned char additional_data[] = { 0xEC, 0x46, 0xBB, 0x63, 0xB0, 0x25, 0x20,
0xC3, 0x3C, 0x49, 0xFD, 0x70
};
unsigned char input_data[] = { 0xB9, 0x6B, 0x49, 0xE2, 0x1D, 0x62, 0x17, 0x41,
0x63, 0x28, 0x75, 0xDB, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x92, 0x43,
0xD2, 0xD7, 0xC2
};
unsigned char *output_data = NULL;
size_t output_size = 0;
size_t output_length = 0;
output_size = sizeof(input_data);
output_data = malloc(output_size);
status = psa_crypto_init();
psa_key_policy_init(&policy);
psa_key_policy_set_usage(&policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, PSA_ALG_CCM);
status = psa_set_key_policy(slot, &policy);
status = psa_import_key(slot, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key, sizeof(key));
status = psa_aead_decrypt(slot, PSA_ALG_CCM,
nonce, sizeof(nonce),
additional_data, sizeof(additional_data),
input_data, sizeof(input_data),
output_data, output_size,
&output_length);
psa_destroy_key(slot);
mbedtls_free(output_data);
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
```
### Generating and exporting keys
Mbed Crypto provides a simple way to generate a key or key pair.
Prerequisites to using key generation and export APIs:
* Initialize the library with a successful call to `psa_crypto_init`.
Generate a piece of random 128-bit AES data:
1. Set the key policy for key generation by calling `psa_key_policy_set_usage()` with the `PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT` parameter and the algorithm `PSA_ALG_GCM`.
1. Generate a random AES key by calling `psa_generate_key()`.
1. Export the generated key by calling `psa_export_key()`:
```C
int slot = 1;
size_t bits = 128;
size_t exported_size = bits;
size_t exported_length = 0;
uint8_t *exported = malloc(exported_size);
psa_crypto_init();
psa_key_policy_init(&policy);
psa_key_policy_set_usage(&policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, PSA_ALG_GCM);
psa_set_key_policy(slot, &policy);
/* Generate a key */
psa_generate_key(slot, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, bits, NULL, 0);
psa_export_key(slot, exported, exported_size, &exported_length)
psa_destroy_key(slot);
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free();
```
### More about the Mbed Crypto library
More information on [Mbed Crypto](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/).
More information on [PSA Crypto](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/blob/development/docs/PSA_Crypto_API_Overview.pdf).

5
include/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -3,11 +3,16 @@ option(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS "Install mbed TLS headers." ON)
if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
file(GLOB headers "mbedtls/*.h")
file(GLOB psa_headers "psa/*.h")
install(FILES ${headers}
DESTINATION include/mbedtls
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)
install(FILES ${psa_headers}
DESTINATION include/psa
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)
endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
# Make config.h available in an out-of-source build. ssl-opt.sh requires it.

36
include/mbedtls/check_config.h
View File

@ -496,6 +496,38 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE cannot be defined simultaneously"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C)
#error "Only one of MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C can be defined"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C) ) )
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) )
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C) && \
! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
@ -638,6 +670,10 @@
#endif
#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) && !defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif

219
include/mbedtls/cipher.h
View File

@ -179,16 +179,16 @@ typedef enum {
/** Supported cipher modes. */
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */
} mbedtls_cipher_mode_t;
@ -321,14 +321,32 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t
/** CMAC-specific context. */
mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed
* by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation
* of the PSA Crypto API.
* This is unset if the cipher context was established through
* mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through
* mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa().
*/
unsigned char psa_enabled;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
} mbedtls_cipher_context_t;
/**
* \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported by the generic
* cipher module.
* \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported
* by the generic cipher module.
*
* \return A statically-allocated array of ciphers. The last entry
* is zero.
* For any cipher identifier in the returned list, you can
* obtain the corresponding generic cipher information structure
* via mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), which can then be used
* to prepare a cipher context via mbedtls_cipher_setup().
*
*
* \return A statically-allocated array of cipher identifiers
* of type cipher_type_t. The last entry is zero.
*/
const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void );
@ -388,9 +406,8 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
/**
* \brief This function initializes and fills the cipher-context
* structure with the appropriate values. It also clears
* the structure.
* \brief This function initializes a cipher context for
* use with the given cipher primitive.
*
* \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be NULL.
* \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
@ -405,7 +422,35 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
* In future versions, the caller will be required to call
* mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info );
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief This function initializes a cipher context for
* PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive.
*
* \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA.
*
* \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL.
* \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
* \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the
* authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide
* the same tag length.
* For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the
* cipher-specific context fails.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
size_t taglen );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/**
* \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher.
@ -415,7 +460,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_in
* \return The size of the blocks of the cipher.
* \return 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized.
*/
static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return 0;
@ -432,7 +478,8 @@ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( const mbedtls_cipher_c
* \return The mode of operation.
* \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized.
*/
static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE;
@ -450,7 +497,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( const mbedtl
* \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce.
* \return The actual size if an IV has been set.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return 0;
@ -469,7 +517,8 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ct
* \return The type of the cipher.
* \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized.
*/
static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE;
@ -486,7 +535,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( const mbedtls_ciphe
* \return The name of the cipher.
* \return NULL if \p ctx has not been not initialized.
*/
static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return 0;
@ -503,7 +553,8 @@ static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( const mbedtls_cipher_context_
* \return #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if ctx \p has not been
* initialized.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE;
@ -519,7 +570,8 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t
* \return The type of operation: #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT.
* \return #MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized.
*/
static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE;
@ -543,8 +595,10 @@ static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_ci
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_operation_t operation );
int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
int key_bitlen,
const mbedtls_operation_t operation );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
/**
@ -562,7 +616,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *k
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the cipher mode
* does not support padding.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode );
int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
/**
@ -582,7 +637,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_ciph
* parameter-verification failure.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len );
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len );
/**
* \brief This function resets the cipher state.
@ -597,16 +652,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
/**
* \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers.
* Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
* Must be called exactly once, after mbedtls_cipher_reset().
* \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers.
* Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
* Must be called exactly once, after mbedtls_cipher_reset().
*
* \param ctx The generic cipher context.
* \param ad The additional data to use.
* \param ad_len the Length of \p ad.
* \param ctx The generic cipher context.
* \param ad The additional data to use.
* \param ad_len the Length of \p ad.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return A specific error code on failure.
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return A specific error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len );
@ -643,8 +698,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
* unsupported mode for a cipher.
* \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen );
int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen, unsigned char *output,
size_t *olen );
/**
* \brief The generic cipher finalization function. If data still
@ -736,27 +793,27 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
/**
* \brief The generic autenticated encryption (AEAD) function.
* \brief The generic autenticated encryption (AEAD) function.
*
* \param ctx The generic cipher context.
* \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers.
* \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV.
* This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV.
* \param ad The additional data to authenticate.
* \param ad_len The length of \p ad.
* \param input The buffer holding the input data.
* \param ilen The length of the input data.
* \param output The buffer for the output data.
* Must be able to hold at least \p ilen.
* \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the
* actual number of Bytes written.
* \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag.
* \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag.
* \param ctx The generic cipher context.
* \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers.
* \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV.
* This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV.
* \param ad The additional data to authenticate.
* \param ad_len The length of \p ad.
* \param input The buffer holding the input data.
* \param ilen The length of the input data.
* \param output The buffer for the output data.
* Must be able to hold at least \p ilen.
* \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the
* actual number of Bytes written.
* \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag.
* \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
@ -766,32 +823,32 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
/**
* \brief The generic autenticated decryption (AEAD) function.
* \brief The generic autenticated decryption (AEAD) function.
*
* \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer
* is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being
* used, making this interface safer.
* \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer
* is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being
* used, making this interface safer.
*
* \param ctx The generic cipher context.
* \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers.
* \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV.
* This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV.
* \param ad The additional data to be authenticated.
* \param ad_len The length of \p ad.
* \param input The buffer holding the input data.
* \param ilen The length of the input data.
* \param output The buffer for the output data.
* Must be able to hold at least \p ilen.
* \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the
* actual number of Bytes written.
* \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag.
* \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag.
* \param ctx The generic cipher context.
* \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers.
* \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV.
* This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV.
* \param ad The additional data to be authenticated.
* \param ad_len The length of \p ad.
* \param input The buffer holding the input data.
* \param ilen The length of the input data.
* \param output The buffer for the output data.
* Must be able to hold at least \p ilen.
* \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the
* actual number of Bytes written.
* \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag.
* \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic.
* \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic.
* \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,

28
include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h
View File

@ -34,6 +34,10 @@
#include "cipher.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -114,6 +118,30 @@ typedef struct
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info;
} mbedtls_cipher_definition_t;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
typedef enum
{
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0,
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */
/* use raw key material internally imported */
/* into a allocated key slot, and which */
/* hence need to destroy that key slot */
/* when they are no longer needed. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */
/* which use a key from a key slot */
/* provided by the user, and which */
/* hence should not be destroyed when */
/* the context is no longer needed. */
} mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership;
typedef struct
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
psa_key_slot_t slot;
mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state;
} mbedtls_cipher_context_psa;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[];
extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[];

106
include/mbedtls/config.h
View File

@ -1103,6 +1103,16 @@
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
*
* Enable the non-volatile secure storage usage.
*
* This is crucial on systems that do not have a HW TRNG support.
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
*
@ -1159,6 +1169,30 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
*
* When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure
* Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a
* NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process
* Environment).
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto.c
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
*
* Enable the non-volatile secure storage usage.
*
* This is crucial on systems that do not have a HW TRNG support.
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
*
@ -1582,6 +1616,24 @@
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
*
* Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, see
* #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
*
* Note: this option is still in progress, the full X.509 and TLS modules are
* not covered yet, but parts that are not ported to PSA yet will still work
* as usual, so enabling this option should not break backwards compatibility.
*
* \warning Support for PSA is still an experimental feature.
* Any public API that depends on this option may change
* at any time until this warning is removed.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
*
@ -2046,7 +2098,7 @@
* Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
@ -2590,6 +2642,58 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
*
* Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
*
* Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and one of either
* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
* (but not both)
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
*
* Enable persistent key storage over files for the
* Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto_storage_file.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_FS_IO
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
*
* Enable persistent key storage over PSA ITS for the
* Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto_storage_its.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
*

27
include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
View File

@ -35,25 +35,30 @@
#include "ecp.h"
#include "md.h"
/*
* RFC-4492 page 20:
/**
* \brief Maximum ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size
*
* \param bits Curve size in bits
* \return Maximum signature size in bytes
*
* \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument
* is one. It may evaluate its argument multiple times.
*/
/*
* Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
* r INTEGER,
* s INTEGER
* }
*
* Size is at most
* 1 (tag) + 1 (len) + 1 (initial 0) + ECP_MAX_BYTES for each of r and s,
* twice that + 1 (tag) + 2 (len) for the sequence
* (assuming ECP_MAX_BYTES is less than 126 for r and s,
* and less than 124 (total len <= 255) for the sequence)
* For each of r and s, the value (V) may include an extra initial "0" bit.
*/
#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES > 124
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES bigger than expected, please fix MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN"
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits ) \
( /*T,L of SEQUENCE*/ ( ( bits ) >= 61 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \
/*T,L of r,s*/ 2 * ( ( ( bits ) >= 127 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \
/*V of r,s*/ ( ( bits ) + 8 ) / 8 ) )
/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN ( 3 + 2 * ( 3 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) )
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS )
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {

73
include/mbedtls/pk.h
View File

@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
#include "ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
#define inline __inline
@ -83,6 +87,7 @@ typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT,
MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS,
MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
} mbedtls_pk_type_t;
/**
@ -203,6 +208,11 @@ void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx );
/**
* \brief Free a mbedtls_pk_context
*
* \note For contexts that have been set up with
* mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(), this does not free the underlying
* key slot and you still need to call psa_destroy_key()
* independently if you want to destroy that key.
*/
void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx );
@ -234,6 +244,38 @@ void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx );
*/
int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Initialize a PK context to wrap a PSA key slot.
*
* \note This function replaces mbedtls_pk_setup() for contexts
* that wrap a (possibly opaque) PSA key slot instead of
* storing and manipulating the key material directly.
*
* \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE).
* \param key The PSA key slot to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair
* (see notes below).
*
* \note The wrapped key slot must remain valid as long as the
* wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between
* the point this function is called and the point
* mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped
* key slot might then be independently used or destroyed.
*
* \note This function is currently only available for ECC key
* pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material).
* Support for other key types may be added later.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input
* (context already used, invalid key slot).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the key is not an
* ECC key pair.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const psa_key_slot_t key );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
/**
* \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context
@ -480,7 +522,11 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
* \param pub Context holding a public key.
* \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key.
*
* \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA
* \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not
* be checked - in that case they may or may not match.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid.
* \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv );
@ -694,6 +740,31 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Turn an EC key into an Opaque one
*
* \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might
* change or be removed at any time without notice.
*
* \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the
* specified hash is the only allowed use of that key.
*
* \param pk Input: the EC key to transfer to a PSA key slot.
* Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key slot.
* \param slot Output: the chosen slot for storing the key.
* It's the caller's responsibility to destroy that slot
* after calling mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context.
* \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_slot_t *slot,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

4
include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h
View File

@ -135,4 +135,8 @@ extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info;
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */

264
include/mbedtls/psa_util.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
/**
* \file psa_util.h
*
* \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library.
*
* \warning This function is not part of the public API and may
* change at any time.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "ecp.h"
#include "md.h"
#include "pk.h"
/* Slot allocation */
static inline psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *key )
{
for( psa_key_slot_t slot = 1; slot <= 32; slot++ )
{
if( psa_get_key_information( slot, NULL, NULL ) == PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT )
{
*key = slot;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
}
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
}
/* Translations for symmetric crypto. */
static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(
mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher )
{
switch( cipher )
{
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:
return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES );
/* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */
/* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:
return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen )
{
switch( mode )
{
case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM:
return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen ) );
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM:
return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen ) );
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC:
if( taglen == 0 )
return( PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING );
/* Intentional fallthrough for taglen != 0 */
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
static inline psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation(
mbedtls_operation_t op )
{
switch( op )
{
case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:
return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT );
case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:
return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
/* Translations for hashing. */
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
switch( md_alg )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2:
return( PSA_ALG_MD2 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4:
return( PSA_ALG_MD4 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
return( PSA_ALG_MD5 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 );
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 );
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
return( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 );
#endif
case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: /* Intentional fallthrough */
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
/* Translations for ECC. */
static inline psa_ecc_curve_t mbedtls_psa_translate_ecc_group( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid )
{
switch( grpid )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448 );
#endif
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
/* Translations for PK layer */
static inline int mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( psa_status_t status )
{
switch( status )
{
case PSA_SUCCESS:
return( 0 );
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* All other failures */
case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE:
case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:
case PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
default: /* We return the same as for the 'other failures',
* but list them separately nonetheless to indicate
* which failure conditions we have considered. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */

178
include/mbedtls/ssl.h
View File

@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
#include "platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* SSL Error codes
*/
@ -923,19 +927,37 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char *psk; /*!< pre-shared key. This field should
only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
size_t psk_len; /*!< length of the pre-shared key. This
field should only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< identity for PSK negotiation. This
field should only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< length of identity. This field should
only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_slot_t psk_opaque; /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
* If either no PSK or a raw PSK have
* been configured, this has value \c 0. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char *psk; /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should
* only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* If either no PSK or an opaque PSK
* have been configured, this has value NULL. */
size_t psk_len; /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* Its value is non-zero if and only if
* \c psk is not \c NULL. */
unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* This is set if and only if either
* \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */
size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< The length of PSK identity.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* Its value is non-zero if and only if
* \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque
* is not \c 0. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */
@ -2057,68 +2079,146 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Set the Pre Shared Key (PSK) and the expected identity name
* \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
* to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
*
* \note Currently clients can only register one pre-shared key.
* In other words, the servers' identity hint is ignored.
* \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
* Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more
* than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
* Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature but
* feedback is welcomed.
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
* but feedback is welcomed.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param psk pointer to the pre-shared key
* \param psk_len pre-shared key length
* \param psk_identity pointer to the pre-shared key identity
* \param psk_identity_len identity key length
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use.
* \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
* \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
* \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
* in bytes.
*
* \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
* \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and
* hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime
* of the SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
* to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
*
* \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
* Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than
* once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
* Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
* but feedback is welcomed.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
* Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully
* called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a
* key of type #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy
* allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied
* in the handshake.
* \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
* \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
* in bytes.
*
* \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need
* not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the
* SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
psa_key_slot_t psk,
const unsigned char *psk_identity,
size_t psk_identity_len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/**
* \brief Set the Pre Shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake
* \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
*
* \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
* ie the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
* i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param psk pointer to the pre-shared key
* \param psk_len pre-shared key length
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
* \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key.
* \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
*
* \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
*
* \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
* i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
* \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
* For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot
* must be populated with a key of type
* #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its
* use for the key derivation algorithm
* applied in the handshake.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
psa_key_slot_t psk );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/**
* \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only).
*
* If set, the PSK callback is called for each
* handshake where a PSK ciphersuite was negotiated.
* handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated.
* The caller provides the identity received and wants to
* receive the actual PSK data and length.
*
* The callback has the following parameters: (void *parameter,
* mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *psk_identity,
* size_t identity_len)
* The callback has the following parameters:
* - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk.
* - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which
* the operation applies.
* - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity
* selected by the client.
* - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity
* selected by the client.
*
* If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() on the ssl context to set the
* correct PSK and return 0.
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()
* on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0.
* Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity.
*
* \note If you set a PSK callback using this function, then you
* don't need to set a PSK key and identity using
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param f_psk PSK identity function
* \param p_psk PSK identity parameter
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
* \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based
* in the PSK identity chosen by the client.
* \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to
* the callback, for example a PSK store.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,

5
include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h
View File

@ -283,9 +283,12 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_slot_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */
size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)

2142
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796
include/psa/crypto_accel_driver.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,796 @@
/**
* \file psa/crypto_accel_driver.h
* \brief PSA cryptography accelerator driver module
*
* This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography
* drivers that access key material directly. This is meant for
* on-chip cryptography accelerators.
*
* This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for
* driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a
* standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions
* comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not
* intended to be called by application developers.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ACCEL_DRIVER_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_ACCEL_DRIVER_H
#include "crypto_driver_common.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/** \defgroup driver_digest Message Digests
*
* Generation and authentication of Message Digests (aka hashes) must be done
* in parts using the following sequence:
* - `psa_drv_hash_setup_t`
* - `psa_drv_hash_update_t`
* - ...
* - `psa_drv_hash_finish_t`
*
* If a previously started Message Digest operation needs to be terminated
* before the `psa_drv_hash_finish_t` operation is complete, it should be aborted
* by the `psa_drv_hash_abort_t`. Failure to do so may result in allocated
* resources not being freed or in other undefined behavior.
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief The hardware-specific hash context structure
*
* The contents of this structure are implementation dependent and are
* therefore not described here
*/
typedef struct psa_drv_hash_context_s psa_drv_hash_context_t;
/** \brief The function prototype for the start operation of a hash (message
* digest) operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_hash_<ALGO>_setup
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying hash function
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the
* hardware-specific hash context
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_hash_setup_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context);
/** \brief The function prototype for the update operation of a hash (message
* digest) operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_hash_<ALGO>_update
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously-established hash operation to be
* continued
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended
* to the hash operation
* \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_hash_update_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length);
/** \brief The prototype for the finish operation of a hash (message digest)
* operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_hash_<ALGO>_finish
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started hash operation to be
* fiinished
* \param[out] p_output A buffer where the generated digest will be
* placed
* \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been
* allocated for the `p_output` buffer
* \param[out] p_output_length The number of bytes placed in `p_output` after
* success
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_hash_finish_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the abort operation of a hash (message
* digest) operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_hash_<ALGO>_abort
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously
* started hash operation to be aborted
*/
typedef void (*psa_drv_hash_abort_t)(psa_drv_hash_context_t *p_context);
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup transparent_mac Transparent Message Authentication Code
* Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using
* transparent keys can be done either as a single function call (via the
* `psa_drv_mac_transparent_generate_t` or `psa_drv_mac_transparent_verify_t`
* functions), or in parts using the following sequence:
* - `psa_drv_mac_transparent_setup_t`
* - `psa_drv_mac_transparent_update_t`
* - `psa_drv_mac_transparent_update_t`
* - ...
* - `psa_drv_mac_transparent_finish_t` or `psa_drv_mac_transparent_finish_verify_t`
*
* If a previously started Transparent MAC operation needs to be terminated, it
* should be done so by the `psa_drv_mac_transparent_abort_t`. Failure to do so may
* result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined
* behavior.
*
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief The hardware-specific transparent-key MAC context structure
*
* The contents of this structure are implementation dependent and are
* therefore not described here.
*/
typedef struct psa_drv_mac_transparent_context_s psa_drv_mac_transparent_context_t;
/** \brief The function prototype for the setup operation of a
* transparent-key MAC operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_mac_transparent_<ALGO>_<MAC_VARIANT>_setup
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying primitive, and `MAC_VARIANT`
* is the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the
* hardware-specific MAC context
* \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the cleartext key material
* to be used in the operation
* \param[in] key_length The size in bytes of the key material
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_transparent_setup_t)(psa_drv_mac_transparent_context_t *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the update operation of a
* transparent-key MAC operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_mac_transparent_<ALGO>_<MAC_VARIANT>_update
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT`
* is the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously-established MAC operation to be
* continued
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended
* to the MAC operation
* \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_transparent_update_t)(psa_drv_mac_transparent_context_t *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the finish operation of a
* transparent-key MAC operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_mac_transparent_<ALGO>_<MAC_VARIANT>_finish
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is
* the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started MAC operation to be
* finished
* \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be placed
* \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the buffer that has been
* allocated for the `p_mac` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_transparent_finish_t)(psa_drv_mac_transparent_context_t *p_context,
uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the finish and verify operation of a
* transparent-key MAC operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_mac_transparent_<ALGO>_<MAC_VARIANT>_finish_verify
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is
* the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started MAC operation to be
* verified and finished
* \param[in] p_mac A buffer containing the MAC that will be used
* for verification
* \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the data in the `p_mac`
* buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* The operation completed successfully and the comparison matched
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_transparent_finish_verify_t)(psa_drv_mac_transparent_context_t *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the abort operation for a previously
* started transparent-key MAC operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_mac_transparent_<ALGO>_<MAC_VARIANT>_abort
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is
* the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started MAC operation to be
* aborted
*
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_transparent_abort_t)(psa_drv_mac_transparent_context_t *p_context);
/** \brief The function prototype for a one-shot operation of a transparent-key
* MAC operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_mac_transparent_<ALGO>_<MAC_VARIANT>
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is
* the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC)
*
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be MACed
* \param[in] input_length The length in bytes of the `p_input` data
* \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the key material to be used
* for the MAC operation
* \param[in] key_length The length in bytes of the `p_key` data
* \param[in] alg The algorithm to be performed
* \param[out] p_mac The buffer where the resulting MAC will be placed
* upon success
* \param[in] mac_length The length in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_transparent_t)(const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_length,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for a one-shot operation of a transparent-key
* MAC Verify operation
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_mac_transparent_<ALGO>_<MAC_VARIANT>_verify
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the underlying algorithm, and `MAC_VARIANT` is
* the specific variant of a MAC operation (such as HMAC or CMAC)
*
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be MACed
* \param[in] input_length The length in bytes of the `p_input` data
* \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the key material to be used
* for the MAC operation
* \param[in] key_length The length in bytes of the `p_key` data
* \param[in] alg The algorithm to be performed
* \param[in] p_mac The MAC data to be compared
* \param[in] mac_length The length in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* The operation completed successfully and the comparison matched
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_transparent_verify_t)(const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_length,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_length);
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup transparent_cipher Transparent Block Cipher
* Encryption and Decryption using transparent keys in block modes other than
* ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow:
* - `psa_drv_cipher_transparent_setup_t`
* - `psa_drv_cipher_transparent_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode)
* - `psa_drv_cipher_transparent_update_t`
* - ...
* - `psa_drv_cipher_transparent_finish_t`
* If a previously started Transparent Cipher operation needs to be terminated,
* it should be done so by the `psa_drv_cipher_transparent_abort_t`. Failure to do
* so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined
* behavior.
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief The hardware-specific transparent-key Cipher context structure
*
* The contents of this structure are implementation dependent and are
* therefore not described here.
*/
typedef struct psa_drv_cipher_transparent_context_s psa_drv_cipher_transparent_context_t;
/** \brief The function prototype for the setup operation of transparent-key
* block cipher operations.
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* conventions:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_cipher_transparent_setup_<CIPHER_NAME>_<MODE>
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where
* - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES)
* - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR)
* or for stream ciphers:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_cipher_transparent_setup_<CIPHER_NAME>
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of a stream cipher (i.e. RC4)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the
* hardware-specific cipher context
* \param[in] direction Indicates if the operation is an encrypt or a
* decrypt
* \param[in] p_key_data A buffer containing the cleartext key material
* to be used in the operation
* \param[in] key_data_size The size in bytes of the key material
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_transparent_setup_t)(psa_drv_cipher_transparent_context_t *p_context,
psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction,
const uint8_t *p_key_data,
size_t key_data_size);
/** \brief The function prototype for the set initialization vector operation
* of transparent-key block cipher operations
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_cipher_transparent_set_iv_<CIPHER_NAME>_<MODE>
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where
* - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES)
* - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A structure that contains the previously setup
* hardware-specific cipher context
* \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vecotr
* \param[in] iv_length The size in bytes of the contents of `p_iv`
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_transparent_set_iv_t)(psa_drv_cipher_transparent_context_t *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_iv,
size_t iv_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the update operation of transparent-key
* block cipher operations.
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_cipher_transparent_update_<CIPHER_NAME>_<MODE>
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where
* - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES)
* - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started cipher operation
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be
* encrypted or decrypted
* \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the `p_input` buffer
* \param[out] p_output A caller-allocated buffer where the
* generated output will be placed
* \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of the `p_output` buffer
* \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number
* of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_transparent_update_t)(psa_drv_cipher_transparent_context_t *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_size,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the finish operation of transparent-key
* block cipher operations.
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_cipher_transparent_finish_<CIPHER_NAME>_<MODE>
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where
* - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES)
* - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started cipher operation
* \param[out] p_output A caller-allocated buffer where the generated
* output will be placed
* \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of the `p_output` buffer
* \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of
* bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_transparent_finish_t)(psa_drv_cipher_transparent_context_t *p_context,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/** \brief The function prototype for the abort operation of transparent-key
* block cipher operations.
*
* Functions that implement the following prototype should be named in the
* following convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_cipher_transparent_abort_<CIPHER_NAME>_<MODE>
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where
* - `CIPHER_NAME` is the name of the underlying block cipher (i.e. AES or DES)
* - `MODE` is the block mode of the cipher operation (i.e. CBC or CTR)
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started cipher operation
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_transparent_abort_t)(psa_drv_cipher_transparent_context_t *p_context);
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup aead_transparent AEAD Transparent
*
* Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with
* transparent keys must be done in one function call. While this creates a
* burden for implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the
* entire message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before
* the authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be
* authentic.
*/
/**@{*/
/** Process an authenticated encryption operation using an opaque key.
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_aead_<ALGO>_encrypt
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the AEAD algorithm
*
* \param[in] p_key A pointer to the key material
* \param[in] key_length The size in bytes of the key material
* \param[in] alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true)
* \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use
* \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `nonce` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be MACed
* but not encrypted.
* \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `additional_data` in bytes
* \param[in] plaintext Data that will be MACed and
* encrypted.
* \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `plaintext` in bytes
* \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and
* encrypted data. The additional data is
* not part of this output. For algorithms
* where the encrypted data and the
* authentication tag are defined as
* separate outputs, the authentication
* tag is appended to the encrypted data.
* \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `ciphertext` buffer in
* bytes
* This must be at least
* #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(`alg`,
* `plaintext_length`).
* \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in
* the `ciphertext` buffer
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_aead_transparent_encrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_length,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *nonce,
size_t nonce_length,
const uint8_t *additional_data,
size_t additional_data_length,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_length,
uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_size,
size_t *ciphertext_length);
/** Process an authenticated decryption operation using an opaque key.
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_aead_<ALGO>_decrypt
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the AEAD algorithm
* \param[in] p_key A pointer to the key material
* \param[in] key_length The size in bytes of the key material
* \param[in] alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true)
* \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use
* \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `nonce` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been MACed
* but not encrypted
* \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `additional_data` in bytes
* \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been MACed and
* encrypted
* For algorithms where the encrypted data
* and the authentication tag are defined
* as separate inputs, the buffer must
* contain the encrypted data followed by
* the authentication tag.
* \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `ciphertext` in bytes
* \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data
* \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `plaintext` buffer in
* bytes
* This must be at least
* #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(`alg`,
* `ciphertext_length`).
* \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output
* in the \b plaintext buffer
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_aead_transparent_decrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_length,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *nonce,
size_t nonce_length,
const uint8_t *additional_data,
size_t additional_data_length,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_length,
uint8_t *plaintext,
size_t plaintext_size,
size_t *plaintext_length);
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup transparent_asymmetric Transparent Asymmetric Cryptography
*
* Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using
* asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using
* transparent keys must be done in single function calls.
*/
/**@{*/
/**
* \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a transparent
* asymmetric private key
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_asymmetric_<ALGO>_sign
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the signing algorithm
*
* \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the private key
* material
* \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible
* with the type of `p_key`
* \param[in] p_hash The hash or message to sign
* \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written
* \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the returned signature value
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_transparent_sign_t)(const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_hash,
size_t hash_length,
uint8_t *p_signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t *p_signature_length);
/**
* \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using
* a transparent asymmetric public key
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_asymmetric_<ALGO>_verify
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the signing algorithm
*
* \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the public key material
* \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of `key`
* \param[in] p_hash The hash or message whose signature is to be
* verified
* \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify
* \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* The signature is valid.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_transparent_verify_t)(const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_hash,
size_t hash_length,
const uint8_t *p_signature,
size_t signature_length);
/**
* \brief A function that encrypts a short message with a transparent
* asymmetric public key
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_asymmetric_<ALGO>_encrypt
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the encryption algorithm
*
* \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the public key material
* \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data
* \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
* compatible with the type of `key`
* \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt
* \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the
* encryption algorithm
* If the algorithm does not support a
* salt, pass `NULL`
* If the algorithm supports an optional
* salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
* pass `NULL`.
* For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
* supported.
* \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes
* If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0.
* \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to
* be written
* \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the returned output
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_transparent_encrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *p_salt,
size_t salt_length,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/**
* \brief Decrypt a short message with a transparent asymmetric private key
*
* Functions that implement the prototype should be named in the following
* convention:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_asymmetric_<ALGO>_decrypt
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Where `ALGO` is the name of the encryption algorithm
*
* \param[in] p_key A buffer containing the private key material
* \param[in] key_size The size in bytes of the `p_key` data
* \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
* compatible with the type of `key`
* \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt
* \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the
* encryption algorithm
* If the algorithm does not support a
* salt, pass `NULL`.
* If the algorithm supports an optional
* salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
* pass `NULL`.
* For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
* supported
* \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes
* If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0
* \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to
* be written
* \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the returned output
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_transparent_decrypt_t)(const uint8_t *p_key,
size_t key_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *p_salt,
size_t salt_length,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/**@}*/
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCEL_DRIVER_H */

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/**
* \file psa/crypto_driver_common.h
* \brief Definitions for all PSA crypto drivers
*
* This file contains common definitions shared by all PSA crypto drivers.
* Do not include it directly: instead, include the header file(s) for
* the type(s) of driver that you are implementing. For example, if
* you are writing a driver for a chip that provides both a hardware
* random generator and an accelerator for some cryptographic algorithms,
* include `psa/crypto_entropy_driver.h` and `psa/crypto_accel_driver.h`.
*
* This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for
* driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a
* standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions
* comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not
* intended to be called by application developers.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* Include type definitions (psa_status_t, psa_algorithm_t,
* psa_key_type_t, etc.) and macros to build and analyze values
* of these types. */
#include "crypto_types.h"
#include "crypto_values.h"
/** For encrypt-decrypt functions, whether the operation is an encryption
* or a decryption. */
typedef enum {
PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_DECRYPT,
PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_ENCRYPT
} psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t;
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H */

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/**
* \file psa/crypto_entropy_driver.h
* \brief PSA entropy source driver module
*
* This header declares types and function signatures for entropy sources.
*
* This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for
* driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a
* standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions
* comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not
* intended to be called by application developers.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ENTROPY_DRIVER_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_ENTROPY_DRIVER_H
#include "crypto_driver_common.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/** \defgroup driver_rng Entropy Generation
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief A hardware-specific structure for a entropy providing hardware
*/
typedef struct psa_drv_entropy_context_s psa_drv_entropy_context_t;
/** \brief Initialize an entropy driver
*
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure
* containing any context information for
* the implementation
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_entropy_init_t)(psa_drv_entropy_context_t *p_context);
/** \brief Get a specified number of bits from the entropy source
*
* It retrives `buffer_size` bytes of data from the entropy source. The entropy
* source will always fill the provided buffer to its full size, however, most
* entropy sources have biases, and the actual amount of entropy contained in
* the buffer will be less than the number of bytes.
* The driver will return the actual number of bytes of entropy placed in the
* buffer in `p_received_entropy_bytes`.
* A PSA Crypto API implementation will likely feed the output of this function
* into a Digital Random Bit Generator (DRBG), and typically has a minimum
* amount of entropy that it needs.
* To accomplish this, the PSA Crypto implementation should be designed to call
* this function multiple times until it has received the required amount of
* entropy from the entropy source.
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure
* containing any context information
* for the implementation
* \param[out] p_buffer A caller-allocated buffer for the
* retrieved entropy to be placed in
* \param[in] buffer_size The allocated size of `p_buffer`
* \param[out] p_received_entropy_bits The amount of entropy (in bits)
* actually provided in `p_buffer`
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_entropy_get_bits_t)(psa_drv_entropy_context_t *p_context,
uint8_t *p_buffer,
uint32_t buffer_size,
uint32_t *p_received_entropy_bits);
/**
* \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to interface
* to an entropy source
*
* PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
* appropriate upon startup.
*
* If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
*/
typedef struct {
/** Function that performs initialization for the entropy source */
psa_drv_entropy_init_t *p_init;
/** Function that performs the get_bits operation for the entropy source
*/
psa_drv_entropy_get_bits_t *p_get_bits;
} psa_drv_entropy_t;
/**@}*/
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ENTROPY_DRIVER_H */

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/**
* \file psa/crypto_extra.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include psa/crypto.h.
*
* This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/* UID for secure storage seed */
#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52
/**
* \brief Library deinitialization.
*
* This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer,
* including the whole key store.
*
* This is an Mbed TLS extension.
*/
void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void );
/**
* \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into
* secure storage.
*
* This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator
* used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted
* entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator),
* the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its
* random generator.
*
* On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be
* called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with
* a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional.
* In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any
* other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init().
*
* When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in
* persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function
* can no longer succeed.
*
* If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state.
* You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the
* error if possible.
*
* \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status.
*
* \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a
* factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed
* is critical to the security of the device. It must be
* *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*.
* You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically
* secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources.
* You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure
* that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the
* needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to
* the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value
* once this function returns.
*
* This is an Mbed TLS extension.
*
* \note This function is only available on the following platforms:
* * If the compile-time options MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED and
* MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO are both enabled. Note that you
* must provide compatible implementations of mbedtls_nv_seed_read
* and mbedtls_nv_seed_write.
* * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side,
* if the server supports this feature.
* \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject.
* \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer.
* The size of the seed in bytes must be greater
* or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM
* and #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE.
* It must be less or equal to
* #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator
* of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use.
* You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto
* implementation.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \p seed_size is out of range.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval `PSA_ITS_ERROR_XXX`
* There was a failure reading or writing from storage.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* The library has already been initialized. It is no longer
* possible to call this function.
*/
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const unsigned char *seed,
size_t seed_size);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */

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/**
* \file psa/crypto_platform.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS platfom definitions
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include psa/crypto.h.
*
* This file contains platform-dependent type definitions.
*
* In implementations with isolation between the application and the
* cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that
* the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the
* module implements.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H
/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it
* in each of its header files. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "../mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
/* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */
#include <stdint.h>
/* Integral type representing a key handle. */
typedef uint16_t psa_key_handle_t;
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */

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/**
* \file psa/crypto_se_driver.h
* \brief PSA external cryptoprocessor driver module
*
* This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography
* drivers that access key material via opaque references. This is
* meant for cryptoprocessors that have a separate key storage from the
* space in which the PSA Crypto implementation runs, typically secure
* elements.
*
* This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for
* driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a
* standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions
* comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not
* intended to be called by application developers.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H
#include "crypto_driver_common.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/** An internal designation of a key slot between the core part of the
* PSA Crypto implementation and the driver. The meaning of this value
* is driver-dependent. */
typedef uint32_t psa_key_slot_t;
/** \defgroup opaque_mac Opaque Message Authentication Code
* Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using
* opaque keys can be done either as a single function call (via the
* `psa_drv_mac_opaque_generate_t` or `psa_drv_mac_opaque_verify_t` functions), or in
* parts using the following sequence:
* - `psa_drv_mac_opaque_setup_t`
* - `psa_drv_mac_opaque_update_t`
* - `psa_drv_mac_opaque_update_t`
* - ...
* - `psa_drv_mac_opaque_finish_t` or `psa_drv_mac_opaque_finish_verify_t`
*
* If a previously started Opaque MAC operation needs to be terminated, it
* should be done so by the `psa_drv_mac_opaque_abort_t`. Failure to do so may
* result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined
* behavior.
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief A function that starts a MAC operation for a PSA Crypto Driver
* implementation using an opaque key
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the
* hardware-specific MAC context
* \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the
* operation
* \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used to underly the MAC
* operation
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_opaque_setup_t)(void *p_context,
psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t algorithm);
/** \brief A function that continues a previously started MAC operation using
* an opaque key
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously-established MAC operation to be
* continued
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended
* to the MAC operation
* \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_opaque_update_t)(void *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length);
/** \brief a function that completes a previously started MAC operation by
* returning the resulting MAC using an opaque key
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started MAC operation to be
* finished
* \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be
* placed
* \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been
* allocated for the `output` buffer
* \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of
* bytes placed in the `p_mac` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_opaque_finish_t)(void *p_context,
uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *p_mac_length);
/** \brief A function that completes a previously started MAC operation by
* comparing the resulting MAC against a known value using an opaque key
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously
* started MAC operation to be fiinished
* \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will
* be compared against
* \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac`
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each
* other
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
* The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did
* not match the provided MAC
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_opaque_finish_verify_t)(void *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_length);
/** \brief A function that aborts a previous started opaque-key MAC operation
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously
* started MAC operation to be aborted
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_opaque_abort_t)(void *p_context);
/** \brief A function that performs a MAC operation in one command and returns
* the calculated MAC using an opaque key
*
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed
* \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `p_input`
* \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used
* \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC
* operation
* \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be
* placed
* \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer
* \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of
* bytes placed in the `output` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_opaque_generate_t)(const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *p_mac_length);
/** \brief A function that performs an MAC operation in one command and
* compare the resulting MAC against a known value using an opaque key
*
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed
* \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `input`
* \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used
* \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC
* operation
* \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will
* be compared against
* \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of `mac`
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each
* other
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
* The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did
* not match the provided MAC
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_mac_opaque_verify_t)(const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_mac,
size_t mac_length);
/** \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to
* implement MAC operations using opaque keys.
*
* PSA Crypto API implementations should populate the table as appropriate
* upon startup.
*
* If one of the functions is not implemented (such as
* `psa_drv_mac_opaque_generate_t`), it should be set to NULL.
*
* Driver implementers should ensure that they implement all of the functions
* that make sense for their hardware, and that they provide a full solution
* (for example, if they support `p_setup`, they should also support
* `p_update` and at least one of `p_finish` or `p_finish_verify`).
*
*/
typedef struct {
/**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific Opaque-MAC Context structure
*/
size_t context_size;
/** Function that performs the setup operation
*/
psa_drv_mac_opaque_setup_t *p_setup;
/** Function that performs the update operation
*/
psa_drv_mac_opaque_update_t *p_update;
/** Function that completes the operation
*/
psa_drv_mac_opaque_finish_t *p_finish;
/** Function that completed a MAC operation with a verify check
*/
psa_drv_mac_opaque_finish_verify_t *p_finish_verify;
/** Function that aborts a previoustly started operation
*/
psa_drv_mac_opaque_abort_t *p_abort;
/** Function that performs the MAC operation in one call
*/
psa_drv_mac_opaque_generate_t *p_mac;
/** Function that performs the MAC and verify operation in one call
*/
psa_drv_mac_opaque_verify_t *p_mac_verify;
} psa_drv_mac_opaque_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup opaque_cipher Opaque Symmetric Ciphers
*
* Encryption and Decryption using opaque keys in block modes other than ECB
* must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow:
* - `psa_drv_cipher_opaque_setup_t`
* - `psa_drv_cipher_opaque_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode)
* - `psa_drv_cipher_opaque_update_t`
* - ...
* - `psa_drv_cipher_opaque_finish_t`
* If a previously started Opaque Cipher operation needs to be terminated, it
* should be done so by the `psa_drv_cipher_opaque_abort_t`. Failure to do so may
* result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined
* behavior.
*
* In situations where a PSA Cryptographic API implementation is using a block
* mode not-supported by the underlying hardware or driver, it can construct
* the block mode itself, while calling the `psa_drv_cipher_opaque_ecb_t` function
* pointer for the cipher operations.
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief A function pointer that provides the cipher setup function for
* opaque-key operations
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A structure that will contain the
* hardware-specific cipher context.
* \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the
* operation
* \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher
* operation
* \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt
* or decrypt
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_opaque_setup_t)(void *p_context,
psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction);
/** \brief A function pointer that sets the initialization vector (if
* necessary) for an opaque cipher operation
*
* Rationale: The `psa_cipher_*` function in the PSA Cryptographic API has two
* IV functions: one to set the IV, and one to generate it internally. The
* generate function is not necessary for the drivers to implement as the PSA
* Crypto implementation can do the generation using its RNG features.
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A structure that contains the previously set up
* hardware-specific cipher context
* \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vector
* \param[in] iv_length The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_opaque_set_iv_t)(void *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_iv,
size_t iv_length);
/** \brief A function that continues a previously started opaque-key cipher
* operation
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started cipher operation
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be
* encrypted/decrypted
* \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to
* by `p_input`
* \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the
* output will be placed
* \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the
* `p_output` buffer
* \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number
* of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_opaque_update_t)(void *p_context,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_size,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/** \brief A function that completes a previously started opaque-key cipher
* operation
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started cipher operation
* \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output
* will be placed
* \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output`
* buffer
* \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of
* bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_opaque_finish_t)(void *p_context,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/** \brief A function that aborts a previously started opaque-key cipher
* operation
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure for the
* previously started cipher operation
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_opaque_abort_t)(void *p_context);
/** \brief A function that performs the ECB block mode for opaque-key cipher
* operations
*
* Note: this function should only be used with implementations that do not
* provide a needed higher-level operation.
*
* \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the operation
* \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher operation
* \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt or
* decrypt
* \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be
* encrypted/decrypted
* \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by
* `p_input`
* \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output will
* be placed
* \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output`
* buffer
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_cipher_opaque_ecb_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_size,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size);
/**
* \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement
* cipher operations using opaque keys.
*
* PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
* appropriate upon startup.
*
* If one of the functions is not implemented (such as
* `psa_drv_cipher_opaque_ecb_t`), it should be set to NULL.
*/
typedef struct {
/** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific Opaque Cipher context
* structure
*/
size_t size;
/** Function that performs the setup operation */
psa_drv_cipher_opaque_setup_t *p_setup;
/** Function that sets the IV (if necessary) */
psa_drv_cipher_opaque_set_iv_t *p_set_iv;
/** Function that performs the update operation */
psa_drv_cipher_opaque_update_t *p_update;
/** Function that completes the operation */
psa_drv_cipher_opaque_finish_t *p_finish;
/** Function that aborts the operation */
psa_drv_cipher_opaque_abort_t *p_abort;
/** Function that performs ECB mode for the cipher
* (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA
* Crypto Client API)
*/
psa_drv_cipher_opaque_ecb_t *p_ecb;
} psa_drv_cipher_opaque_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup opaque_asymmetric Opaque Asymmetric Cryptography
*
* Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using
* asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using
* opaque keys must be done in single function calls.
*/
/**@{*/
/**
* \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a private key
*
* \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible
* with the type of `key`
* \param[in] p_hash The hash to sign
* \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written
* \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the returned signature value
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_sign_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_hash,
size_t hash_length,
uint8_t *p_signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t *p_signature_length);
/**
* \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using
* an asymmetric public key
*
* \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key
* pair
* \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
* the type of `key`
* \param[in] p_hash The hash whose signature is to be verified
* \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify
* \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* The signature is valid.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_verify_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_hash,
size_t hash_length,
const uint8_t *p_signature,
size_t signature_length);
/**
* \brief A function that encrypts a short message with an asymmetric public
* key
*
* \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key
* pair
* \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
* compatible with the type of `key`
* \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt
* \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the
* encryption algorithm
* If the algorithm does not support a
* salt, pass `NULL`.
* If the algorithm supports an optional
* salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
* pass `NULL`.
* For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
* supported.
* \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes
* If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0.
* \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to
* be written
* \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
* the returned output
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_encrypt_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *p_salt,
size_t salt_length,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/**
* \brief Decrypt a short message with an asymmetric private key.
*
* \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair
* \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
* compatible with the type of `key`
* \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt
* \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the
* encryption algorithm
* If the algorithm does not support a
* salt, pass `NULL`.
* If the algorithm supports an optional
* salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
* pass `NULL`.
* For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
* supported.
* \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes
* If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0.
* \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to
* be written
* \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes
* \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the returned output
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_decrypt_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t *p_input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t *p_salt,
size_t salt_length,
uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/**
* \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement
* asymmetric cryptographic operations using opaque keys.
*
* PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
* appropriate upon startup.
*
* If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
*/
typedef struct {
/** Function that performs the asymmetric sign operation */
psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_sign_t *p_sign;
/** Function that performs the asymmetric verify operation */
psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_verify_t *p_verify;
/** Function that performs the asymmetric encrypt operation */
psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_encrypt_t *p_encrypt;
/** Function that performs the asymmetric decrypt operation */
psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_decrypt_t *p_decrypt;
} psa_drv_asymmetric_opaque_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup aead_opaque AEAD Opaque
* Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with opaque
* keys must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden for
* implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire
* message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the
* authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic.
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief Process an authenticated encryption operation using an opaque key
*
* \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use.
* \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true)
* \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use
* \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that will be
* authenticated but not encrypted
* \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes
* \param[in] p_plaintext Data that will be authenticated and
* encrypted
* \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `p_plaintext` in bytes
* \param[out] p_ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and
* encrypted data. The additional data is
* not part of this output. For algorithms
* where the encrypted data and the
* authentication tag are defined as
* separate outputs, the authentication
* tag is appended to the encrypted data.
* \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `p_ciphertext` buffer in
* bytes
* \param[out] p_ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in
* the `p_ciphertext` buffer
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_aead_opaque_encrypt_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
const uint8_t *p_nonce,
size_t nonce_length,
const uint8_t *p_additional_data,
size_t additional_data_length,
const uint8_t *p_plaintext,
size_t plaintext_length,
uint8_t *p_ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_size,
size_t *p_ciphertext_length);
/** Process an authenticated decryption operation using an opaque key
*
* \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use
* \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true)
* \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use
* \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes
* \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that has been
* authenticated but not encrypted
* \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes
* \param[in] p_ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and
* encrypted.
* For algorithms where the encrypted data
* and the authentication tag are defined
* as separate inputs, the buffer must
* contain the encrypted data followed by
* the authentication tag.
* \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `p_ciphertext` in bytes
* \param[out] p_plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data
* \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `p_plaintext` buffer in
* bytes
* \param[out] p_plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in
* the `p_plaintext` buffer
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_aead_opaque_decrypt_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
const uint8_t *p_nonce,
size_t nonce_length,
const uint8_t *p_additional_data,
size_t additional_data_length,
const uint8_t *p_ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_length,
uint8_t *p_plaintext,
size_t plaintext_size,
size_t *p_plaintext_length);
/**
* \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement
* Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data operations using opaque keys
*
* PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
* appropriate upon startup.
*
* If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
*/
typedef struct {
/** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */
psa_drv_aead_opaque_encrypt_t *p_encrypt;
/** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */
psa_drv_aead_opaque_decrypt_t *p_decrypt;
} psa_drv_aead_opaque_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup driver_key_management Key Management
* Currently, key management is limited to importing keys in the clear,
* destroying keys, and exporting keys in the clear.
* Whether a key may be exported is determined by the key policies in place
* on the key slot.
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief Import a key in binary format
*
* This function can support any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the
* documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type.
*
* \param[in] key_slot Slot where the key will be stored
* This must be a valid slot for a key of the chosen
* type. It must be unoccupied.
* \param[in] type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value)
* \param[in] algorithm Key algorithm (a \c PSA_ALG_XXX value)
* \param[in] usage The allowed uses of the key
* \param[in] p_data Buffer containing the key data
* \param[in] data_length Size of the `data` buffer in bytes
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_opaque_import_key_t)(psa_key_slot_t key_slot,
psa_key_type_t type,
psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
psa_key_usage_t usage,
const uint8_t *p_data,
size_t data_length);
/**
* \brief Destroy a key and restore the slot to its default state
*
* This function destroys the content of the key slot from both volatile
* memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall
* make a best effort to ensure that any previous content of the slot is
* unrecoverable.
*
* This function also erases any metadata such as policies. It returns the
* specified slot to its default state.
*
* \param[in] key_slot The key slot to erase.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* The slot's content, if any, has been erased.
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_destroy_key_t)(psa_key_slot_t key);
/**
* \brief Export a key in binary format
*
* The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
* create an equivalent object.
*
* If a key is created with `psa_import_key()` and then exported with
* this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is
* identical: the implementation may choose a different representation
* of the same key if the format permits it.
*
* For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
*
* - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the
* raw bytes of the key.
* - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be
* correct.
* - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the
* two or three DES keys.
* - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR), the format
* is the non-encrypted DER representation defined by PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017)
* as RSAPrivateKey.
* - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the format
* is the DER representation defined by RFC 5280 as SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
*
* \param[in] key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must
* be an occupied key slot.
* \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written.
* \param[in] data_size Size of the `p_data` buffer in bytes.
* \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the key data.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_export_key_t)(psa_key_slot_t key,
uint8_t *p_data,
size_t data_size,
size_t *p_data_length);
/**
* \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format
*
* The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
* create an object that is equivalent to the public key.
*
* For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
*
* - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY),
* the format is the DER representation of the public key defined by RFC 5280
* as SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
*
* \param[in] key_slot Slot whose content is to be exported. This must
* be an occupied key slot.
* \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written.
* \param[in] data_size Size of the `data` buffer in bytes.
* \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes
* that make up the key data.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_export_public_key_t)(psa_key_slot_t key,
uint8_t *p_data,
size_t data_size,
size_t *p_data_length);
/**
* \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for key
* management using opaque keys
*
* PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
* appropriate upon startup.
*
* If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
*/
typedef struct {
/** Function that performs the key import operation */
psa_drv_opaque_import_key_t *p_import;
/** Function that performs the key destroy operation */
psa_drv_destroy_key_t *p_destroy;
/** Function that performs the key export operation */
psa_drv_export_key_t *p_export;
/** Function that perforsm the public key export operation */
psa_drv_export_public_key_t *p_export_public;
} psa_drv_key_management_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup driver_derivation Key Derivation and Agreement
* Key derivation is the process of generating new key material using an
* existing key and additional parameters, iterating through a basic
* cryptographic function, such as a hash.
* Key agreement is a part of cryptographic protocols that allows two parties
* to agree on the same key value, but starting from different original key
* material.
* The flows are similar, and the PSA Crypto Driver Model uses the same functions
* for both of the flows.
*
* There are two different final functions for the flows,
* `psa_drv_key_derivation_derive` and `psa_drv_key_derivation_export`.
* `psa_drv_key_derivation_derive` is used when the key material should be placed
* in a slot on the hardware and not exposed to the caller.
* `psa_drv_key_derivation_export` is used when the key material should be returned
* to the PSA Cryptographic API implementation.
*
* Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs.
* Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which
* can be problemmatic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed
* to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_key_derivation_collateral`, that is
* called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key
* derivation algorithm that required 3 paramter inputs, the flow would look
* something like:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes);
* psa_drv_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_0,
* p_collateral_0,
* collateral_0_size);
* psa_drv_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_1,
* p_collateral_1,
* collateral_1_size);
* psa_drv_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_2,
* p_collateral_2,
* collateral_2_size);
* psa_drv_key_derivation_derive();
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*
* key agreement example:
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
* psa_drv_key_derivation_setup(alg, source_key. dest_key_size_bytes);
* psa_drv_key_derivation_collateral(DHE_PUBKEY, p_pubkey, pubkey_size);
* psa_drv_key_derivation_export(p_session_key,
* session_key_size,
* &session_key_length);
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*/
/**@{*/
/** \brief The hardware-specific key derivation context structure
*
* The contents of this structure are implementation dependent and are
* therefore not described here
*/
typedef struct psa_drv_key_derivation_context_s psa_drv_key_derivation_context_t;
/** \brief Set up a key derivation operation by specifying the algorithm and
* the source key sot
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure containing any
* context information for the implementation
* \param[in] kdf_alg The algorithm to be used for the key derivation
* \param[in] souce_key The key to be used as the source material for the
* key derivation
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_key_derivation_context_t *p_context,
psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg,
psa_key_slot_t source_key);
/** \brief Provide collateral (parameters) needed for a key derivation or key
* agreement operation
*
* Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is
* expeced that this function may be called multiple times for the same
* operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id`
*
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure containing any
* context information for the implementation
* \param[in] collateral_id An ID for the collateral being provided
* \param[in] p_collateral A buffer containing the collateral data
* \param[in] collateral_size The size in bytes of the collateral
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_key_derivation_collateral_t)(psa_drv_key_derivation_context_t *p_context,
uint32_t collateral_id,
const uint8_t *p_collateral,
size_t collateral_size);
/** \brief Perform the final key derivation step and place the generated key
* material in a slot
* \param[in,out] p_context A hardware-specific structure containing any
* context information for the implementation
* \param[in] dest_key The slot where the generated key material
* should be placed
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_key_derivation_derive_t)(psa_drv_key_derivation_context_t *p_context,
psa_key_slot_t dest_key);
/** \brief Perform the final step of a key agreement and place the generated
* key material in a buffer
*
* \param[out] p_output Buffer in which to place the generated key
* material
* \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of `p_output`
* \param[out] p_output_length Upon success, contains the number of bytes of
* key material placed in `p_output`
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
*/
typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_key_derivation_export_t)(uint8_t *p_output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *p_output_length);
/**
* \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for key
* derivation and agreement
*
* PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
* appropriate upon startup.
*
* If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
*/
typedef struct {
/** Function that performs the key derivation setup */
psa_drv_key_derivation_setup_t *p_setup;
/** Function that sets the key derivation collateral */
psa_drv_key_derivation_collateral_t *p_collateral;
/** Function that performs the final key derivation step */
psa_drv_key_derivation_derive_t *p_derive;
/** Function that perforsm the final key derivation or agreement and
* exports the key */
psa_drv_key_derivation_export_t *p_export;
} psa_drv_key_derivation_t;
/**@}*/
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H */

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/**
* \file psa/crypto_sizes.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include psa/crypto.h.
*
* This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to
* compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros
* are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on
* the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances
* on buffer sizes.
*
* In implementations with isolation between the application and the
* cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that
* the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the
* module implements.
*
* Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the
* implementation are in crypto.h.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H
/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it
* in each of its header files. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "../mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7) / 8)
#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8)
/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes.
*
* This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects.
*
* \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm
* (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a
* hash algorithm).
*
* \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm.
* If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
* An implementation may return either 0 or the correct size
* for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_HASH_SIZE(alg) \
( \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 16 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48 : \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 : \
0)
/** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
*
* Maximum size of a hash.
*
* This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value
* should be the maximum size of a hash supported by the implementation,
* in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum.
*/
/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-226,
* 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for
* HMAC-SHA3-512. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64
#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
#else
#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32
#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64
#endif
/** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE
*
* Maximum size of a MAC.
*
* This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value
* should be the maximum size of a MAC supported by the implementation,
* in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum.
*/
/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the
* minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */
/* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value
* to 64 bytes.
*/
#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
/** The tag size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
*
* \param alg An AEAD algorithm
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
*
* \return The tag size for the specified algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified
* tag that can be distinguished from the rest of
* the ciphertext, return 0.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
* An implementation may return either 0 or a
* correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
* recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET) : \
0)
/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits.
* This is a vendor-specific macro.
*
* Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key
* whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can
* induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other
* auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the
* library is configured, this macro defines how the library is
* configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an
* RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here.
*
* Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different
* operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */
#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096
/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits.
* This is a vendor-specific macro. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192
#else
#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0
#endif
/** \def PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN
*
* This macro returns the maximum length of the PSK supported
* by the TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation.
*
* Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3:
* TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support
* arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary
* PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and
* keys is RECOMMENDED.
*
* Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64
* for #PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN 128
/** \def PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
*
* Maximum size of an asymmetric signature.
*
* This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. This value
* should be the maximum size of a MAC supported by the implementation,
* in bytes, and must be no smaller than this maximum.
*/
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \
PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( \
PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS > PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS ? \
PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS : \
PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS \
)
/** The maximum size of a block cipher supported by the implementation. */
#define PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16
/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes.
*
* This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects.
*
* \param key_type The type of the MAC key.
* \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits.
* \param alg A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true).
*
* \return The MAC size for the specified algorithm with
* the specified key parameters.
* \return 0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized.
* \return Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that
* the implementation recognizes, but does not support.
* \return Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent
* with the algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \
PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_SIZE(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \
PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(key_type) : \
((void)(key_type), (void)(key_bits), 0))
/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes.
*
* If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
* guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an
* insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
* the ciphertext may be smaller.
*
* \param alg An AEAD algorithm
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true).
* \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes.
*
* \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
* algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
* An implementation may return either 0 or a
* correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
* recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, plaintext_length) \
(PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) != 0 ? \
(plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \
0)
/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes.
*
* If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
* guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an
* insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
* the plaintext may be smaller.
*
* \param alg An AEAD algorithm
* (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true).
* \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes.
*
* \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
* algorithm.
* If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
* An implementation may return either 0 or a
* correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it
* recognizes, but does not support.
*/
#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, ciphertext_length) \
(PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) != 0 ? \
(plaintext_length) - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \
0)
#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \
2 * PSA_HASH_FINAL_SIZE(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \
11 /*PKCS#1v1.5*/)
/**
* \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size
*
* \param curve_bits Curve size in bits.
* \return Signature size in bytes.
*
* \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
*/
#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \
(PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2)
/** Safe signature buffer size for psa_asymmetric_sign().
*
* This macro returns a safe buffer size for a signature using a key
* of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
* Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller
* (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature).
*
* \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
* zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
* side effects.
*
* \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
* key pair type or a public key type).
* \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
* \param alg The signature algorithm.
*
* \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_asymmetric_sign() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
* If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
* by the implementation, this macro either shall return either a
* sensible size or 0.
* If the parameters are not valid, the
* return value is unspecified.
*/
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \
((void)alg, 0))
/** Safe output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt().
*
* This macro returns a safe buffer size for a ciphertext produced using
* a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
* Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending
* on the algorithm.
*
* \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
* zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
* side effects.
*
* \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
* key pair type or a public key type).
* \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
* \param alg The signature algorithm.
*
* \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
* If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
* by the implementation, this macro either shall return either a
* sensible size or 0.
* If the parameters are not valid, the
* return value is unspecified.
*/
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \
((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \
0)
/** Safe output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt().
*
* This macro returns a safe buffer size for a ciphertext produced using
* a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
* Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending
* on the algorithm.
*
* \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
* zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
* side effects.
*
* \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
* key pair type or a public key type).
* \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
* \param alg The signature algorithm.
*
* \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
* If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
* by the implementation, this macro either shall return either a
* sensible size or 0.
* If the parameters are not valid, the
* return value is unspecified.
*/
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \
PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \
0)
/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified
* number of bits.
*
* This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field
* is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the
* bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus:
* - 1 type byte;
* - 1 to 3 length bytes;
* - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \
((bits) / 8 + 5)
/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key.
* Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32.
*
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains RSAPublicKey
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* parameters NULL }
* RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* modulus INTEGER, -- n
* publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
*
* - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
* - 1 + 1 + 9 bytes of algorithm (RSA OID);
* - 2 bytes of NULL;
* - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead;
* - n : INTEGER;
* - 7 bytes for the public exponent.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
(PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 36)
/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair.
* Assumes thatthe public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size
* difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit.
*
* RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* version Version, -- 0
* modulus INTEGER, -- N-bit
* publicExponent INTEGER, -- 32-bit
* privateExponent INTEGER, -- N-bit
* prime1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
* prime2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
* exponent1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
* exponent2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
* coefficient INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
* }
*
* - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
* - 3 bytes of version;
* - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs,
* overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS;
* - 7 bytes for the public exponent.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEYPAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
(9 * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2 + 1) + 14)
/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key.
*
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains DSAPublicKey
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* parameters Dss-Parms } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs
* DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y
*
* - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
* - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID);
* - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead;
* - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y);
* - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits).
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
(PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 59)
/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair.
*
* DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* version Version, -- 0
* prime INTEGER, -- p
* subprime INTEGER, -- q
* generator INTEGER, -- g
* public INTEGER, -- y
* private INTEGER, -- x
* }
*
* - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
* - 3 bytes of version;
* - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y);
* - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits).
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEYPAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
(PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 75)
/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key.
*
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains ECPoint
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* parameters OBJECT IDENTIFIER } -- namedCurve
* ECPoint ::= ...
* -- first 8 bits: 0x04;
* -- then x_P as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big endian;
* -- then y_P as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big endian;
* -- where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve.
*
* - 2 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
* - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (id-ecPublicKey OID);
* - 1 + 1 + 12 bytes of namedCurve OID;
* - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead;
* - 1 byte + 2 * point size in ECPoint.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
(2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 36)
/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair.
*
* An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEYPAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
(PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
/** Safe output buffer size for psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key().
*
* This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
* compile-time constants.
*
* \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
* zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
* side effects.
*
* The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export
* a key by querying the key type and size at runtime.
* \code{c}
* psa_key_type_t key_type;
* size_t key_bits;
* psa_status_t status;
* status = psa_get_key_information(key, &key_type, &key_bits);
* if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
* size_t buffer_size = PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
* unsigned char *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
* if (buffer != NULL) handle_error(...);
* size_t buffer_length;
* status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
* if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
* \endcode
*
* For psa_export_public_key(), calculate the buffer size from the
* public key type. You can use the macro #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR
* to convert a key pair type to the corresponding public key type.
* \code{c}
* psa_key_type_t key_type;
* size_t key_bits;
* psa_status_t status;
* status = psa_get_key_information(key, &key_type, &key_bits);
* if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
* psa_key_type_t public_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(key_type);
* size_t buffer_size = PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(public_key_type, key_bits);
* unsigned char *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
* if (buffer != NULL) handle_error(...);
* size_t buffer_length;
* status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
* if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
* \endcode
*
* \param key_type A supported key type.
* \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
*
* \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
* a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
* psa_asymmetric_sign() will not fail with
* #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
* If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported
* by the implementation, this macro either shall return either a
* sensible size or 0.
* If the parameters are not valid, the
* return value is unspecified.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
(key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEYPAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
(key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
(key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEYPAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEYPAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
(key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEYPAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEYPAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
0)
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */

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/**
* \file psa/crypto_struct.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS structured type implementations
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include psa/crypto.h.
*
* This file contains the definitions of some data structures with
* implementation-specific definitions.
*
* In implementations with isolation between the application and the
* cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end
* would have different versions of this file.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H
/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it
* in each of its header files. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "../mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/md2.h"
#include "mbedtls/md4.h"
#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
struct psa_hash_operation_s
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
union
{
unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C)
mbedtls_md2_context md2;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C)
mbedtls_md4_context md4;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
mbedtls_md5_context md5;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
mbedtls_ripemd160_context ripemd160;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
mbedtls_sha1_context sha1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
#endif
} ctx;
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
typedef struct
{
/** The hash context. */
struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx;
/** The HMAC part of the context. */
uint8_t opad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
} psa_hmac_internal_data;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
struct psa_mac_operation_s
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
unsigned int key_set : 1;
unsigned int iv_required : 1;
unsigned int iv_set : 1;
unsigned int has_input : 1;
unsigned int is_sign : 1;
uint8_t mac_size;
union
{
unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
psa_hmac_internal_data hmac;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cmac;
#endif
} ctx;
};
struct psa_cipher_operation_s
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
unsigned int key_set : 1;
unsigned int iv_required : 1;
unsigned int iv_set : 1;
uint8_t iv_size;
uint8_t block_size;
union
{
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher;
} ctx;
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
typedef struct
{
uint8_t *info;
size_t info_length;
psa_hmac_internal_data hmac;
uint8_t prk[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff
#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t"
#endif
uint8_t offset_in_block;
uint8_t block_number;
} psa_hkdf_generator_t;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_generator_s
{
/* The TLS 1.2 PRF uses the key for each HMAC iteration,
* hence we must store it for the lifetime of the generator.
* This is different from HKDF, where the key is only used
* in the extraction phase, but not during expansion. */
unsigned char *key;
size_t key_len;
/* `A(i) + seed` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5 */
uint8_t *Ai_with_seed;
size_t Ai_with_seed_len;
/* `HMAC_hash( prk, A(i) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */
uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff
#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t"
#endif
/* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have
* already been read by the user. */
uint8_t offset_in_block;
/* The 1-based number of the block. */
uint8_t block_number;
} psa_tls12_prf_generator_t;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
struct psa_crypto_generator_s
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
size_t capacity;
union
{
struct
{
uint8_t *data;
size_t size;
} buffer;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
psa_hkdf_generator_t hkdf;
psa_tls12_prf_generator_t tls12_prf;
#endif
} ctx;
};
#define PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT {0, 0, {{0, 0}}}
static inline struct psa_crypto_generator_s psa_crypto_generator_init( void )
{
const struct psa_crypto_generator_s v = PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT;
return( v );
}
struct psa_key_policy_s
{
psa_key_usage_t usage;
psa_algorithm_t alg;
};
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */

101
include/psa/crypto_types.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
/**
* \file psa/crypto_types.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases.
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver
* header file.
*
* This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties
* of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and
* error codes returned by the library.
*
* This header file does not declare any function.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
#include <stdint.h>
/** \defgroup error Error codes
* @{
*/
/**
* \brief Function return status.
*
* This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success,
* or a nonzero value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are
* encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here.
*/
typedef int32_t psa_status_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
* @{
*/
/** \brief Encoding of a key type.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_key_type_t;
/** The type of PSA elliptic curve identifiers. */
typedef uint16_t psa_ecc_curve_t;
/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm.
*
* For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type
* does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers
* based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher
* mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded
* via #psa_key_type_t.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
* @{
*/
/** Encoding of key lifetimes.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t;
/** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys.
*/
typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t;
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup policy Key policies
* @{
*/
/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. */
typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t;
/**@}*/
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */

1420
include/psa/crypto_values.h Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

72
library/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ set(src_crypto
platform.c
platform_util.c
poly1305.c
psa_crypto.c
psa_crypto_slot_management.c
psa_crypto_storage.c
psa_crypto_storage_file.c
psa_crypto_storage_its.c
ripemd160.c
rsa.c
rsa_internal.c
@ -143,39 +148,64 @@ if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${libs})
target_include_directories(${mbedcrypto_static_target}
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/crypto/include/)
add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509)
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target})
if(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
install(TARGETS ${mbedcrypto_static_target}
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
else()
add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509)
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target})
add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls)
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target})
add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls)
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target})
install(TARGETS ${mbedtls_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
install(TARGETS ${mbedtls_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
endif()
endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 3)
target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
target_include_directories(mbedcrypto
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/crypto/include/)
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 0)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
if(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
install(TARGETS mbedcrypto
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
else()
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 0)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 12)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 12)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
endif()
endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_custom_target(lib DEPENDS mbedcrypto mbedx509 mbedtls)
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_dependencies(lib mbedcrypto_static mbedx509_static mbedtls_static)
if(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
add_custom_target(crypto_lib DEPENDS mbedcrypto)
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_dependencies(crypto_lib mbedcrypto_static)
endif()
else()
add_custom_target(lib DEPENDS mbedcrypto mbedx509 mbedtls)
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_dependencies(lib mbedcrypto_static mbedx509_static mbedtls_static)
endif()
endif()

11
library/Makefile
View File

@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ CFLAGS ?= -O2
WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -W -Wdeclaration-after-statement
LDFLAGS ?=
LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
CRYPTO_INCLUDES ?= -I../include
LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) $(CRYPTO_INCLUDES) -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
LOCAL_LDFLAGS =
ifdef DEBUG
@ -81,6 +82,11 @@ OBJS_CRYPTO= aes.o aesni.o arc4.o \
pk.o pk_wrap.o pkcs12.o \
pkcs5.o pkparse.o pkwrite.o \
platform.o platform_util.o poly1305.o \
psa_crypto.o \
psa_crypto_slot_management.o \
psa_crypto_storage.o \
psa_crypto_storage_file.o \
psa_crypto_storage_its.o \
ripemd160.o rsa_internal.o rsa.o \
sha1.o sha256.o sha512.o \
threading.o timing.o version.o \
@ -199,5 +205,6 @@ clean:
ifndef WINDOWS
rm -f *.o libmbed*
else
del /Q /F *.o libmbed*
if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o
if exist libmbed* del /Q /F libmbed*
endif

403
library/cipher.c
View File

@ -58,6 +58,11 @@
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -71,7 +76,8 @@
* a non-zero value.
* This is currently only used by GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
*/
static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2, size_t len )
static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2,
size_t len )
{
const unsigned char *p1 = (const unsigned char*) v1;
const unsigned char *p2 = (const unsigned char*) v2;
@ -108,7 +114,8 @@ const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void )
return( mbedtls_cipher_supported );
}
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type )
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(
const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
@ -119,7 +126,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher
return( NULL );
}
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name )
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(
const char *cipher_name )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
@ -133,9 +141,10 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher
return( NULL );
}
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id,
int key_bitlen,
const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode )
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(
const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id,
int key_bitlen,
const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
@ -158,6 +167,29 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
if( ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL )
{
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
if( cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED )
{
/* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */
(void) psa_destroy_key( cipher_psa->slot );
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cipher_psa, sizeof( *cipher_psa ) );
mbedtls_free( cipher_psa );
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) );
return;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
if( ctx->cmac_ctx )
{
@ -173,7 +205,8 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) );
}
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info )
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info )
{
if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -199,12 +232,119 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_in
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_operation_t operation )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
size_t taglen )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
psa_algorithm_t alg;
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa;
if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are
* supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */
alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( cipher_info->mode, taglen );
if( alg == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
if( mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( cipher_info->type ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) );
cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa ) );
if( cipher_psa == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED );
cipher_psa->alg = alg;
ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa;
ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info;
ctx->psa_enabled = 1;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
int key_bitlen,
const mbedtls_operation_t operation )
{
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info ||
NULL == ctx->cipher_ctx )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
if( operation != MBEDTLS_DECRYPT &&
operation != MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
size_t const key_bytelen = ( (size_t) key_bitlen + 7 ) / 8;
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_type_t key_type;
psa_key_usage_t key_usage;
psa_key_policy_t key_policy;
/* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */
if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */
if( cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Find a fresh key slot to use. */
status = mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( &cipher_psa->slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to
* destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */
cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED;
/* From that point on, the responsibility for destroying the
* key slot is on mbedtls_cipher_free(). This includes the case
* where the policy setup or key import below fail, as
* mbedtls_cipher_free() needs to be called in any case. */
/* Setup policy for the new key slot. */
psa_key_policy_init( &key_policy );
/* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation
* (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption
* and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this
* are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */
/* key_usage = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */
key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &key_policy, key_usage, cipher_psa->alg );
status = psa_set_key_policy( cipher_psa->slot, &key_policy );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* Populate new key slot. */
key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(
ctx->cipher_info->type );
if( key_type == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
status = psa_import_key( cipher_psa->slot,
key_type, key, key_bytelen );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen;
ctx->operation = operation;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN ) == 0 &&
(int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen )
{
@ -223,12 +363,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *k
MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_enc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key,
ctx->key_bitlen );
ctx->key_bitlen );
}
if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation )
return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_dec_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key,
ctx->key_bitlen );
ctx->key_bitlen );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
@ -242,6 +383,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
else if( NULL == iv && iv_len != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( NULL == iv && iv_len == 0 )
ctx->iv_size = 0;
@ -286,6 +437,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* We don't support resetting PSA-based
* cipher contexts, yet. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
return( 0 );
@ -298,6 +458,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
@ -342,6 +512,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
*olen = 0;
block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx );
@ -748,6 +928,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || NULL == olen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
*olen = 0;
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode ||
@ -830,7 +1020,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode )
int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode )
{
if( NULL == ctx ||
MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ctx->cipher_info->mode )
@ -838,6 +1029,19 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_ciph
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding
* schemes, we currently don't make them
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
if( mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
switch( mode )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
@ -887,9 +1091,22 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
return mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag, tag_len );
return( mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
tag, tag_len ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
@ -899,8 +1116,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if ( tag_len != 16U )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
return mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx,
tag );
return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(
(mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag ) );
}
#endif
@ -919,14 +1136,25 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
if( tag_len > sizeof( check_tag ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
check_tag, tag_len ) ) )
if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(
(mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
check_tag, tag_len ) ) )
{
return( ret );
}
@ -946,8 +1174,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if ( tag_len != sizeof( check_tag ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx,
check_tag );
ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(
(mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag );
if ( ret != 0 )
{
return( ret );
@ -976,16 +1204,76 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
int ret;
size_t finish_olen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
* a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
* still be in its default state of 0, which is
* guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
* below will gracefully fail. */
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
psa_status_t status;
psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op;
size_t part_len;
if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT )
{
status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &cipher_op,
cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg );
}
else if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT )
{
status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &cipher_op,
cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg );
}
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* In the following, we can immediately return on an error,
* because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations
* are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(),
* and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
status = psa_cipher_update( &cipher_op,
input, ilen,
output, ilen, olen );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
status = psa_cipher_finish( &cipher_op,
output + *olen, ilen - *olen,
&part_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
*olen += part_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( ctx, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, output, olen ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen,
output, olen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, &finish_olen ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen,
&finish_olen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*olen += finish_olen;
@ -1004,13 +1292,45 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
* a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
* still be in its default state of 0, which is
* guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
* below will gracefully fail. */
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
psa_status_t status;
/* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag
* at the end of the encrypted message. */
if( tag != output + ilen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
status = psa_aead_encrypt( cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg,
iv, iv_len,
ad, ad_len,
input, ilen,
output, ilen + tag_len, olen );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
*olen -= tag_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
*olen = ilen;
return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen,
iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output,
tag_len, tag ) );
return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
input, output, tag_len, tag ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
@ -1051,6 +1371,39 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
* a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
* still be in its default state of 0, which is
* guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
* below will gracefully fail. */
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
psa_status_t status;
/* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag
* at the end of the encrypted message. */
if( tag != input + ilen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
status = psa_aead_decrypt( cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg,
iv, iv_len,
ad, ad_len,
input, ilen + tag_len,
output, ilen, olen );
if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
else if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{

3
library/cipher_wrap.c
View File

@ -2266,7 +2266,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] =
{ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL }
};
#define NUM_CIPHERS sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions / sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]
#define NUM_CIPHERS ( sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \
sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]) )
int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS];
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */

103
library/pk.c
View File

@ -41,6 +41,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
@ -139,6 +143,38 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info )
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* Initialise a PSA-wrapping context
*/
int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const psa_key_slot_t key )
{
const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info;
psa_key_slot_t *pk_ctx;
psa_key_type_t type;
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_information( key, &type, NULL ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */
if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEYPAIR( type ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ;
if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
ctx->pk_info = info;
pk_ctx = (psa_key_slot_t *) ctx->pk_ctx;
*pk_ctx = key;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
/*
* Initialize an RSA-alt context
@ -433,12 +469,14 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv )
{
if( pub == NULL || pub->pk_info == NULL ||
prv == NULL || prv->pk_info == NULL ||
prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL )
prv == NULL || prv->pk_info == NULL )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT )
{
if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
@ -501,4 +539,65 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx )
return( ctx->pk_info->type );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* Load the key to a PSA key slot,
* then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot.
*
* Currently only works for EC private keys.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_slot_t *slot,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
#else
psa_key_slot_t key;
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec;
unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t d_len;
psa_ecc_curve_t curve_id;
psa_key_type_t key_type;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
int ret;
/* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk );
d_len = ( ec->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, d, d_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
curve_id = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( ec->grp.id )->tls_id;
/* find a free key slot */
if( PSA_SUCCESS != mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( &key ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* set policy */
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN,
PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) );
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_set_key_policy( key, &policy ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* import private key in slot */
key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(curve_id);
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_import_key( key, key_type, d, d_len ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* remember slot number to be destroyed later by caller */
*slot = key;
/* make PK context wrap the key slot */
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
return( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( pk, key ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */

337
library/pk_wrap.c
View File

@ -41,10 +41,20 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -472,6 +482,154 @@ static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of
* those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA.
*/
static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int( unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *to, size_t to_len )
{
int ret;
size_t unpadded_len, padding_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( from, end, &unpadded_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
while( unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00 )
{
( *from )++;
unpadded_len--;
}
if( unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len;
memset( to, 0x00, padding_len );
memcpy( to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len );
( *from ) += unpadded_len;
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers
* to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least
* twice as big as int_size.
*/
static int extract_ecdsa_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size )
{
int ret;
size_t tmp_size;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &tmp_size,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/* Extract r */
if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig, int_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/* Extract s */
if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig + int_size, int_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
}
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
int ret;
psa_key_slot_t key_slot;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_key_type_t psa_type;
mbedtls_pk_context key;
int key_len;
/* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */
unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*) sig;
mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info;
psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md, psa_md;
psa_ecc_curve_t curve = mbedtls_psa_translate_ecc_group(
( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx )->grp.id );
const size_t signature_part_size = ( ( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx )->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8;
if( curve == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* mbedlts_pk_write_pubkey_der() expects a full PK context,
* re-construct one to make it happy */
key.pk_info = &pk_info;
key.pk_ctx = ctx;
key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( &key, buf, sizeof( buf ) );
if( key_len <= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( &key_slot ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( ret ) );
psa_md = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg );
if( psa_md == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( psa_md );
psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve );
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY, psa_sig_md );
if( ( ret = psa_set_key_policy( key_slot, &policy ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( ret );
goto cleanup;
}
if( psa_import_key( key_slot, psa_type, buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
/* We don't need the exported key anymore and can
* reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */
if( 2 * signature_part_size > sizeof( buf ) )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig( &p, sig + sig_len, buf,
signature_part_size ) ) != 0 )
{
goto cleanup;
}
if( psa_asymmetric_verify( key_slot, psa_sig_md,
hash, hash_len,
buf, 2 * signature_part_size )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if( p != sig + sig_len )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
return( ret );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
@ -487,6 +645,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
@ -716,4 +875,182 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap( void )
{
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psa_key_slot_t ) );
/* no _init() function to call, an calloc() already zeroized */
return( ctx );
}
static void pk_opaque_free_wrap( void *ctx )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( psa_key_slot_t ) );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen( const void *ctx )
{
const psa_key_slot_t *key = (const psa_key_slot_t *) ctx;
size_t bits;
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_information( *key, NULL, &bits ) )
return( 0 );
return( bits );
}
static int pk_opaque_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
{
/* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs,
* as checked by setup_psa().
* Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */
return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA );
}
/*
* Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer
* to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer.
* See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi().
*
* p: pointer to the end of the output buffer
* start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end
* n_len: length of the mpi to read from start
*/
static int asn1_write_mpibuf( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
size_t n_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
if( (size_t)( *p - start ) < n_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
len = n_len;
*p -= len;
memmove( *p, start, len );
/* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
* Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect
* that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */
while( len > 0 && **p == 0x00 )
{
++(*p);
--len;
}
/* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */
if( len == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0.
* Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */
if( **p & 0x80 )
{
if( *p - start < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
*--(*p) = 0x00;
len += 1;
}
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) );
return( (int) len );
}
/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence.
* See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of
* MPIs, and in-place.
*
* [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding
* [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding
* [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer
*/
static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
size_t buf_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2;
unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig + rs_len, rs_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig, rs_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, sig, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, sig,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
memmove( sig, p, len );
*sig_len = len;
return( 0 );
}
static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
const psa_key_slot_t *key = (const psa_key_slot_t *) ctx;
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) );
size_t bits, buf_len;
psa_status_t status;
/* PSA has its own RNG */
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
/* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide
* that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a
* maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is
* buggy anyway). */
status = psa_get_key_information( *key, NULL, &bits );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) );
buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits );
/* make the signature */
status = psa_asymmetric_sign( *key, alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, buf_len, sig_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) );
/* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */
return( pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( sig, sig_len, buf_len ) );
}
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = {
MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
"Opaque",
pk_opaque_get_bitlen,
pk_opaque_can_do,
NULL, /* verify - will be done later */
pk_opaque_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */
NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */
#endif
NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */
NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */
NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */
pk_opaque_alloc_wrap,
pk_opaque_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */
NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */
#endif
NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */

29
library/pkwrite.c
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@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -161,6 +164,28 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) );
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE )
{
size_t buffer_size;
psa_key_slot_t* key_slot = (psa_key_slot_t*) key->pk_ctx;
if ( *p < start )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
buffer_size = (size_t)( *p - start );
if ( psa_export_public_key( *key_slot, start, buffer_size, &len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
else
{
memmove( *p - len, start, len );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return( (int) len );
@ -177,6 +202,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, key ) );
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE )
{
return( (int) len );
}
if( c - buf < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );

4423
library/psa_crypto.c Normal file
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99
library/psa_crypto_core.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
/*
* PSA crypto core internal interfaces
*/
/* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material
* and metadata for one key.
*/
typedef struct
{
psa_key_type_t type;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime;
psa_key_id_t persistent_storage_id;
unsigned allocated : 1;
union
{
struct raw_data
{
uint8_t *data;
size_t bytes;
} raw;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
} data;
} psa_key_slot_t;
/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy.
*
* Persistent storage is not affected.
*
* \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was
* already fully wiped.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot );
/** Import key data into a slot.
*
* `slot->type` must have been set previously.
* This function assumes that the slot does not contain any key material yet.
* On failure, the slot content is unchanged.
*
* Persistent storage is not affected.
*
* \param[in,out] slot The key slot to import data into.
* Its `type` field must have previously been set to
* the desired key type.
* It must not contain any key material yet.
* \param[in] data Buffer containing the key material to parse and import.
* \param data_length Size of \p data in bytes.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
*/
psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */

79
library/psa_crypto_invasive.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
/**
* \file psa_crypto_invasive.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: invasive interfaces for test only.
*
* The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only.
* They MUST NOT be made available to clients over IPC in integrations
* with isolation, and they SHOULD NOT be made available in library
* integrations except when building the library for testing.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#else
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
/** \brief Configure entropy sources.
*
* This function may only be called before a call to psa_crypto_init(),
* or after a call to mbedtls_psa_crypto_free() and before any
* subsequent call to psa_crypto_init().
*
* This function is only intended for test purposes. The functionality
* it provides is also useful for system integrators, but
* system integrators should configure entropy drivers instead of
* breaking through to the Mbed TLS API.
*
* \param entropy_init Function to initialize the entropy context
* and set up the desired entropy sources.
* It is called by psa_crypto_init().
* By default this is mbedtls_entropy_init().
* This function cannot report failures directly.
* To indicate a failure, set the entropy context
* to a state where mbedtls_entropy_func() will
* return an error.
* \param entropy_free Function to free the entropy context
* and associated resources.
* It is called by mbedtls_psa_crypto_free().
* By default this is mbedtls_entropy_free().
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* The caller does not have the permission to configure
* entropy sources.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
* The library has already been initialized.
*/
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources(
void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ),
void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */

287
library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
/*
* PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto
*/
/* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h"
#include "psa_crypto_storage.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) )
typedef struct
{
psa_key_slot_t key_slots[PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT];
unsigned key_slots_initialized : 1;
} psa_global_data_t;
static psa_global_data_t global_data;
/* Access a key slot at the given handle. The handle of a key slot is
* the index of the slot in the global slot array, plus one so that handles
* start at 1 and not 0. */
psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot( psa_key_handle_t handle,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot )
{
psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
if( ! global_data.key_slots_initialized )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
/* 0 is not a valid handle under any circumstance. This
* implementation provides slots number 1 to N where N is the
* number of available slots. */
if( handle == 0 || handle > ARRAY_LENGTH( global_data.key_slots ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE );
slot = &global_data.key_slots[handle - 1];
/* If the slot hasn't been allocated, the handle is invalid. */
if( ! slot->allocated )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE );
*p_slot = slot;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void )
{
/* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both
* guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which
* means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. */
global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void )
{
psa_key_handle_t key;
for( key = 1; key <= PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; key++ )
{
psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[key - 1];
(void) psa_wipe_key_slot( slot );
}
global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0;
}
/** Find a free key slot and mark it as in use.
*
* \param[out] handle On success, a slot number that is not in use. This
* value can be used as a handle to the slot.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
*/
static psa_status_t psa_internal_allocate_key_slot( psa_key_handle_t *handle )
{
for( *handle = PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; *handle != 0; --( *handle ) )
{
psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[*handle - 1];
if( ! slot->allocated )
{
slot->allocated = 1;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
}
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
}
/** Wipe a key slot and mark it as available.
*
* This does not affect persistent storage.
*
* \param handle The handle to the key slot to release.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
static psa_status_t psa_internal_release_key_slot( psa_key_handle_t handle )
{
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
psa_status_t status;
status = psa_get_key_slot( handle, &slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
return( psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_allocate_key( psa_key_type_t type,
size_t max_bits,
psa_key_handle_t *handle )
{
/* This implementation doesn't reserve memory for the keys. */
(void) type;
(void) max_bits;
*handle = 0;
return( psa_internal_allocate_key_slot( handle ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *p_slot )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
uint8_t *key_data = NULL;
size_t key_data_length = 0;
status = psa_load_persistent_key( p_slot->persistent_storage_id,
&( p_slot )->type,
&( p_slot )->policy, &key_data,
&key_data_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
status = psa_import_key_into_slot( p_slot,
key_data, key_data_length );
exit:
psa_free_persistent_key_data( key_data, key_data_length );
return( status );
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */
/** Declare a slot as persistent and load it from storage.
*
* This function may only be called immediately after a successful call
* to psa_internal_allocate_key_slot().
*
* \param handle A handle to a key slot freshly allocated with
* psa_internal_allocate_key_slot().
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* The slot content was loaded successfully.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
* There is no content for this slot in persistent storage.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \p id is not acceptable.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
*/
static psa_status_t psa_internal_make_key_persistent( psa_key_handle_t handle,
psa_key_id_t id )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
psa_status_t status;
/* Reject id=0 because by general library conventions, 0 is an invalid
* value wherever possible. */
if( id == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Reject high values because the file names are reserved for the
* library's internal use. */
if( id >= PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
status = psa_get_key_slot( handle, &slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
slot->lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT;
slot->persistent_storage_id = id;
status = psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( slot );
return( status );
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */
(void) handle;
(void) id;
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */
}
static psa_status_t persistent_key_setup( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime,
psa_key_id_t id,
psa_key_handle_t *handle,
psa_status_t wanted_load_status )
{
psa_status_t status;
*handle = 0;
if( lifetime != PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
status = psa_internal_allocate_key_slot( handle );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
status = psa_internal_make_key_persistent( *handle, id );
if( status != wanted_load_status )
{
psa_internal_release_key_slot( *handle );
*handle = 0;
}
return( status );
}
psa_status_t psa_open_key( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime,
psa_key_id_t id,
psa_key_handle_t *handle )
{
return( persistent_key_setup( lifetime, id, handle, PSA_SUCCESS ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_create_key( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime,
psa_key_id_t id,
psa_key_type_t type,
size_t max_bits,
psa_key_handle_t *handle )
{
psa_status_t status;
/* This implementation doesn't reserve memory for the keys. */
(void) type;
(void) max_bits;
status = persistent_key_setup( lifetime, id, handle,
PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT );
switch( status )
{
case PSA_SUCCESS: return( PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT );
case PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT: return( PSA_SUCCESS );
default: return( status );
}
}
psa_status_t psa_close_key( psa_key_handle_t handle )
{
return( psa_internal_release_key_slot( handle ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */

58
library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
/*
* PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto
*/
/* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H
/* Number of key slots (plus one because 0 is not used).
* The value is a compile-time constant for now, for simplicity. */
#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32
/** Access a key slot at the given handle.
*
* \param handle Key handle to query.
* \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the
* key slot in memory designated by \p handle.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success: \p handle is a handle to `*p_slot`. Note that `*p_slot`
* may be empty or occupied.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* \p handle is out of range or is not in use.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
* The library has not been initialized.
*/
psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot( psa_key_handle_t handle,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot );
/** Initialize the key slot structures.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Currently this function always succeeds.
*/
psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void );
/** Delete all data from key slots in memory.
*
* This does not affect persistent storage. */
void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void );
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H */

219
library/psa_crypto_storage.c Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
/*
* PSA persistent key storage
*/
/* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#else
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_storage.h"
#include "psa_crypto_storage_backend.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
/*
* 32-bit integer manipulation macros (little endian)
*/
#ifndef GET_UINT32_LE
#define GET_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \
{ \
(n) = ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) ] ) \
| ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 1] << 8 ) \
| ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 2] << 16 ) \
| ( (uint32_t) (b)[(i) + 3] << 24 ); \
}
#endif
#ifndef PUT_UINT32_LE
#define PUT_UINT32_LE(n,b,i) \
{ \
(b)[(i) ] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) ) & 0xFF ); \
(b)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \
(b)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \
(b)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char) ( ( (n) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \
}
#endif
/**
* Persistent key storage magic header.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY"
#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ( sizeof( PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER ) )
typedef struct {
uint8_t magic[PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH];
uint8_t version[4];
uint8_t type[sizeof( psa_key_type_t )];
uint8_t policy[sizeof( psa_key_policy_t )];
uint8_t data_len[4];
uint8_t key_data[];
} psa_persistent_key_storage_format;
void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data,
const size_t data_length,
const psa_key_type_t type,
const psa_key_policy_t *policy,
uint8_t *storage_data )
{
psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format =
(psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data;
memcpy( storage_format->magic, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH );
PUT_UINT32_LE(0, storage_format->version, 0);
PUT_UINT32_LE(type, storage_format->type, 0);
PUT_UINT32_LE(policy->usage, storage_format->policy, 0);
PUT_UINT32_LE(policy->alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ));
PUT_UINT32_LE(data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0);
memcpy( storage_format->key_data, data, data_length );
}
static psa_status_t check_magic_header( const uint8_t *data )
{
if( memcmp( data, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER,
PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ) != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data,
size_t storage_data_length,
uint8_t **key_data,
size_t *key_data_length,
psa_key_type_t *type,
psa_key_policy_t *policy )
{
psa_status_t status;
const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format =
(const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *)storage_data;
uint32_t version;
if( storage_data_length < sizeof(*storage_format) )
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
status = check_magic_header( storage_data );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
GET_UINT32_LE(version, storage_format->version, 0);
if( version != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
GET_UINT32_LE(*key_data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0);
if( *key_data_length > ( storage_data_length - sizeof(*storage_format) ) ||
*key_data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE )
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
*key_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *key_data_length );
if( *key_data == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
GET_UINT32_LE(*type, storage_format->type, 0);
GET_UINT32_LE(policy->usage, storage_format->policy, 0);
GET_UINT32_LE(policy->alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ));
memcpy( *key_data, storage_format->key_data, *key_data_length );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_key_id_t key,
const psa_key_type_t type,
const psa_key_policy_t *policy,
const uint8_t *data,
const size_t data_length )
{
size_t storage_data_length;
uint8_t *storage_data;
psa_status_t status;
if( data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE )
return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE;
storage_data_length = data_length + sizeof( psa_persistent_key_storage_format );
storage_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length );
if( storage_data == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
psa_format_key_data_for_storage( data, data_length, type, policy,
storage_data );
status = psa_crypto_storage_store( key,
storage_data, storage_data_length );
mbedtls_free( storage_data );
return( status );
}
void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length )
{
if( key_data != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_data, key_data_length );
}
mbedtls_free( key_data );
}
psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_key_id_t key,
psa_key_type_t *type,
psa_key_policy_t *policy,
uint8_t **data,
size_t *data_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
uint8_t *loaded_data;
size_t storage_data_length = 0;
status = psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( key, &storage_data_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
loaded_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length );
if( loaded_data == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
status = psa_crypto_storage_load( key, loaded_data, storage_data_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
status = psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( loaded_data, storage_data_length,
data, data_length, type, policy );
exit:
mbedtls_free( loaded_data );
return( status );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */

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/**
* \file psa_crypto_storage.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS key storage
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it
* in each of its header files. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#else
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include <stdint.h>
/* Limit the maximum key size to 30kB (just in case someone tries to
* inadvertently store an obscene amount of data) */
#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ( 30 * 1024 )
/** The maximum permitted persistent slot number.
*
* In Mbed Crypto 0.1.0b:
* - Using the file backend, all key ids are ok except 0.
* - Using the ITS backend, all key ids are ok except 0xFFFFFF52
* (#PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID) for which the file contains the
* device's random seed (if this feature is enabled).
* - Only key ids from 1 to #PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT are actually used.
*
* Since we need to preserve the random seed, avoid using that key slot.
* Reserve a whole range of key slots just in case something else comes up.
*
* This limitation will probably become moot when we implement client
* separation for key storage.
*/
#define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER 0xffff0000
/**
* \brief Format key data and metadata and save to a location for given key
* slot.
*
* This function formats the key data and metadata and saves it to a
* persistent storage backend. The storage location corresponding to the
* key slot must be empty, otherwise this function will fail. This function
* should be called after psa_import_key_into_slot() to ensure the
* persistent key is not saved into a storage location corresponding to an
* already occupied non-persistent key, as well as validating the key data.
*
*
* \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be stored. This
* should be an unoccupied storage location.
* \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value).
* \param[in] policy The key policy to save.
* \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data.
* \param data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT
*/
psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_key_id_t key,
const psa_key_type_t type,
const psa_key_policy_t *policy,
const uint8_t *data,
const size_t data_length );
/**
* \brief Parses key data and metadata and load persistent key for given
* key slot number.
*
* This function reads from a storage backend, parses the key data and
* metadata and writes them to the appropriate output parameters.
*
* Note: This function allocates a buffer and returns a pointer to it through
* the data parameter. psa_free_persistent_key_data() must be called after
* this function to zeroize and free this buffer, regardless of whether this
* function succeeds or fails.
*
* \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be loaded. This
* should be an occupied storage location.
* \param[out] type On success, the key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX
* value).
* \param[out] policy On success, the key's policy.
* \param[out] data Pointer to an allocated key data buffer on return.
* \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
*/
psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_key_id_t key,
psa_key_type_t *type,
psa_key_policy_t *policy,
uint8_t **data,
size_t *data_length );
/**
* \brief Remove persistent data for the given key slot number.
*
* \param key Persistent identifier of the key to remove
* from persistent storage.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* The key was successfully removed,
* or the key did not exist.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
*/
psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const psa_key_id_t key );
/**
* \brief Free the temporary buffer allocated by psa_load_persistent_key().
*
* This function must be called at some point after psa_load_persistent_key()
* to zeroize and free the memory allocated to the buffer in that function.
*
* \param key_data Buffer for the key data.
* \param key_data_length Size of the key data buffer.
*
*/
void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length );
/**
* \brief Formats key data and metadata for persistent storage
*
* \param[in] data Buffer for the key data.
* \param data_length Length of the key data buffer.
* \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value).
* \param policy The key policy.
* \param[out] storage_data Output buffer for the formatted data.
*
*/
void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data,
const size_t data_length,
const psa_key_type_t type,
const psa_key_policy_t *policy,
uint8_t *storage_data );
/**
* \brief Parses persistent storage data into key data and metadata
*
* \param[in] storage_data Buffer for the storage data.
* \param storage_data_length Length of the storage data buffer
* \param[out] key_data On output, pointer to a newly allocated buffer
* containing the key data. This must be freed
* using psa_free_persistent_key_data()
* \param[out] key_data_length Length of the key data buffer
* \param[out] type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value).
* \param[out] policy The key policy.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
*/
psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data,
size_t storage_data_length,
uint8_t **key_data,
size_t *key_data_length,
psa_key_type_t *type,
psa_key_policy_t *policy );
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H */

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/**
* \file psa_crypto_storage_backend.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS key storage backend
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_BACKEND_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_BACKEND_H
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it
* in each of its header files. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#else
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_storage.h"
#include <stdint.h>
/**
* \brief Load persistent data for the given key slot number.
*
* This function reads data from a storage backend and returns the data in a
* buffer.
*
* \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be loaded. This
* should be an occupied storage location.
* \param[out] data Buffer where the data is to be written.
* \param data_size Size of the \c data buffer in bytes.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
*/
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( const psa_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data,
size_t data_size );
/**
* \brief Store persistent data for the given key slot number.
*
* This function stores the given data buffer to a persistent storage.
*
* \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be stored. This
* should be an unoccupied storage location.
* \param[in] data Buffer containing the data to be stored.
* \param data_length The number of bytes
* that make up the data.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT
*/
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store( const psa_key_id_t key,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length );
/**
* \brief Checks if persistent data is stored for the given key slot number
*
* This function checks if any key data or metadata exists for the key slot in
* the persistent storage.
*
* \param key Persistent identifier to check.
*
* \retval 0
* No persistent data present for slot number
* \retval 1
* Persistent data present for slot number
*/
int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const psa_key_id_t key );
/**
* \brief Get data length for given key slot number.
*
* \param key Persistent identifier whose stored data length
* is to be obtained.
* \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the data.
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* \retval PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
*/
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( const psa_key_id_t key,
size_t *data_length );
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H */

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/*
* PSA file storage backend for persistent keys
*/
/* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#else
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C)
#include <string.h>
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_storage_backend.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf
#endif
/* This option sets where files are to be stored. If this is left unset,
* the files by default will be stored in the same location as the program,
* which may not be desired or possible. */
#if !defined(CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION)
#define CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION ""
#endif
enum { MAX_LOCATION_LEN = sizeof(CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION) + 40 };
static void key_id_to_location( const psa_key_id_t key,
char *location,
size_t location_size )
{
mbedtls_snprintf( location, location_size,
CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION "psa_key_slot_%lu",
(unsigned long) key );
}
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( const psa_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data,
size_t data_size )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
FILE *file;
size_t num_read;
char slot_location[MAX_LOCATION_LEN];
key_id_to_location( key, slot_location, MAX_LOCATION_LEN );
file = fopen( slot_location, "rb" );
if( file == NULL )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
num_read = fread( data, 1, data_size, file );
if( num_read != data_size )
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
exit:
if( file != NULL )
fclose( file );
return( status );
}
int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const psa_key_id_t key )
{
char slot_location[MAX_LOCATION_LEN];
FILE *file;
key_id_to_location( key, slot_location, MAX_LOCATION_LEN );
file = fopen( slot_location, "r" );
if( file == NULL )
{
/* File doesn't exist */
return( 0 );
}
fclose( file );
return( 1 );
}
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store( const psa_key_id_t key,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
int ret;
size_t num_written;
char slot_location[MAX_LOCATION_LEN];
FILE *file;
/* The storage location corresponding to "key slot 0" is used as a
* temporary location in order to make the apparition of the actual slot
* file atomic. 0 is not a valid key slot number, so this should not
* affect actual keys. */
const char *temp_location = CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_LOCATION "psa_key_slot_0";
key_id_to_location( key, slot_location, MAX_LOCATION_LEN );
if( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key ) == 1 )
return( PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT );
file = fopen( temp_location, "wb" );
if( file == NULL )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
num_written = fwrite( data, 1, data_length, file );
if( num_written != data_length )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
ret = fclose( file );
file = NULL;
if( ret != 0 )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
if( rename( temp_location, slot_location ) != 0 )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
exit:
if( file != NULL )
fclose( file );
remove( temp_location );
return( status );
}
psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const psa_key_id_t key )
{
FILE *file;
char slot_location[MAX_LOCATION_LEN];
key_id_to_location( key, slot_location, MAX_LOCATION_LEN );
/* Only try remove the file if it exists */
file = fopen( slot_location, "rb" );
if( file != NULL )
{
fclose( file );
if( remove( slot_location ) != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
}
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( const psa_key_id_t key,
size_t *data_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
FILE *file;
long file_size;
char slot_location[MAX_LOCATION_LEN];
key_id_to_location( key, slot_location, MAX_LOCATION_LEN );
file = fopen( slot_location, "rb" );
if( file == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT );
if( fseek( file, 0, SEEK_END ) != 0 )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
file_size = ftell( file );
if( file_size < 0 )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
#if LONG_MAX > SIZE_MAX
if( (unsigned long) file_size > SIZE_MAX )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
#endif
*data_length = (size_t) file_size;
exit:
fclose( file );
return( status );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C */

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/*
* PSA storage backend for persistent keys using psa_its APIs.
*/
/* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#else
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_storage_backend.h"
#include "psa_prot_internal_storage.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#endif
static psa_status_t its_to_psa_error( psa_its_status_t ret )
{
switch( ret )
{
case PSA_ITS_SUCCESS:
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
return( PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT );
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE:
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SPACE:
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE );
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_OFFSET_INVALID:
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIZE:
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_BAD_POINTER:
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_FLAGS_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
case PSA_ITS_ERROR_WRITE_ONCE:
return( PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT );
default:
return( PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR );
}
}
static uint32_t psa_its_identifier_of_slot( psa_key_id_t key )
{
return( key );
}
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( const psa_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data,
size_t data_size )
{
psa_its_status_t ret;
psa_status_t status;
uint32_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key );
struct psa_its_info_t data_identifier_info;
ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info );
status = its_to_psa_error( ret );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
ret = psa_its_get( data_identifier, 0, data_size, data );
status = its_to_psa_error( ret );
return( status );
}
int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const psa_key_id_t key )
{
psa_its_status_t ret;
uint32_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key );
struct psa_its_info_t data_identifier_info;
ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info );
if( ret == PSA_ITS_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND )
return( 0 );
return( 1 );
}
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store( const psa_key_id_t key,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length )
{
psa_its_status_t ret;
psa_status_t status;
uint32_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key );
struct psa_its_info_t data_identifier_info;
if( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key ) == 1 )
return( PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT );
ret = psa_its_set( data_identifier, data_length, data, 0 );
status = its_to_psa_error( ret );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
}
ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info );
status = its_to_psa_error( ret );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
goto exit;
}
if( data_identifier_info.size != data_length )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
exit:
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
psa_its_remove( data_identifier );
return( status );
}
psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const psa_key_id_t key )
{
psa_its_status_t ret;
uint32_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key );
struct psa_its_info_t data_identifier_info;
ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info );
if( ret == PSA_ITS_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND )
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
if( psa_its_remove( data_identifier ) != PSA_ITS_SUCCESS )
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info );
if( ret != PSA_ITS_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND )
return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( const psa_key_id_t key,
size_t *data_length )
{
psa_its_status_t ret;
psa_status_t status;
uint32_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key );
struct psa_its_info_t data_identifier_info;
ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info );
status = its_to_psa_error( ret );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
*data_length = (size_t) data_identifier_info.size;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C */

16
library/rsa.c
View File

@ -1124,7 +1124,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
p += hlen;
p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
*p++ = 1;
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
if( ilen != 0 )
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
@ -1171,7 +1172,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
// We don't check p_rng because it won't be dereferenced here
if( f_rng == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL )
if( f_rng == NULL || output == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ilen != 0 && input == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
olen = ctx->len;
@ -1211,7 +1214,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
}
*p++ = 0;
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
if( ilen != 0 )
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
@ -1375,7 +1379,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
}
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
if( *olen != 0 )
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
ret = 0;
cleanup:
@ -1473,7 +1478,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
}
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
if( *olen != 0 )
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
ret = 0;
cleanup:

84
library/ssl_cli.c
View File

@ -51,6 +51,44 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
{
if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
conf->psk_identity_len == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
return( 1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
{
if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
conf->psk_identity_len == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
@ -754,6 +792,15 @@ static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_inf
return( 1 );
#endif
/* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) &&
ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
return( 1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
@ -3007,10 +3054,12 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
/*
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL )
if( ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for PSK" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
/* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
* and we check that the server's choice is among the
* ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
i = 4;
@ -3039,6 +3088,12 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 2 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
@ -3047,6 +3102,12 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
*/
@ -3077,6 +3138,12 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
*/
@ -3098,6 +3165,17 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK &&
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
{

75
library/ssl_srv.c
View File

@ -149,6 +149,48 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
{
if( conf->f_psk != NULL )
return( 1 );
if( conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL )
return( 0 );
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
return( 1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
{
/* If we've used a callback to select the PSK,
* the static configuration is irrelevant. */
if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
if( ssl->conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
@ -867,9 +909,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id,
/* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't
* have one, skip it now rather than failing later */
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) &&
ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL &&
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) )
ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) );
return( 0 );
@ -3648,9 +3688,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha
int ret = 0;
size_t n;
if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL &&
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) )
if( ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
@ -3828,6 +3866,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation atomatically
* and skip the intermediate PMS. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) );
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
{
@ -3859,6 +3904,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret );
@ -3888,6 +3939,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif
if( p != end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
@ -3919,6 +3976,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,

80
library/ssl_ticket.c
View File

@ -54,6 +54,19 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx )
#define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */
#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4
#define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12
#define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2
#define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16
#define TICKET_MIN_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \
TICKET_IV_BYTES + \
TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES + \
TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES )
#define TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \
TICKET_IV_BYTES + \
TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES )
/*
* Generate/update a key
*/
@ -141,11 +154,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
if( cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[0].ctx,
cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
return( ret );
/* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA,
* so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[1].ctx,
cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
return( ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 0 ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 1 ) ) != 0 )
@ -278,6 +307,7 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
* The key_name, iv, and length of encrypted_state are the additional
* authenticated data.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *start,
@ -289,9 +319,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key;
unsigned char *key_name = start;
unsigned char *iv = start + 4;
unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + 12;
unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + 2;
unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES;
unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES;
unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES;
unsigned char *tag;
size_t clear_len, ciph_len;
@ -302,7 +332,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
/* We need at least 4 bytes for key_name, 12 for IV, 2 for len 16 for tag,
* in addition to session itself, that will be checked when writing it. */
if( end - start < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 )
if( end - start < TICKET_MIN_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -317,9 +347,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
*ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime;
memcpy( key_name, key->name, 4 );
memcpy( key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES );
if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, 12 ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
/* Dump session state */
@ -335,8 +365,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
/* Encrypt and authenticate */
tag = state + clear_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &key->ctx,
iv, 12, key_name, 4 + 12 + 2,
state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 )
iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES,
/* Additional data: key name, IV and length */
key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN,
state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len,
tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 )
{
goto cleanup;
}
@ -346,7 +379,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
goto cleanup;
}
*tlen = 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 + ciph_len;
*tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len;
cleanup:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -385,17 +418,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket,
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key;
unsigned char *key_name = buf;
unsigned char *iv = buf + 4;
unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 12;
unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + 2;
unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES;
unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES;
unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES;
unsigned char *tag;
size_t enc_len, clear_len;
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* See mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write() */
if( len < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 )
if( len < TICKET_MIN_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -409,7 +441,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket,
enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1];
tag = ticket + enc_len;
if( len != 4 + 12 + 2 + enc_len + 16 )
if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
@ -425,9 +457,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket,
}
/* Decrypt and authenticate */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx, iv, 12,
key_name, 4 + 12 + 2, ticket, enc_len,
ticket, &clear_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx,
iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES,
/* Additional data: key name, IV and length */
key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN,
ticket, enc_len,
ticket, &clear_len,
tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;

382
library/ssl_tls.c
View File

@ -607,9 +607,34 @@ static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
{
/* If we've used a callback to select the PSK,
* the static configuration is irrelevant. */
if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
if( ssl->conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int psa_fallthrough;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char tmp[64];
unsigned char keyblk[256];
unsigned char *key1;
@ -618,9 +643,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
unsigned char *mac_dec;
size_t mac_key_len;
size_t iv_copy_len;
size_t taglen = 0;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
/* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1:
* "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */
size_t const master_secret_len = 48;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
unsigned char session_hash[48];
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_negotiate;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
@ -700,68 +734,127 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* TLSv1+:
* master = PRF( premaster, "master secret", randbytes )[0..47]
*/
if( handshake->resume == 0 )
if( handshake->resume != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", handshake->premaster,
handshake->pmslen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) );
}
else
{
/* The label for the KDF used for key expansion.
* This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret"
* depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension
* is used. */
char const *lbl = "master secret";
/* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion.
* - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used,
* this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random
* (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246).
* - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used,
* this is the transcript of the handshake so far.
* (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */
unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes;
size_t salt_len = 64;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = ciphersuite_info->mac;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED )
{
unsigned char session_hash[48];
size_t hash_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using extended master secret" ) );
lbl = "extended master secret";
salt = session_hash;
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac ==
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
{
hash_len = 48;
}
if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
salt_len = 48;
else
#endif
hash_len = 32;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
salt_len = 32;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
hash_len = 36;
salt_len = 36;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash", session_hash, hash_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash", session_hash, salt_len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK &&
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
{
/* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */
psa_status_t status;
psa_algorithm_t alg;
psa_crypto_generator_t generator = PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT;
psa_key_slot_t psk;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion" ) );
psk = ssl->conf->psk_opaque;
if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
psk = ssl->handshake->psk_opaque;
if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
else
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
status = psa_key_derivation( &generator, psk, alg,
salt, salt_len,
(unsigned char const *) lbl,
(size_t) strlen( lbl ),
master_secret_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_generator_abort( &generator );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
status = psa_generator_read( &generator, session->master,
master_secret_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_generator_abort( &generator );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
status = psa_generator_abort( &generator );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
else
#endif
{
ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen,
"extended master secret",
session_hash, hash_len,
session->master, 48 );
lbl, salt, salt_len,
session->master,
master_secret_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif
ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen,
"master secret",
handshake->randbytes, 64,
session->master, 48 );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret",
handshake->premaster,
handshake->pmslen );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster,
sizeof(handshake->premaster) );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster,
sizeof(handshake->premaster) );
}
}
else
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) );
/*
* Swap the client and server random values.
@ -810,7 +903,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
{
size_t taglen, explicit_ivlen;
size_t explicit_ivlen;
transform->maclen = 0;
mac_key_len = 0;
@ -1030,6 +1123,43 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2.
* That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where
* we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates
* the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based
* implementation currently doesn't. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
cipher_info, taglen );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ret == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) );
psa_fallthrough = 0;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
psa_fallthrough = 1;
}
}
else
psa_fallthrough = 1;
#else
psa_fallthrough = 1;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
if( psa_fallthrough == 1 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
{
@ -1037,6 +1167,42 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2.
* That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where
* we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates
* the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based
* implementation currently doesn't. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
cipher_info, taglen );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ret == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) );
psa_fallthrough = 0;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) );
psa_fallthrough = 1;
}
}
else
psa_fallthrough = 1;
#else
psa_fallthrough = 1;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
if( psa_fallthrough == 1 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
{
@ -7326,23 +7492,23 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len )
static void ssl_conf_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
if( psk == NULL || psk_identity == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */
if( ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 ||
psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
/* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the
* user's responsibility. */
conf->psk_opaque = 0;
}
/* This and the following branch should never
* be taken simultaenously as we maintain the
* invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never
* configured simultaneously. As a safeguard,
* though, `else` is omitted here. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( conf->psk != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len );
@ -7351,32 +7517,84 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
conf->psk = NULL;
conf->psk_len = 0;
}
/* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */
if( conf->psk_identity != NULL )
{
mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
conf->psk_identity = NULL;
conf->psk_identity_len = 0;
}
}
if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ||
( conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ) ) == NULL )
/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset.
* It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts
* to make a copy of it in the SSL config.
* On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */
static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
unsigned char const *psk_identity,
size_t psk_identity_len )
{
/* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */
if( psk_identity == NULL ||
( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 ||
psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
mbedtls_free( conf->psk );
mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity );
conf->psk = NULL;
conf->psk_identity = NULL;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
conf->psk_len = psk_len;
conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len;
conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len );
if( conf->psk_identity == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len );
conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len;
memcpy( conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len );
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len )
{
int ret;
/* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */
ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
/* Check and set raw PSK */
if( psk == NULL || psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
conf->psk_len = psk_len;
memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len );
/* Check and set PSK Identity */
ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len );
if( ret != 0 )
ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
return( ret );
}
static void ssl_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = 0;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk,
ssl->handshake->psk_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk );
ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0;
}
}
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len )
{
@ -7386,13 +7604,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk,
ssl->handshake->psk_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk );
ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0;
}
ssl_remove_psk( ssl );
if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
@ -7403,6 +7615,42 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
psa_key_slot_t psk_slot,
const unsigned char *psk_identity,
size_t psk_identity_len )
{
int ret;
/* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */
ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
/* Check and set opaque PSK */
if( psk_slot == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
conf->psk_opaque = psk_slot;
/* Check and set PSK Identity */
ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity,
psk_identity_len );
if( ret != 0 )
ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
return( ret );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
psa_key_slot_t psk_slot )
{
if( psk_slot == 0 || ssl->handshake == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ssl_remove_psk( ssl );
ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk_slot;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
size_t),

24
library/version_features.c
View File

@ -402,6 +402,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
"MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
"MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */
@ -417,6 +420,12 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
"MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
"MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
@ -513,6 +522,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
"MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
"MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES)
"MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */
@ -681,6 +693,18 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
"MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
"MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */

34
library/x509_crt.c
View File

@ -49,6 +49,11 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -1892,16 +1897,35 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t hash_len;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
/* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */
if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#else
psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md );
if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( -1 );
if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
/* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
return( -1 );
}
if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
return( -1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) )
return( -1 );
@ -1910,7 +1934,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )
{
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) );
}
#else
@ -1918,7 +1942,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
#endif
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) );
}

27
library/x509write_csr.c
View File

@ -37,6 +37,11 @@
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@ -136,7 +141,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s
size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation;
size_t hash_len;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( ctx->md_alg );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* Prepare data to be signed in tmp_buf
*/
@ -187,9 +196,23 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s
/*
* Prepare signature
* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error
*/
mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, c, len ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{

4
programs/.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ pkey/rsa_sign
pkey/rsa_sign_pss
pkey/rsa_verify
pkey/rsa_verify_pss
psa/crypto_examples
psa/psa_constant_names
psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c
psa/key_ladder_demo
random/gen_entropy
random/gen_random_ctr_drbg
random/gen_random_havege

1
programs/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
add_subdirectory(aes)
add_subdirectory(hash)
add_subdirectory(pkey)
add_subdirectory(psa)
add_subdirectory(random)
add_subdirectory(ssl)
add_subdirectory(test)

32
programs/Makefile
View File

@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ APPS = aes/aescrypt2$(EXEXT) aes/crypt_and_hash$(EXEXT) \
pkey/rsa_decrypt$(EXEXT) pkey/rsa_encrypt$(EXEXT) \
pkey/rsa_sign$(EXEXT) pkey/rsa_verify$(EXEXT) \
pkey/rsa_sign_pss$(EXEXT) pkey/rsa_verify_pss$(EXEXT) \
psa/crypto_examples$(EXEXT) \
psa/key_ladder_demo$(EXEXT) psa/psa_constant_names$(EXEXT) \
ssl/dtls_client$(EXEXT) ssl/dtls_server$(EXEXT) \
ssl/ssl_client1$(EXEXT) ssl/ssl_client2$(EXEXT) \
ssl/ssl_server$(EXEXT) ssl/ssl_server2$(EXEXT) \
@ -83,6 +85,8 @@ ifdef TEST_CPP
APPS += test/cpp_dummy_build$(EXEXT)
endif
EXTRA_GENERATED =
.SILENT:
.PHONY: all clean list
@ -92,6 +96,16 @@ all: $(APPS)
$(DEP):
$(MAKE) -C ../library
ifdef WINDOWS
EXTRA_GENERATED += psa\psa_constant_names_generated.c
else
EXTRA_GENERATED += psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c
endif
psa/psa_constant_names$(EXEXT): psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c
psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c: ../scripts/generate_psa_constants.py ../include/psa/crypto_values.h
../scripts/generate_psa_constants.py
aes/aescrypt2$(EXEXT): aes/aescrypt2.c $(DEP)
echo " CC aes/aescrypt2.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) aes/aescrypt2.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
@ -188,6 +202,14 @@ pkey/rsa_encrypt$(EXEXT): pkey/rsa_encrypt.c $(DEP)
echo " CC pkey/rsa_encrypt.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) pkey/rsa_encrypt.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
psa/key_ladder_demo$(EXEXT): psa/key_ladder_demo.c $(DEP)
echo " CC psa/key_ladder_demo.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) psa/key_ladder_demo.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
psa/psa_constant_names$(EXEXT): psa/psa_constant_names.c $(DEP)
echo " CC psa/psa_constant_names.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) psa/psa_constant_names.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
random/gen_entropy$(EXEXT): random/gen_entropy.c $(DEP)
echo " CC random/gen_entropy.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) random/gen_entropy.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
@ -292,11 +314,17 @@ x509/req_app$(EXEXT): x509/req_app.c $(DEP)
echo " CC x509/req_app.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) x509/req_app.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
psa/crypto_examples$(EXEXT): psa/crypto_examples.c $(DEP)
echo " CC psa/crypto_examples.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) psa/crypto_examples.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
clean:
ifndef WINDOWS
rm -f $(APPS)
rm -f $(APPS) $(EXTRA_GENERATED)
else
del /S /Q /F *.o *.exe
if exist *.o del /S /Q /F *.o
if exist *.exe del /S /Q /F *.exe
if exist $(EXTRA_GENERATED) del /S /Q /F $(EXTRA_GENERATED)
endif
list:

7
programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
add_executable(crypto_examples crypto_examples.c)
target_link_libraries(crypto_examples mbedtls)
install(TARGETS crypto_examples
DESTINATION "bin"
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)

337
programs/psa/crypto_examples.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#endif
#define ASSERT( predicate ) \
do \
{ \
if( ! ( predicate ) ) \
{ \
mbedtls_printf( "\tassertion failed at %s:%d - '%s'\r\n", \
__FILE__, __LINE__, #predicate); \
goto exit; \
} \
} while ( 0 )
#define ASSERT_STATUS( actual, expected ) \
do \
{ \
if( ( actual ) != ( expected ) ) \
{ \
mbedtls_printf( "\tassertion failed at %s:%d - " \
"actual:%d expected:%d\r\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, \
(psa_status_t) actual, (psa_status_t) expected ); \
goto exit; \
} \
} while ( 0 )
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
int main( void )
{
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and/or MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or "
"MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC and/or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR "
"and/or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING "
"not defined.\r\n" );
return( 0 );
}
#else
static psa_status_t set_key_policy( psa_key_handle_t key_handle,
psa_key_usage_t key_usage,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, key_usage, alg );
status = psa_set_key_policy( key_handle, &policy );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
exit:
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t cipher_operation( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_size,
size_t part_size,
uint8_t * output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_len )
{
psa_status_t status;
size_t bytes_to_write = 0, bytes_written = 0, len = 0;
*output_len = 0;
while( bytes_written != input_size )
{
bytes_to_write = ( input_size - bytes_written > part_size ?
part_size :
input_size - bytes_written );
status = psa_cipher_update( operation, input + bytes_written,
bytes_to_write, output + *output_len,
output_size - *output_len, &len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
bytes_written += bytes_to_write;
*output_len += len;
}
status = psa_cipher_finish( operation, output + *output_len,
output_size - *output_len, &len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
*output_len += len;
exit:
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t cipher_encrypt( psa_key_handle_t key_handle,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
uint8_t * iv,
size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_size,
size_t part_size,
uint8_t * output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_len )
{
psa_status_t status;
psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
size_t iv_len = 0;
memset( &operation, 0, sizeof( operation ) );
status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key_handle, alg );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation, iv, iv_size, &iv_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_operation( &operation, input, input_size, part_size,
output, output_size, output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
exit:
psa_cipher_abort( &operation );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t cipher_decrypt( psa_key_handle_t key_handle,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * iv,
size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_size,
size_t part_size,
uint8_t * output,
size_t output_size,
size_t *output_len )
{
psa_status_t status;
psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
memset( &operation, 0, sizeof( operation ) );
status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key_handle, alg );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv, iv_size );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_operation( &operation, input, input_size, part_size,
output, output_size, output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
exit:
psa_cipher_abort( &operation );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t
cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_nopad_1_block( void )
{
enum {
block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ),
key_bits = 256,
part_size = block_size,
};
const psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING;
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_handle_t key_handle = 0;
size_t output_len = 0;
uint8_t iv[block_size];
uint8_t input[block_size];
uint8_t encrypt[block_size];
uint8_t decrypt[block_size];
status = psa_generate_random( input, sizeof( input ) );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_allocate_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key_bits, &key_handle );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = set_key_policy( key_handle,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT,
alg );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_generate_key( key_handle, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key_bits,
NULL, 0 );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_encrypt( key_handle, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ),
input, sizeof( input ), part_size,
encrypt, sizeof( encrypt ), &output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_decrypt( key_handle, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ),
encrypt, output_len, part_size,
decrypt, sizeof( decrypt ), &output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = memcmp( input, decrypt, sizeof( input ) );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
exit:
psa_destroy_key( key_handle );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_pkcs7_multi( void )
{
enum {
block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ),
key_bits = 256,
input_size = 100,
part_size = 10,
};
const psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7;
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_handle_t key_handle = 0;
size_t output_len = 0;
uint8_t iv[block_size], input[input_size],
encrypt[input_size + block_size], decrypt[input_size + block_size];
status = psa_generate_random( input, sizeof( input ) );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_allocate_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key_bits, &key_handle );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = set_key_policy( key_handle,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT,
alg );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_generate_key( key_handle, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key_bits,
NULL, 0 );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_encrypt( key_handle, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ),
input, sizeof( input ), part_size,
encrypt, sizeof( encrypt ), &output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_decrypt( key_handle, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ),
encrypt, output_len, part_size,
decrypt, sizeof( decrypt ), &output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = memcmp( input, decrypt, sizeof( input ) );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
exit:
psa_destroy_key( key_handle );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_ctr_multi( void )
{
enum {
block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ),
key_bits = 256,
input_size = 100,
part_size = 10,
};
const psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_CTR;
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_handle_t key_handle = 0;
size_t output_len = 0;
uint8_t iv[block_size], input[input_size], encrypt[input_size],
decrypt[input_size];
status = psa_generate_random( input, sizeof( input ) );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_allocate_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key_bits, &key_handle );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = set_key_policy( key_handle,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT,
alg );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_generate_key( key_handle, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, key_bits,
NULL, 0 );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_encrypt( key_handle, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ),
input, sizeof( input ), part_size,
encrypt, sizeof( encrypt ), &output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = cipher_decrypt( key_handle, alg, iv, sizeof( iv ),
encrypt, output_len, part_size,
decrypt, sizeof( decrypt ), &output_len );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = memcmp( input, decrypt, sizeof( input ) );
ASSERT_STATUS( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
exit:
psa_destroy_key( key_handle );
return( status );
}
static void cipher_examples( void )
{
psa_status_t status;
mbedtls_printf( "cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CBC no padding:\r\n" );
status = cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_nopad_1_block( );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
mbedtls_printf( "\tsuccess!\r\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CBC PKCS7 multipart:\r\n" );
status = cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_cbc_pkcs7_multi( );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
mbedtls_printf( "\tsuccess!\r\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "cipher encrypt/decrypt AES CTR multipart:\r\n" );
status = cipher_example_encrypt_decrypt_aes_ctr_multi( );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
mbedtls_printf( "\tsuccess!\r\n" );
}
int main( void )
{
ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
cipher_examples( );
exit:
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */

724
programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,724 @@
/**
* PSA API key derivation demonstration
*
* This program calculates a key ladder: a chain of secret material, each
* derived from the previous one in a deterministic way based on a label.
* Two keys are identical if and only if they are derived from the same key
* using the same label.
*
* The initial key is called the master key. The master key is normally
* randomly generated, but it could itself be derived from another key.
*
* This program derives a series of keys called intermediate keys.
* The first intermediate key is derived from the master key using the
* first label passed on the command line. Each subsequent intermediate
* key is derived from the previous one using the next label passed
* on the command line.
*
* This program has four modes of operation:
*
* - "generate": generate a random master key.
* - "wrap": derive a wrapping key from the last intermediate key,
* and use that key to encrypt-and-authenticate some data.
* - "unwrap": derive a wrapping key from the last intermediate key,
* and use that key to decrypt-and-authenticate some
* ciphertext created by wrap mode.
* - "save": save the last intermediate key so that it can be reused as
* the master key in another run of the program.
*
* See the usage() output for the command line usage. See the file
* `key_ladder_demo.sh` for an example run.
*/
/* Copyright (C) 2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
/* First include Mbed TLS headers to get the Mbed TLS configuration and
* platform definitions that we'll use in this program. Also include
* standard C headers for functions we'll use here. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS
#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" // for mbedtls_platform_zeroize
/* If the build options we need are not enabled, compile a placeholder. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
int main( void )
{
mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and/or MBEDTLS_MD_C and/or "
"MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_CCM_C and/or "
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n");
return( 0 );
}
#else
/* The real program starts here. */
#include <psa/crypto.h>
/* Run a system function and bail out if it fails. */
#define SYS_CHECK( expr ) \
do \
{ \
if( ! ( expr ) ) \
{ \
perror( #expr ); \
status = DEMO_ERROR; \
goto exit; \
} \
} \
while( 0 )
/* Run a PSA function and bail out if it fails. */
#define PSA_CHECK( expr ) \
do \
{ \
status = ( expr ); \
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) \
{ \
mbedtls_printf( "Error %d at line %u: %s\n", \
(int) status, \
__LINE__, \
#expr ); \
goto exit; \
} \
} \
while( 0 )
/* To report operational errors in this program, use an error code that is
* different from every PSA error code. */
#define DEMO_ERROR 120
/* The maximum supported key ladder depth. */
#define MAX_LADDER_DEPTH 10
/* Salt to use when deriving an intermediate key. */
#define DERIVE_KEY_SALT ( (uint8_t *) "key_ladder_demo.derive" )
#define DERIVE_KEY_SALT_LENGTH ( strlen( (const char*) DERIVE_KEY_SALT ) )
/* Salt to use when deriving a wrapping key. */
#define WRAPPING_KEY_SALT ( (uint8_t *) "key_ladder_demo.wrap" )
#define WRAPPING_KEY_SALT_LENGTH ( strlen( (const char*) WRAPPING_KEY_SALT ) )
/* Size of the key derivation keys (applies both to the master key and
* to intermediate keys). */
#define KEY_SIZE_BYTES 40
/* Algorithm for key derivation. */
#define KDF_ALG PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
/* Type and size of the key used to wrap data. */
#define WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
#define WRAPPING_KEY_BITS 128
/* Cipher mode used to wrap data. */
#define WRAPPING_ALG PSA_ALG_CCM
/* Nonce size used to wrap data. */
#define WRAPPING_IV_SIZE 13
/* Header used in files containing wrapped data. We'll save this header
* directly without worrying about data representation issues such as
* integer sizes and endianness, because the data is meant to be read
* back by the same program on the same machine. */
#define WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC "key_ladder_demo" // including trailing null byte
#define WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH ( sizeof( WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC ) )
typedef struct
{
char magic[WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH];
size_t ad_size; /* Size of the additional data, which is this header. */
size_t payload_size; /* Size of the encrypted data. */
/* Store the IV inside the additional data. It's convenient. */
uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_SIZE];
} wrapped_data_header_t;
/* The modes that this program can operate in (see usage). */
enum program_mode
{
MODE_GENERATE,
MODE_SAVE,
MODE_UNWRAP,
MODE_WRAP
};
/* Save a key to a file. In the real world, you may want to export a derived
* key sometimes, to share it with another party. */
static psa_status_t save_key( psa_key_handle_t key_handle,
const char *output_file_name )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
uint8_t key_data[KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
size_t key_size;
FILE *key_file = NULL;
PSA_CHECK( psa_export_key( key_handle,
key_data, sizeof( key_data ),
&key_size ) );
SYS_CHECK( ( key_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( fwrite( key_data, 1, key_size, key_file ) == key_size );
SYS_CHECK( fclose( key_file ) == 0 );
key_file = NULL;
exit:
if( key_file != NULL)
fclose( key_file );
return( status );
}
/* Generate a master key for use in this demo.
*
* Normally a master key would be non-exportable. For the purpose of this
* demo, we want to save it to a file, to avoid relying on the keystore
* capability of the PSA crypto library. */
static psa_status_t generate( const char *key_file_name )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_key_handle_t key_handle = 0;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
PSA_CHECK( psa_allocate_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE,
PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( KEY_SIZE_BYTES ),
&key_handle ) );
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT,
KDF_ALG );
PSA_CHECK( psa_set_key_policy( key_handle, &policy ) );
PSA_CHECK( psa_generate_key( key_handle,
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE,
PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( KEY_SIZE_BYTES ),
NULL, 0 ) );
PSA_CHECK( save_key( key_handle, key_file_name ) );
exit:
(void) psa_destroy_key( key_handle );
return( status );
}
/* Load the master key from a file.
*
* In the real world, this master key would be stored in an internal memory
* and the storage would be managed by the keystore capability of the PSA
* crypto library. */
static psa_status_t import_key_from_file( psa_key_usage_t usage,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const char *key_file_name,
psa_key_handle_t *master_key_handle )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
uint8_t key_data[KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
size_t key_size;
FILE *key_file = NULL;
unsigned char extra_byte;
*master_key_handle = 0;
SYS_CHECK( ( key_file = fopen( key_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( ( key_size = fread( key_data, 1, sizeof( key_data ),
key_file ) ) != 0 );
if( fread( &extra_byte, 1, 1, key_file ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Key file too large (max: %u).\n",
(unsigned) sizeof( key_data ) );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
SYS_CHECK( fclose( key_file ) == 0 );
key_file = NULL;
PSA_CHECK( psa_allocate_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE,
PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( key_size ),
master_key_handle ) );
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, usage, alg );
PSA_CHECK( psa_set_key_policy( *master_key_handle, &policy ) );
PSA_CHECK( psa_import_key( *master_key_handle,
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE,
key_data, key_size ) );
exit:
if( key_file != NULL )
fclose( key_file );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_data, sizeof( key_data ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
/* If psa_allocate_key hasn't been called yet or has failed,
* *master_key_handle is 0. psa_destroy_key(0) is guaranteed to do
* nothing and return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE. */
(void) psa_destroy_key( *master_key_handle );
*master_key_handle = 0;
}
return( status );
}
/* Derive the intermediate keys, using the list of labels provided on
* the command line. On input, *key_handle is a handle to the master key.
* This function closes the master key. On successful output, *key_handle
* is a handle to the final derived key. */
static psa_status_t derive_key_ladder( const char *ladder[],
size_t ladder_depth,
psa_key_handle_t *key_handle )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_crypto_generator_t generator = PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT;
size_t i;
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT,
KDF_ALG );
/* For each label in turn, ... */
for( i = 0; i < ladder_depth; i++ )
{
/* Start deriving material from the master key (if i=0) or from
* the current intermediate key (if i>0). */
PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation(
&generator,
*key_handle,
KDF_ALG,
DERIVE_KEY_SALT, DERIVE_KEY_SALT_LENGTH,
(uint8_t*) ladder[i], strlen( ladder[i] ),
KEY_SIZE_BYTES ) );
/* When the parent key is not the master key, destroy it,
* since it is no longer needed. */
PSA_CHECK( psa_close_key( *key_handle ) );
*key_handle = 0;
PSA_CHECK( psa_allocate_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE,
PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( KEY_SIZE_BYTES ),
key_handle ) );
PSA_CHECK( psa_set_key_policy( *key_handle, &policy ) );
/* Use the generator obtained from the parent key to create
* the next intermediate key. */
PSA_CHECK( psa_generator_import_key(
*key_handle,
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE,
PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( KEY_SIZE_BYTES ),
&generator ) );
PSA_CHECK( psa_generator_abort( &generator ) );
}
exit:
psa_generator_abort( &generator );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_close_key( *key_handle );
*key_handle = 0;
}
return( status );
}
/* Derive a wrapping key from the last intermediate key. */
static psa_status_t derive_wrapping_key( psa_key_usage_t usage,
psa_key_handle_t derived_key_handle,
psa_key_handle_t *wrapping_key_handle )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_crypto_generator_t generator = PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT;
*wrapping_key_handle = 0;
PSA_CHECK( psa_allocate_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, WRAPPING_KEY_BITS,
wrapping_key_handle ) );
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, usage, WRAPPING_ALG );
PSA_CHECK( psa_set_key_policy( *wrapping_key_handle, &policy ) );
PSA_CHECK( psa_key_derivation(
&generator,
derived_key_handle,
KDF_ALG,
WRAPPING_KEY_SALT, WRAPPING_KEY_SALT_LENGTH,
NULL, 0,
PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( WRAPPING_KEY_BITS ) ) );
PSA_CHECK( psa_generator_import_key(
*wrapping_key_handle,
PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES,
WRAPPING_KEY_BITS,
&generator ) );
exit:
psa_generator_abort( &generator );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_close_key( *wrapping_key_handle );
*wrapping_key_handle = 0;
}
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t wrap_data( const char *input_file_name,
const char *output_file_name,
psa_key_handle_t wrapping_key_handle )
{
psa_status_t status;
FILE *input_file = NULL;
FILE *output_file = NULL;
long input_position;
size_t input_size;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
size_t ciphertext_size;
wrapped_data_header_t header;
/* Find the size of the data to wrap. */
SYS_CHECK( ( input_file = fopen( input_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( fseek( input_file, 0, SEEK_END ) == 0 );
SYS_CHECK( ( input_position = ftell( input_file ) ) != -1 );
#if LONG_MAX > SIZE_MAX
if( input_position > SIZE_MAX )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Input file too large.\n" );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
#endif
input_size = input_position;
buffer_size = PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( WRAPPING_ALG, input_size );
/* Check for integer overflow. */
if( buffer_size < input_size )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Input file too large.\n" );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
/* Load the data to wrap. */
SYS_CHECK( fseek( input_file, 0, SEEK_SET ) == 0 );
SYS_CHECK( ( buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buffer_size ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( fread( buffer, 1, input_size, input_file ) == input_size );
SYS_CHECK( fclose( input_file ) == 0 );
input_file = NULL;
/* Construct a header. */
memcpy( &header.magic, WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC, WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH );
header.ad_size = sizeof( header );
header.payload_size = input_size;
/* Wrap the data. */
PSA_CHECK( psa_generate_random( header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE ) );
PSA_CHECK( psa_aead_encrypt( wrapping_key_handle, WRAPPING_ALG,
header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE,
(uint8_t *) &header, sizeof( header ),
buffer, input_size,
buffer, buffer_size,
&ciphertext_size ) );
/* Write the output. */
SYS_CHECK( ( output_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( fwrite( &header, 1, sizeof( header ),
output_file ) == sizeof( header ) );
SYS_CHECK( fwrite( buffer, 1, ciphertext_size,
output_file ) == ciphertext_size );
SYS_CHECK( fclose( output_file ) == 0 );
output_file = NULL;
exit:
if( input_file != NULL )
fclose( input_file );
if( output_file != NULL )
fclose( output_file );
if( buffer != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buffer, buffer_size );
mbedtls_free( buffer );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t unwrap_data( const char *input_file_name,
const char *output_file_name,
psa_key_handle_t wrapping_key_handle )
{
psa_status_t status;
FILE *input_file = NULL;
FILE *output_file = NULL;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
size_t ciphertext_size = 0;
size_t plaintext_size;
wrapped_data_header_t header;
unsigned char extra_byte;
/* Load and validate the header. */
SYS_CHECK( ( input_file = fopen( input_file_name, "rb" ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( fread( &header, 1, sizeof( header ),
input_file ) == sizeof( header ) );
if( memcmp( &header.magic, WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC,
WRAPPED_DATA_MAGIC_LENGTH ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "The input does not start with a valid magic header.\n" );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
if( header.ad_size != sizeof( header ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "The header size is not correct.\n" );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
ciphertext_size =
PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE( WRAPPING_ALG, header.payload_size );
/* Check for integer overflow. */
if( ciphertext_size < header.payload_size )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Input file too large.\n" );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
/* Load the payload data. */
SYS_CHECK( ( buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ciphertext_size ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( fread( buffer, 1, ciphertext_size,
input_file ) == ciphertext_size );
if( fread( &extra_byte, 1, 1, input_file ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Extra garbage after ciphertext\n" );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
SYS_CHECK( fclose( input_file ) == 0 );
input_file = NULL;
/* Unwrap the data. */
PSA_CHECK( psa_aead_decrypt( wrapping_key_handle, WRAPPING_ALG,
header.iv, WRAPPING_IV_SIZE,
(uint8_t *) &header, sizeof( header ),
buffer, ciphertext_size,
buffer, ciphertext_size,
&plaintext_size ) );
if( plaintext_size != header.payload_size )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Incorrect payload size in the header.\n" );
status = DEMO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
/* Write the output. */
SYS_CHECK( ( output_file = fopen( output_file_name, "wb" ) ) != NULL );
SYS_CHECK( fwrite( buffer, 1, plaintext_size,
output_file ) == plaintext_size );
SYS_CHECK( fclose( output_file ) == 0 );
output_file = NULL;
exit:
if( input_file != NULL )
fclose( input_file );
if( output_file != NULL )
fclose( output_file );
if( buffer != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buffer, ciphertext_size );
mbedtls_free( buffer );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t run( enum program_mode mode,
const char *key_file_name,
const char *ladder[], size_t ladder_depth,
const char *input_file_name,
const char *output_file_name )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_key_handle_t derivation_key_handle = 0;
psa_key_handle_t wrapping_key_handle = 0;
/* Initialize the PSA crypto library. */
PSA_CHECK( psa_crypto_init( ) );
/* Generate mode is unlike the others. Generate the master key and exit. */
if( mode == MODE_GENERATE )
return( generate( key_file_name ) );
/* Read the master key. */
PSA_CHECK( import_key_from_file( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT,
KDF_ALG,
key_file_name,
&derivation_key_handle ) );
/* Calculate the derived key for this session. */
PSA_CHECK( derive_key_ladder( ladder, ladder_depth,
&derivation_key_handle ) );
switch( mode )
{
case MODE_SAVE:
PSA_CHECK( save_key( derivation_key_handle, output_file_name ) );
break;
case MODE_UNWRAP:
PSA_CHECK( derive_wrapping_key( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT,
derivation_key_handle,
&wrapping_key_handle ) );
PSA_CHECK( unwrap_data( input_file_name, output_file_name,
wrapping_key_handle ) );
break;
case MODE_WRAP:
PSA_CHECK( derive_wrapping_key( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT,
derivation_key_handle,
&wrapping_key_handle ) );
PSA_CHECK( wrap_data( input_file_name, output_file_name,
wrapping_key_handle ) );
break;
default:
/* Unreachable but some compilers don't realize it. */
break;
}
exit:
/* Close any remaining key. Deinitializing the crypto library would do
* this anyway, but explicitly closing handles makes the code easier
* to reuse. */
(void) psa_close_key( derivation_key_handle );
(void) psa_close_key( wrapping_key_handle );
/* Deinitialize the PSA crypto library. */
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
return( status );
}
static void usage( void )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Usage: key_ladder_demo MODE [OPTION=VALUE]...\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "Demonstrate the usage of a key derivation ladder.\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "Modes:\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " generate Generate the master key\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " save Save the derived key\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " unwrap Unwrap (decrypt) input with the derived key\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " wrap Wrap (encrypt) input with the derived key\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "Options:\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " input=FILENAME Input file (required for wrap/unwrap)\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " master=FILENAME File containing the master key (default: master.key)\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " output=FILENAME Output file (required for save/wrap/unwrap)\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " label=TEXT Label for the key derivation.\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " This may be repeated multiple times.\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " To get the same key, you must use the same master key\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " and the same sequence of labels.\n" );
}
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
char *key_file_name = "master.key";
char *input_file_name = NULL;
char *output_file_name = NULL;
const char *ladder[MAX_LADDER_DEPTH];
size_t ladder_depth = 0;
int i;
enum program_mode mode;
psa_status_t status;
if( argc <= 1 ||
strcmp( argv[1], "help" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( argv[1], "-help" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( argv[1], "--help" ) == 0 )
{
usage( );
return( MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS );
}
for( i = 2; i < argc; i++ )
{
char *q = strchr( argv[i], '=' );
if( q == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Missing argument to option %s\n", argv[i] );
goto usage_failure;
}
*q = 0;
++q;
if( strcmp( argv[i], "input" ) == 0 )
input_file_name = q;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "label" ) == 0 )
{
if( ladder_depth == MAX_LADDER_DEPTH )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Maximum ladder depth %u exceeded.\n",
(unsigned) MAX_LADDER_DEPTH );
return( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE );
}
ladder[ladder_depth] = q;
++ladder_depth;
}
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "master" ) == 0 )
key_file_name = q;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "output" ) == 0 )
output_file_name = q;
else
{
mbedtls_printf( "Unknown option: %s\n", argv[i] );
goto usage_failure;
}
}
if( strcmp( argv[1], "generate" ) == 0 )
mode = MODE_GENERATE;
else if( strcmp( argv[1], "save" ) == 0 )
mode = MODE_SAVE;
else if( strcmp( argv[1], "unwrap" ) == 0 )
mode = MODE_UNWRAP;
else if( strcmp( argv[1], "wrap" ) == 0 )
mode = MODE_WRAP;
else
{
mbedtls_printf( "Unknown action: %s\n", argv[1] );
goto usage_failure;
}
if( input_file_name == NULL &&
( mode == MODE_WRAP || mode == MODE_UNWRAP ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Required argument missing: input\n" );
return( DEMO_ERROR );
}
if( output_file_name == NULL &&
( mode == MODE_SAVE || mode == MODE_WRAP || mode == MODE_UNWRAP ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Required argument missing: output\n" );
return( DEMO_ERROR );
}
status = run( mode, key_file_name,
ladder, ladder_depth,
input_file_name, output_file_name );
return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ?
MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS :
MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE );
usage_failure:
usage( );
return( MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && MBEDTLS_MD_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO */

49
programs/psa/key_ladder_demo.sh Executable file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -e -u
program="${0%/*}"/key_ladder_demo
files_to_clean=
run () {
echo
echo "# $1"
shift
echo "+ $*"
"$@"
}
if [ -e master.key ]; then
echo "# Reusing the existing master.key file."
else
files_to_clean="$files_to_clean master.key"
run "Generate a master key." \
"$program" generate master=master.key
fi
files_to_clean="$files_to_clean input.txt hello_world.wrap"
echo "Here is some input. See it wrapped." >input.txt
run "Derive a key and wrap some data with it." \
"$program" wrap master=master.key label=hello label=world \
input=input.txt output=hello_world.wrap
files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hello_world.txt"
run "Derive the same key again and unwrap the data." \
"$program" unwrap master=master.key label=hello label=world \
input=hello_world.wrap output=hello_world.txt
run "Compare the unwrapped data with the original input." \
cmp input.txt hello_world.txt
files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hellow_orld.txt"
! run "Derive a different key and attempt to unwrap the data. This must fail." \
"$program" unwrap master=master.key input=hello_world.wrap output=hellow_orld.txt label=hellow label=orld
files_to_clean="$files_to_clean hello.key"
run "Save the first step of the key ladder, then load it as a master key and construct the rest of the ladder." \
"$program" save master=master.key label=hello \
input=hello_world.wrap output=hello.key
run "Check that we get the same key by unwrapping data made by the other key." \
"$program" unwrap master=hello.key label=world \
input=hello_world.wrap output=hello_world.txt
# Cleanup
rm -f $files_to_clean

192
programs/psa/psa_constant_names.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/* This block is present to support Visual Studio builds prior to 2015 */
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900
#include <stdarg.h>
int snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... )
{
int ret;
va_list argp;
/* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */
if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL )
return( -1 );
va_start( argp, fmt );
#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
ret = _vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, argp );
#else
ret = _vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp );
if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n )
{
s[n-1] = '\0';
ret = -1;
}
#endif
va_end( argp );
return( ret );
}
#endif
/* There are different GET_HASH macros for different kinds of algorithms
* built from hashes, but the values are all constructed on the
* same model. */
#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
static void append(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size,
size_t *required_size,
const char *string, size_t length)
{
*required_size += length;
if (*required_size < buffer_size) {
memcpy(*buffer, string, length);
*buffer += length;
}
}
static void append_integer(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size,
size_t *required_size,
const char *format /*printf format for value*/,
unsigned long value)
{
size_t n = snprintf(*buffer, buffer_size - *required_size, format, value);
if (n < buffer_size - *required_size) *buffer += n;
*required_size += n;
}
/* The code of these function is automatically generated and included below. */
static const char *psa_ecc_curve_name(psa_ecc_curve_t curve);
static const char *psa_hash_algorithm_name(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg);
static void append_with_curve(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size,
size_t *required_size,
const char *string, size_t length,
psa_ecc_curve_t curve)
{
const char *curve_name = psa_ecc_curve_name(curve);
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, string, length);
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, "(", 1);
if (curve_name != NULL) {
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size,
curve_name, strlen(curve_name));
} else {
append_integer(buffer, buffer_size, required_size,
"0x%04x", curve);
}
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, ")", 1);
}
static void append_with_hash(char **buffer, size_t buffer_size,
size_t *required_size,
const char *string, size_t length,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg)
{
const char *hash_name = psa_hash_algorithm_name(hash_alg);
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, string, length);
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, "(", 1);
if (hash_name != NULL) {
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size,
hash_name, strlen(hash_name));
} else {
append_integer(buffer, buffer_size, required_size,
"0x%08lx", hash_alg);
}
append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, ")", 1);
}
#include "psa_constant_names_generated.c"
static int psa_snprint_status(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
psa_status_t status)
{
const char *name = psa_strerror(status);
if (name == NULL) {
return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, "%ld", (long) status);
} else {
size_t length = strlen(name);
if (length < buffer_size) {
memcpy(buffer, name, length + 1);
return (int) length;
} else {
return (int) buffer_size;
}
}
}
static int psa_snprint_ecc_curve(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
psa_ecc_curve_t curve)
{
const char *name = psa_ecc_curve_name(curve);
if (name == NULL) {
return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size, "0x%04x", (unsigned) curve);
} else {
size_t length = strlen(name);
if (length < buffer_size) {
memcpy(buffer, name, length + 1);
return (int) length;
} else {
return (int) buffer_size;
}
}
}
static void usage(const char *program_name)
{
printf("Usage: %s TYPE VALUE\n",
program_name == NULL ? "psa_constant_names" : program_name);
printf("Print the symbolic name whose numerical value is VALUE in TYPE.\n");
printf("Supported types (with = between aliases):\n");
printf(" alg=algorithm Algorithm (psa_algorithm_t)\n");
printf(" curve=ecc_curve Elliptic curve identifier (psa_ecc_curve_t)\n");
printf(" type=key_type Key type (psa_key_type_t)\n");
printf(" usage=key_usage Key usage (psa_key_usage_t)\n");
printf(" error=status Status code (psa_status_t)\n");
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char buffer[200];
unsigned long value;
char *end;
if (argc <= 1 ||
!strcmp(argv[1], "help") ||
!strcmp(argv[1], "--help"))
{
usage(argv[0]);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (argc != 3) {
usage(argv[0]);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
value = strtoul(argv[2], &end, 0);
if (*end) {
printf("Non-numeric value: %s\n", argv[2]);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (!strcmp(argv[1], "error") || !strcmp(argv[1], "status"))
psa_snprint_status(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (psa_status_t) value);
else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "alg") || !strcmp(argv[1], "algorithm"))
psa_snprint_algorithm(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (psa_algorithm_t) value);
else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "curve") || !strcmp(argv[1], "ecc_curve"))
psa_snprint_ecc_curve(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (psa_ecc_curve_t) value);
else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "type") || !strcmp(argv[1], "key_type"))
psa_snprint_key_type(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (psa_key_type_t) value);
else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "usage") || !strcmp(argv[1], "key_usage"))
psa_snprint_key_usage(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (psa_key_usage_t) value);
else {
printf("Unknown type: %s\n", argv[1]);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
puts(buffer);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

296
programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c
View File

@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ int main( void )
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -80,7 +85,9 @@ int main( void )
#define DFL_CA_PATH ""
#define DFL_CRT_FILE ""
#define DFL_KEY_FILE ""
#define DFL_KEY_OPAQUE 0
#define DFL_PSK ""
#define DFL_PSK_OPAQUE 0
#define DFL_PSK_IDENTITY "Client_identity"
#define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW NULL
#define DFL_EC_MAX_OPS -1
@ -130,14 +137,36 @@ int main( void )
#define USAGE_IO \
" No file operations available (MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined)\n"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#else
#else /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#define USAGE_IO ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \
" key_opaque=%%d Handle your private key as if it were opaque\n" \
" default: 0 (disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_PSK \
#define USAGE_PSK_RAW \
" psk=%%s default: \"\" (in hex, without 0x)\n" \
" psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT \
" psk_opaque=%%d default: 0 (don't use opaque static PSK)\n" \
" Enable this to store the PSK configured through command line\n" \
" parameter `psk` in a PSA-based key slot.\n" \
" Note: Currently only supported in conjunction with\n" \
" the use of min_version to force TLS 1.2 and force_ciphersuite \n" \
" to force a particular PSK-only ciphersuite.\n" \
" Note: This is to test integration of PSA-based opaque PSKs with\n" \
" Mbed TLS only. Production systems are likely to configure Mbed TLS\n" \
" with prepopulated key slots instead of importing raw key material.\n"
#else
#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#define USAGE_PSK USAGE_PSK_RAW USAGE_PSK_SLOT
#else
#define USAGE_PSK ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
@ -279,6 +308,7 @@ int main( void )
" auth_mode=%%s default: (library default: none)\n" \
" options: none, optional, required\n" \
USAGE_IO \
USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \
"\n" \
USAGE_PSK \
USAGE_ECJPAKE \
@ -333,6 +363,10 @@ struct options
const char *ca_path; /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */
const char *crt_file; /* the file with the client certificate */
const char *key_file; /* the file with the client key */
int key_opaque; /* handle private key as if it were opaque */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int psk_opaque;
#endif
const char *psk; /* the pre-shared key */
const char *psk_identity; /* the pre-shared key identity */
const char *ecjpake_pw; /* the EC J-PAKE password */
@ -536,6 +570,13 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
const char *pers = "ssl_client2";
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_slot_t slot = 0;
psa_algorithm_t alg = 0;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_status_t status;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile crt_profile_for_test = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
#endif
@ -552,6 +593,9 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
mbedtls_x509_crt cacert;
mbedtls_x509_crt clicert;
mbedtls_pk_context pkey;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_slot_t key_slot = 0; /* invalid key slot */
#endif
#endif
char *p, *q;
const int *list;
@ -573,6 +617,17 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
memset( (void * ) alpn_list, 0, sizeof( alpn_list ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
status = psa_crypto_init();
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to initialize PSA Crypto implementation: %d\n",
(int) status );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
#endif
if( argc == 0 )
{
usage:
@ -609,7 +664,11 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
opt.ca_path = DFL_CA_PATH;
opt.crt_file = DFL_CRT_FILE;
opt.key_file = DFL_KEY_FILE;
opt.key_opaque = DFL_KEY_OPAQUE;
opt.psk = DFL_PSK;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
opt.psk_opaque = DFL_PSK_OPAQUE;
#endif
opt.psk_identity = DFL_PSK_IDENTITY;
opt.ecjpake_pw = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
opt.ec_max_ops = DFL_EC_MAX_OPS;
@ -708,8 +767,16 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
opt.crt_file = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "key_file" ) == 0 )
opt.key_file = q;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
else if( strcmp( p, "key_opaque" ) == 0 )
opt.key_opaque = atoi( q );
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "psk" ) == 0 )
opt.psk = q;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_opaque" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_opaque = atoi( q );
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_identity" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_identity = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "ecjpake_pw" ) == 0 )
@ -994,57 +1061,6 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( opt.debug_level );
#endif
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] );
if( opt.max_version != -1 &&
ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver > opt.max_version )
{
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.min_version != -1 &&
ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver < opt.min_version )
{
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* If the server selects a version that's not supported by
* this suite, then there will be no common ciphersuite... */
if( opt.max_version == -1 ||
opt.max_version > ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver )
{
opt.max_version = ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver;
}
if( opt.min_version < ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver )
{
opt.min_version = ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver;
/* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
opt.min_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
/* Enable RC4 if needed and not explicitly disabled */
if( ciphersuite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
{
if( opt.arc4 == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED )
{
mbedtls_printf( "forced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabled\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
/*
* Unhexify the pre-shared key if any is given
@ -1095,6 +1111,101 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
if( opt.psk == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "psk_opaque set but no psk to be imported specified.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] );
if( opt.max_version != -1 &&
ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver > opt.max_version )
{
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.min_version != -1 &&
ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver < opt.min_version )
{
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* If the server selects a version that's not supported by
* this suite, then there will be no common ciphersuite... */
if( opt.max_version == -1 ||
opt.max_version > ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver )
{
opt.max_version = ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver;
}
if( opt.min_version < ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver )
{
opt.min_version = ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver;
/* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
opt.min_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
/* Enable RC4 if needed and not explicitly disabled */
if( ciphersuite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
{
if( opt.arc4 == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED )
{
mbedtls_printf( "forced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabled\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
/* Ensure that the chosen ciphersuite is PSK-only; we must know
* the ciphersuite in advance to set the correct policy for the
* PSK key slot. This limitation might go away in the future. */
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
opt.min_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* Determine KDF algorithm the opaque PSK will be used in. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( opt.curves != NULL )
{
@ -1291,7 +1402,20 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.key_opaque != 0 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey, &key_slot,
PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! "
"mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
mbedtls_printf( " ok (key type: %s)\n", mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pkey ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/*
@ -1466,6 +1590,45 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
/* The algorithm has already been determined earlier. */
status = mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( &slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg );
status = psa_set_key_policy( slot, &policy );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
status = psa_import_key( slot, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, psk, psk_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf, slot,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, psk_len,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 )
@ -1474,7 +1637,7 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
if( opt.min_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
@ -2098,6 +2261,9 @@ exit:
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert );
mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
#endif
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &saved_session );
mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
@ -2105,6 +2271,26 @@ exit:
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg );
mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
/* This is ok even if the slot hasn't been
* initialized (we might have jumed here
* immediately because of bad cmd line params,
* for example). */
status = psa_destroy_key( slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Failed to destroy key slot %u - error was %d",
(unsigned) slot, (int) status );
if( ret == 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED &&
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(_WIN32)
mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" );
fflush( stdout ); getchar();

270
programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c
View File

@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ int main( void )
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -119,6 +124,8 @@ int main( void )
#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY2 ( -1 )
#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_ERROR ( 0 )
#define DFL_PSK ""
#define DFL_PSK_OPAQUE 0
#define DFL_PSK_LIST_OPAQUE 0
#define DFL_PSK_IDENTITY "Client_identity"
#define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW NULL
#define DFL_PSK_LIST NULL
@ -220,9 +227,36 @@ int main( void )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_PSK \
#define USAGE_PSK_RAW \
" psk=%%s default: \"\" (in hex, without 0x)\n" \
" psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n"
" psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n" \
" psk_list=%%s default: \"\"\n" \
" A list of (PSK identity, PSK value) pairs in (hex format, without 0x)\n" \
" id1,psk1[,id2,psk2[,...]]\n"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT \
" psk_opaque=%%d default: 0 (don't use opaque static PSK)\n" \
" Enable this to store the PSK configured through command line\n" \
" parameter `psk` in a PSA-based key slot.\n" \
" Note: Currently only supported in conjunction with\n" \
" the use of min_version to force TLS 1.2 and force_ciphersuite \n" \
" to force a particular PSK-only ciphersuite.\n" \
" Note: This is to test integration of PSA-based opaque PSKs with\n" \
" Mbed TLS only. Production systems are likely to configure Mbed TLS\n" \
" with prepopulated key slots instead of importing raw key material.\n" \
" psk_list_opaque=%%d default: 0 (don't use opaque dynamic PSKs)\n" \
" Enable this to store the list of dynamically chosen PSKs configured\n" \
" through the command line parameter `psk_list` in PSA-based key slots.\n" \
" Note: Currently only supported in conjunction with\n" \
" the use of min_version to force TLS 1.2 and force_ciphersuite \n" \
" to force a particular PSK-only ciphersuite.\n" \
" Note: This is to test integration of PSA-based opaque PSKs with\n" \
" Mbed TLS only. Production systems are likely to configure Mbed TLS\n" \
" with prepopulated key slots instead of importing raw key material.\n"
#else
#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#define USAGE_PSK USAGE_PSK_RAW USAGE_PSK_SLOT
#else
#define USAGE_PSK ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
@ -449,6 +483,10 @@ struct options
int async_private_delay1; /* number of times f_async_resume needs to be called for key 1, or -1 for no async */
int async_private_delay2; /* number of times f_async_resume needs to be called for key 2, or -1 for no async */
int async_private_error; /* inject error in async private callback */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int psk_opaque;
int psk_list_opaque;
#endif
const char *psk; /* the pre-shared key */
const char *psk_identity; /* the pre-shared key identity */
char *psk_list; /* list of PSK id/key pairs for callback */
@ -767,22 +805,39 @@ struct _psk_entry
const char *name;
size_t key_len;
unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN];
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_slot_t slot;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
psk_entry *next;
};
/*
* Free a list of psk_entry's
*/
void psk_free( psk_entry *head )
int psk_free( psk_entry *head )
{
psk_entry *next;
while( head != NULL )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_slot_t const slot = head->slot;
if( slot != 0 )
{
status = psa_destroy_key( slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
next = head->next;
mbedtls_free( head );
head = next;
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
@ -840,6 +895,11 @@ int psk_callback( void *p_info, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( name_len == strlen( cur->name ) &&
memcmp( name, cur->name, name_len ) == 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( cur->slot != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( ssl, cur->slot ) );
else
#endif
return( mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( ssl, cur->key, cur->key_len ) );
}
@ -1170,12 +1230,46 @@ int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd,
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static psa_status_t psa_setup_psk_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
unsigned char *psk,
size_t psk_len )
{
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg );
status = psa_set_key_policy( slot, &policy );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
fprintf( stderr, "POLICY\n" );
return( status );
}
status = psa_import_key( slot, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, psk, psk_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
fprintf( stderr, "IMPORT\n" );
return( status );
}
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
int ret = 0, len, written, frags, exchanges_left;
int version_suites[4][2];
unsigned char* buf = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_algorithm_t alg = 0;
psa_key_slot_t psk_slot = 0;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char psk[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN];
size_t psk_len = 0;
psk_entry *psk_info = NULL;
@ -1238,6 +1332,9 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
int i;
char *p, *q;
const int *list;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_status_t status;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) );
@ -1277,6 +1374,17 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( &cookie_ctx );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
status = psa_crypto_init();
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to initialize PSA Crypto implementation: %d\n",
(int) status );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
#endif
#if !defined(_WIN32)
/* Abort cleanly on SIGTERM and SIGINT */
signal( SIGTERM, term_handler );
@ -1324,6 +1432,10 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
opt.async_private_delay2 = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY2;
opt.async_private_error = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_ERROR;
opt.psk = DFL_PSK;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
opt.psk_opaque = DFL_PSK_OPAQUE;
opt.psk_list_opaque = DFL_PSK_LIST_OPAQUE;
#endif
opt.psk_identity = DFL_PSK_IDENTITY;
opt.psk_list = DFL_PSK_LIST;
opt.ecjpake_pw = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
@ -1452,6 +1564,12 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
else if( strcmp( p, "psk" ) == 0 )
opt.psk = q;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_opaque" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_opaque = atoi( q );
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_list_opaque" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_list_opaque = atoi( q );
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_identity" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_identity = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_list" ) == 0 )
@ -1761,6 +1879,42 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
if( strlen( opt.psk ) == 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "psk_opaque set but no psk to be imported specified.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
}
if( opt.psk_list_opaque != 0 )
{
if( opt.psk_list == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "psk_slot set but no psk to be imported specified.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
@ -1810,6 +1964,30 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 || opt.psk_list_opaque != 0 )
{
/* Ensure that the chosen ciphersuite is PSK-only; we must know
* the ciphersuite in advance to set the correct policy for the
* PSK key slot. This limitation might go away in the future. */
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
opt.min_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* Determine KDF algorithm the opaque PSK will be used in. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
}
if( opt.version_suites != NULL )
@ -2483,12 +2661,42 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( strlen( opt.psk ) != 0 && strlen( opt.psk_identity ) != 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, psk_len,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) );
if( ret != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
status = mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( &psk_slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
fprintf( stderr, "ALLOC FAIL\n" );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
/* The algorithm has already been determined earlier. */
status = psa_setup_psk_key_slot( psk_slot, alg, psk, psk_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
fprintf( stderr, "SETUP FAIL\n" );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf, psk_slot,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, psk_len,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned -0x%04X\n\n", - ret );
goto exit;
@ -2496,7 +2704,34 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
}
if( opt.psk_list != NULL )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_list_opaque != 0 )
{
psk_entry *cur_psk;
for( cur_psk = psk_info; cur_psk != NULL; cur_psk = cur_psk->next )
{
status = mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( &cur_psk->slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
status = psa_setup_psk_key_slot( cur_psk->slot, alg,
cur_psk->key,
cur_psk->key_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( &conf, psk_callback, psk_info );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
@ -3125,12 +3360,31 @@ exit:
sni_free( sni_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
psk_free( psk_info );
if( ( ret = psk_free( psk_info ) ) != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "Failed to list of opaque PSKs - error was %d\n", ret );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
/* This is ok even if the slot hasn't been
* initialized (we might have jumed here
* immediately because of bad cmd line params,
* for example). */
status = psa_destroy_key( psk_slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Failed to destroy key slot %u - error was %d",
(unsigned) psk_slot, (int) status );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED &&
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg );

10
scripts/config.pl
View File

@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
# - this could be enabled if the respective tests were adapted
# MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT
# MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C
# MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
# - experimental, and more an alternative implementation than a feature
# and any symbol beginning _ALT
#
@ -96,6 +98,10 @@ MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT
MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C
MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION
MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
_ALT\s*$
);
@ -115,6 +121,10 @@ MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE
MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT
MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
);
# Things that should be enabled in "full" even if they match @excluded

289
scripts/generate_psa_constants.py Executable file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python
import os
import re
import sys
output_template = '''\
/* Automatically generated by generate_psa_constant.py. DO NOT EDIT. */
static const char *psa_strerror(psa_status_t status)
{
switch (status) {
%(status_cases)s
default: return NULL;
}
}
static const char *psa_ecc_curve_name(psa_ecc_curve_t curve)
{
switch (curve) {
%(ecc_curve_cases)s
default: return NULL;
}
}
static const char *psa_hash_algorithm_name(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg)
{
switch (hash_alg) {
%(hash_algorithm_cases)s
default: return NULL;
}
}
static int psa_snprint_key_type(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
psa_key_type_t type)
{
size_t required_size = 0;
switch (type) {
%(key_type_cases)s
default:
%(key_type_code)s{
return snprintf(buffer, buffer_size,
"0x%%08lx", (unsigned long) type);
}
break;
}
buffer[0] = 0;
return (int) required_size;
}
static int psa_snprint_algorithm(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
psa_algorithm_t alg)
{
size_t required_size = 0;
psa_algorithm_t core_alg = alg;
unsigned long length_modifier = 0;
if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)) {
core_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(alg, 0);
if (core_alg != alg) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(", 22);
length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg);
}
} else if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) {
core_alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH(alg);
if (core_alg != alg) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(", 29);
length_modifier = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg);
}
}
switch (core_alg) {
%(algorithm_cases)s
default:
%(algorithm_code)s{
append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"0x%%08lx", (unsigned long) alg);
}
break;
}
if (core_alg != alg) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ", ", 2);
append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"%%lu", length_modifier);
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, ")", 1);
}
buffer[0] = 0;
return (int) required_size;
}
static int psa_snprint_key_usage(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
psa_key_usage_t usage)
{
size_t required_size = 0;
if (usage == 0) {
if (buffer_size > 1) {
buffer[0] = '0';
buffer[1] = 0;
} else if (buffer_size == 1) {
buffer[0] = 0;
}
return 1;
}
%(key_usage_code)s
if (usage != 0) {
if (required_size != 0) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3);
}
append_integer(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"0x%%08lx", (unsigned long) usage);
} else {
buffer[0] = 0;
}
return (int) required_size;
}
/* End of automatically generated file. */
'''
key_type_from_curve_template = '''if (%(tester)s(type)) {
append_with_curve(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"%(builder)s", %(builder_length)s,
PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE(type));
} else '''
algorithm_from_hash_template = '''if (%(tester)s(core_alg)) {
append_with_hash(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size,
"%(builder)s", %(builder_length)s,
PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(core_alg));
} else '''
bit_test_template = '''\
if (%(var)s & %(flag)s) {
if (required_size != 0) {
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, " | ", 3);
}
append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "%(flag)s", %(length)d);
%(var)s ^= %(flag)s;
}\
'''
class MacroCollector:
def __init__(self):
self.statuses = set()
self.key_types = set()
self.key_types_from_curve = {}
self.ecc_curves = set()
self.algorithms = set()
self.hash_algorithms = set()
self.algorithms_from_hash = {}
self.key_usages = set()
# "#define" followed by a macro name with either no parameters
# or a single parameter. Grab the macro name in group 1, the
# parameter name if any in group 2 and the definition in group 3.
definition_re = re.compile(r'\s*#\s*define\s+(\w+)(?:\s+|\((\w+)\)\s*)(.+)(?:/[*/])?')
def read_line(self, line):
m = re.match(self.definition_re, line)
if not m:
return
name, parameter, definition = m.groups()
if name.endswith('_FLAG') or name.endswith('MASK'):
# Macro only to build actual values
return
elif (name.startswith('PSA_ERROR_') or name == 'PSA_SUCCESS') \
and not parameter:
self.statuses.add(name)
elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_TYPE_') and not parameter:
self.key_types.add(name)
elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_TYPE_') and parameter == 'curve':
self.key_types_from_curve[name] = name[:13] + 'IS_' + name[13:]
elif name.startswith('PSA_ECC_CURVE_') and not parameter:
self.ecc_curves.add(name)
elif name.startswith('PSA_ALG_') and not parameter:
if name in ['PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE',
'PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE']:
# Ad hoc skipping of duplicate names for some numerical values
return
self.algorithms.add(name)
# Ad hoc detection of hash algorithms
if re.search(r'0x010000[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}', definition):
self.hash_algorithms.add(name)
elif name.startswith('PSA_ALG_') and parameter == 'hash_alg':
if name in ['PSA_ALG_DSA', 'PSA_ALG_ECDSA']:
# A naming irregularity
tester = name[:8] + 'IS_RANDOMIZED_' + name[8:]
else:
tester = name[:8] + 'IS_' + name[8:]
self.algorithms_from_hash[name] = tester
elif name.startswith('PSA_KEY_USAGE_') and not parameter:
self.key_usages.add(name)
else:
# Other macro without parameter
return
def read_file(self, header_file):
for line in header_file:
self.read_line(line)
def make_return_case(self, name):
return 'case %(name)s: return "%(name)s";' % {'name': name}
def make_append_case(self, name):
template = ('case %(name)s: '
'append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "%(name)s", %(length)d); '
'break;')
return template % {'name': name, 'length': len(name)}
def make_inner_append_case(self, name):
template = ('case %(name)s: '
'append(buffer, buffer_size, required_size, "%(name)s", %(length)d); '
'break;')
return template % {'name': name, 'length': len(name)}
def make_bit_test(self, var, flag):
return bit_test_template % {'var': var,
'flag': flag,
'length': len(flag)}
def make_status_cases(self):
return '\n '.join(map(self.make_return_case,
sorted(self.statuses)))
def make_ecc_curve_cases(self):
return '\n '.join(map(self.make_return_case,
sorted(self.ecc_curves)))
def make_key_type_cases(self):
return '\n '.join(map(self.make_append_case,
sorted(self.key_types)))
def make_key_type_from_curve_code(self, builder, tester):
return key_type_from_curve_template % {'builder': builder,
'builder_length': len(builder),
'tester': tester}
def make_key_type_code(self):
d = self.key_types_from_curve
make = self.make_key_type_from_curve_code
return ''.join([make(k, d[k]) for k in sorted(d.keys())])
def make_hash_algorithm_cases(self):
return '\n '.join(map(self.make_return_case,
sorted(self.hash_algorithms)))
def make_algorithm_cases(self):
return '\n '.join(map(self.make_append_case,
sorted(self.algorithms)))
def make_algorithm_from_hash_code(self, builder, tester):
return algorithm_from_hash_template % {'builder': builder,
'builder_length': len(builder),
'tester': tester}
def make_algorithm_code(self):
d = self.algorithms_from_hash
make = self.make_algorithm_from_hash_code
return ''.join([make(k, d[k]) for k in sorted(d.keys())])
def make_key_usage_code(self):
return '\n'.join([self.make_bit_test('usage', bit)
for bit in sorted(self.key_usages)])
def write_file(self, output_file):
data = {}
data['status_cases'] = self.make_status_cases()
data['ecc_curve_cases'] = self.make_ecc_curve_cases()
data['key_type_cases'] = self.make_key_type_cases()
data['key_type_code'] = self.make_key_type_code()
data['hash_algorithm_cases'] = self.make_hash_algorithm_cases()
data['algorithm_cases'] = self.make_algorithm_cases()
data['algorithm_code'] = self.make_algorithm_code()
data['key_usage_code'] = self.make_key_usage_code()
output_file.write(output_template % data)
def generate_psa_constants(header_file_name, output_file_name):
collector = MacroCollector()
with open(header_file_name) as header_file:
collector.read_file(header_file)
temp_file_name = output_file_name + '.tmp'
with open(temp_file_name, 'w') as output_file:
collector.write_file(output_file)
os.rename(temp_file_name, output_file_name)
if __name__ == '__main__':
if not os.path.isdir('programs') and os.path.isdir('../programs'):
os.chdir('..')
generate_psa_constants('include/psa/crypto_values.h',
'programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c')

23
scripts/generate_visualc_files.pl
View File

@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ my $vsx_sln_tpl_file = "scripts/data_files/vs2010-sln-template.sln";
my $vsx_sln_file = "$vsx_dir/mbedTLS.sln";
my $programs_dir = 'programs';
my $header_dir = 'include/mbedtls';
my $mbedtls_header_dir = 'include/mbedtls';
my $psa_header_dir = 'include/psa';
my $source_dir = 'library';
# Need windows line endings!
@ -53,7 +54,8 @@ exit( main() );
sub check_dirs {
return -d $vsx_dir
&& -d $header_dir
&& -d $mbedtls_header_dir
&& -d $psa_header_dir
&& -d $source_dir
&& -d $programs_dir;
}
@ -131,9 +133,11 @@ sub gen_entry_list {
}
sub gen_main_file {
my ($headers, $sources, $hdr_tpl, $src_tpl, $main_tpl, $main_out) = @_;
my ($mbedtls_headers, $psa_headers, $source_headers, $sources, $hdr_tpl, $src_tpl, $main_tpl, $main_out) = @_;
my $header_entries = gen_entry_list( $hdr_tpl, @$headers );
my $header_entries = gen_entry_list( $hdr_tpl, @$mbedtls_headers );
$header_entries .= gen_entry_list( $hdr_tpl, @$psa_headers );
$header_entries .= gen_entry_list( $hdr_tpl, @$source_headers );
my $source_entries = gen_entry_list( $src_tpl, @$sources );
my $out = slurp_file( $main_tpl );
@ -187,15 +191,18 @@ sub main {
del_vsx_files();
my @app_list = get_app_list();
my @headers = <$header_dir/*.h>;
my @mbedtls_headers = <$mbedtls_header_dir/*.h>;
my @psa_headers = <$psa_header_dir/*.h>;
my @source_headers = <$source_dir/*.h>;
my @sources = <$source_dir/*.c>;
map { s!/!\\!g } @headers;
map { s!/!\\!g } @mbedtls_headers;
map { s!/!\\!g } @psa_headers;
map { s!/!\\!g } @sources;
gen_app_files( @app_list );
gen_main_file( \@headers, \@sources,
$vsx_hdr_tpl, $vsx_src_tpl,
gen_main_file( \@mbedtls_headers, \@psa_headers, \@source_headers,
\@sources, $vsx_hdr_tpl, $vsx_src_tpl,
$vsx_main_tpl_file, $vsx_main_file );
gen_vsx_solution( @app_list );

2
tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile vendored
View File

@ -1 +1 @@
mbedtls.run_job()
mbedtls_psa.run_job()

8
tests/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -110,6 +110,14 @@ add_test_suite(pk)
add_test_suite(pkparse)
add_test_suite(pkwrite)
add_test_suite(poly1305)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto_entropy)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto_hash)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto_init)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto_metadata)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto_persistent_key)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto_slot_management)
add_test_suite(psa_crypto_storage_file)
add_test_suite(shax)
add_test_suite(ssl)
add_test_suite(timing)

6
tests/Makefile
View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ CFLAGS ?= -O2
WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -W -Wdeclaration-after-statement -Wno-unused-function -Wno-unused-value
LDFLAGS ?=
LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I../include -I../library -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
LOCAL_LDFLAGS = -L../library \
-lmbedtls$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \
-lmbedx509$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \
@ -107,7 +107,9 @@ clean:
ifndef WINDOWS
rm -rf $(BINARIES) *.c *.datax TESTS
else
del /Q /F *.c *.exe *.datax
if exist *.c del /Q /F *.c
if exist *.exe del /Q /F *.exe
if exist *.datax del /Q /F *.datax
ifneq ($(wildcard TESTS/.*),)
rmdir /Q /S TESTS
endif

11
tests/scripts/all.sh
View File

@ -501,7 +501,6 @@ component_check_doxygen_warnings () {
}
################################################################
#### Build and test many configurations and targets
################################################################
@ -702,6 +701,8 @@ component_test_no_platform () {
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
# Note, _DEFAULT_SOURCE needs to be defined for platforms using glibc version >2.19,
# to re-enable platform integration features otherwise disabled in C99 builds
make CC=gcc CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -std=c99 -pedantic -O0 -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE' lib programs
@ -903,6 +904,8 @@ component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc () {
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_NET_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
# following things are not in the default config
@ -920,6 +923,8 @@ component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_udbl_division () {
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_NET_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
# following things are not in the default config
@ -940,6 +945,8 @@ component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication () {
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_NET_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
# following things are not in the default config
@ -960,6 +967,8 @@ component_build_armcc () {
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_NET_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_FS_IO
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE

2
tests/scripts/check-names.sh
View File

@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ done
for THING in identifiers; do
printf "Names of $THING: "
test -r $THING
BAD=$( grep -v '^mbedtls_[0-9a-z_]*[0-9a-z]$' $THING || true )
BAD=$( grep -E -v '^(mbedtls|psa)_[0-9a-z_]*[0-9a-z]$' $THING || true )
if [ "x$BAD" = "x" ]; then
echo "PASS"
else

2
tests/scripts/list-identifiers.sh
View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ if [ -d include/mbedtls ]; then :; else
exit 1
fi
HEADERS=$( ls include/mbedtls/*.h | egrep -v 'compat-1\.3\.h|bn_mul' )
HEADERS=$( ls include/mbedtls/*.h include/psa/*.h library/*.h | egrep -v 'compat-1\.3\.h|bn_mul' )
rm -f identifiers

4
tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl
View File

@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ use warnings;
use strict;
my %configs = (
'config-default.h' => {
'opt' => '-f Default',
'compat' => '-m tls1_2 -V NO',
},
'config-mini-tls1_1.h' => {
'compat' => '-m tls1_1 -f \'^DES-CBC3-SHA$\|^TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA$\'',
},

312
tests/ssl-opt.sh
View File

@ -185,6 +185,12 @@ requires_config_value_at_most() {
fi
}
requires_ciphersuite_enabled() {
if [ -z "$($P_CLI --help | grep $1)" ]; then
SKIP_NEXT="YES"
fi
}
# skip next test if OpenSSL doesn't support FALLBACK_SCSV
requires_openssl_with_fallback_scsv() {
if [ -z "${OPENSSL_HAS_FBSCSV:-}" ]; then
@ -519,14 +525,6 @@ run_test() {
SKIP_NEXT="YES"
fi
# should we skip?
if [ "X$SKIP_NEXT" = "XYES" ]; then
SKIP_NEXT="NO"
echo "SKIP"
SKIPS=$(( $SKIPS + 1 ))
return
fi
# does this test use a proxy?
if [ "X$1" = "X-p" ]; then
PXY_CMD="$2"
@ -541,6 +539,26 @@ run_test() {
CLI_EXPECT="$3"
shift 3
# Check if server forces ciphersuite
FORCE_CIPHERSUITE=$(echo "$SRV_CMD" | sed -n 's/^.*force_ciphersuite=\([a-zA-Z0-9\-]*\).*$/\1/p')
if [ ! -z "$FORCE_CIPHERSUITE" ]; then
requires_ciphersuite_enabled $FORCE_CIPHERSUITE
fi
# Check if client forces ciphersuite
FORCE_CIPHERSUITE=$(echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed -n 's/^.*force_ciphersuite=\([a-zA-Z0-9\-]*\).*$/\1/p')
if [ ! -z "$FORCE_CIPHERSUITE" ]; then
requires_ciphersuite_enabled $FORCE_CIPHERSUITE
fi
# should we skip?
if [ "X$SKIP_NEXT" = "XYES" ]; then
SKIP_NEXT="NO"
echo "SKIP"
SKIPS=$(( $SKIPS + 1 ))
return
fi
# fix client port
if [ -n "$PXY_CMD" ]; then
CLI_CMD=$( echo "$CLI_CMD" | sed s/+SRV_PORT/$PXY_PORT/g )
@ -734,6 +752,23 @@ run_test() {
rm -f $SRV_OUT $CLI_OUT $PXY_OUT
}
run_test_psa() {
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSA-supported ciphersuite: $1" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls1_2" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=1 force_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=$1" \
0 \
-c "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" \
-c "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" \
-s "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" \
-s "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" \
-C "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context"\
-S "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context"\
-s "Protocol is TLSv1.2" \
-S "error" \
-C "error"
}
cleanup() {
rm -f $CLI_OUT $SRV_OUT $PXY_OUT $SESSION
test -n "${SRV_PID:-}" && kill $SRV_PID >/dev/null 2>&1
@ -865,6 +900,33 @@ run_test "Default, DTLS" \
-s "Protocol is DTLSv1.2" \
-s "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256"
# Test using an opaque private key for client authentication
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
run_test "Opaque key for client authentication" \
"$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \
"$P_CLI key_opaque=1 crt_file=data_files/server5.crt \
key_file=data_files/server5.key" \
0 \
-c "key type: Opaque" \
-s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
-S "error" \
-C "error"
# Test ciphersuites which we expect to be fully supported by PSA Crypto
# and check that we don't fall back to Mbed TLS' internal crypto primitives.
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256
run_test_psa TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384
# Test current time in ServerHello
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
run_test "ServerHello contains gmt_unix_time" \
@ -3830,6 +3892,240 @@ run_test "PSK callback: psk, no callback" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \
0 \
-c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback, SHA-384" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \
0 \
-c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback, EMS" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \
0 \
-c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-c "using extended master secret"\
-s "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: opaque psk on client, no callback, SHA-384, EMS" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=1 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 psk_opaque=1" \
0 \
-c "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-c "using extended master secret"\
-s "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback, SHA-384" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback, EMS" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 \
force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA extended_ms=1" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 extended_ms=1" \
0 \
-c "using extended master secret"\
-s "using extended master secret"\
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, static opaque on server, no callback, EMS, SHA384" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk=abc123 psk_identity=foo psk_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 \
force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 extended_ms=1" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 extended_ms=1" \
0 \
-c "using extended master secret"\
-s "using extended master secret"\
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=def psk=beef" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback, SHA-384" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
psk_identity=def psk=beef" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback, EMS" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 \
force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA extended_ms=1" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=abc psk=dead extended_ms=1" \
0 \
-c "using extended master secret"\
-s "using extended master secret"\
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, no static PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback, EMS, SHA384" \
"$P_SRV debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 \
force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 extended_ms=1" \
"$P_CLI debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384 \
psk_identity=abc psk=dead extended_ms=1" \
0 \
-c "using extended master secret"\
-s "using extended master secret"\
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, mismatching static raw PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=def psk=beef" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, mismatching static opaque PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef psk_list_opaque=1 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=def psk=beef" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-s "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, mismatching static opaque PSK on server, raw PSK from callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=foo psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=def psk=beef" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, id-matching but wrong raw PSK on server, opaque PSK from callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=def psk=abc123 debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,beef min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=def psk=beef" \
0 \
-C "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK"\
-C "using extended master secret"\
-S "using extended master secret"\
-S "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable" \
-S "SSL - Unknown identity received" \
-S "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
run_test "PSK callback: raw psk on client, matching opaque PSK on server, wrong opaque PSK from callback" \
"$P_SRV extended_ms=0 psk_opaque=1 psk_identity=def psk=beef debug_level=3 psk_list=abc,dead,def,abc123 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
"$P_CLI extended_ms=0 debug_level=3 min_version=tls1_2 force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \
psk_identity=def psk=beef" \
1 \
-s "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed"
run_test "PSK callback: no psk, no callback" \
"$P_SRV" \
"$P_CLI force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA \

135
tests/suites/helpers.function
View File

@ -69,6 +69,18 @@ typedef struct data_tag
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Macros */
/** Evaluate an expression and fail the test case if it is false.
*
* Failing the test means:
* - Mark this test case as failed.
* - Print a message identifying the failure.
* - Jump to the \c exit label.
*
* This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
* It may jump to the \c exit label.
*
* \param TEST The expression to evaluate.
*/
#define TEST_ASSERT( TEST ) \
do { \
if( ! (TEST) ) \
@ -78,6 +90,77 @@ typedef struct data_tag
} \
} while( 0 )
/** Evaluate two expressions and fail the test case if they have different
* values.
*
* \param expr1 An expression to evaluate.
* \param expr2 The expected value of \p expr1. This can be any
* expression, but it is typically a constant.
*/
#define TEST_EQUAL( expr1, expr2 ) \
TEST_ASSERT( ( expr1 ) == ( expr2 ) )
/** Evaluate an expression and fail the test case if it returns an error.
*
* \param expr The expression to evaluate. This is typically a call
* to a \c psa_xxx function that returns a value of type
* #psa_status_t.
*/
#define PSA_ASSERT( expr ) TEST_EQUAL( ( expr ), PSA_SUCCESS )
/** Allocate memory dynamically and fail the test case if this fails.
*
* You must set \p pointer to \c NULL before calling this macro and
* put `mbedtls_free( pointer )` in the test's cleanup code.
*
* If \p length is zero, the resulting \p pointer will be \c NULL.
* This is usually what we want in tests since API functions are
* supposed to accept null pointers when a buffer size is zero.
*
* This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
* It may jump to the \c exit label.
*
* \param pointer An lvalue where the address of the allocated buffer
* will be stored.
* This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
* \param length Number of elements to allocate.
* This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
*
*/
#define ASSERT_ALLOC( pointer, length ) \
do \
{ \
TEST_ASSERT( ( pointer ) == NULL ); \
if( ( length ) != 0 ) \
{ \
( pointer ) = mbedtls_calloc( sizeof( *( pointer ) ), \
( length ) ); \
TEST_ASSERT( ( pointer ) != NULL ); \
} \
} \
while( 0 )
/** Compare two buffers and fail the test case if they differ.
*
* This macro expands to an instruction, not an expression.
* It may jump to the \c exit label.
*
* \param p1 Pointer to the start of the first buffer.
* \param size1 Size of the first buffer in bytes.
* This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
* \param p2 Pointer to the start of the second buffer.
* \param size2 Size of the second buffer in bytes.
* This expression may be evaluated multiple times.
*/
#define ASSERT_COMPARE( p1, size1, p2, size2 ) \
do \
{ \
TEST_ASSERT( ( size1 ) == ( size2 ) ); \
if( ( size1 ) != 0 ) \
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( ( p1 ), ( p2 ), ( size1 ) ) == 0 ); \
} \
while( 0 )
#define assert(a) if( !( a ) ) \
{ \
mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Assertion Failed at %s:%d - %s\n", \
@ -85,6 +168,58 @@ typedef struct data_tag
mbedtls_exit( 1 ); \
}
#if defined(__GNUC__)
/* Test if arg and &(arg)[0] have the same type. This is true if arg is
* an array but not if it's a pointer. */
#define IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER( arg ) \
( ! __builtin_types_compatible_p( __typeof__( arg ), \
__typeof__( &( arg )[0] ) ) )
#else
/* On platforms where we don't know how to implement this check,
* omit it. Oh well, a non-portable check is better than nothing. */
#define IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER( arg ) 1
#endif
/* A compile-time constant with the value 0. If `const_expr` is not a
* compile-time constant with a nonzero value, cause a compile-time error. */
#define STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR( const_expr ) \
( 0 && sizeof( struct { int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * ! ( const_expr ); } ) )
/* Return the scalar value `value` (possibly promoted). This is a compile-time
* constant if `value` is. `condition` must be a compile-time constant.
* If `condition` is false, arrange to cause a compile-time error. */
#define STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN( condition, value ) \
( STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR( condition ) ? 0 : ( value ) )
#define ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE( array ) \
( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) )
/** Return the number of elements of a static or stack array.
*
* \param array A value of array (not pointer) type.
*
* \return The number of elements of the array.
*/
#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) \
( STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN( IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER( array ), \
ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE( array ) ) )
/** Return the smaller of two values.
*
* \param x An integer-valued expression without side effects.
* \param y An integer-valued expression without side effects.
*
* \return The smaller of \p x and \p y.
*/
#define MIN( x, y ) ( ( x ) < ( y ) ? ( x ) : ( y ) )
/** Return the larger of two values.
*
* \param x An integer-valued expression without side effects.
* \param y An integer-valued expression without side effects.
*
* \return The larger of \p x and \p y.
*/
#define MAX( x, y ) ( ( x ) > ( y ) ? ( x ) : ( y ) )
/*
* 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian)
*/

19
tests/suites/main_test.function
View File

@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Common helper code */
@ -221,8 +224,22 @@ int main( int argc, const char *argv[] )
ret );
return( -1 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
{
psa_status_t status;
status = psa_crypto_init();
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
mbedtls_fprintf( stderr,
"FATAL: Failed to initialize PSA Crypto - error %d\n",
status );
return( -1 );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
ret = execute_tests( argc, argv );
platform_teardown();
return( ret );
}

188
tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.aes.data
View File

@ -1512,187 +1512,283 @@ test_vec_ecb:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000
AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:0
AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"f0000000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"970014d634e2b7650777e8e84d03ccd8":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"f0000000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"970014d634e2b7650777e8e84d03ccd8":0:0
AES-128-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ffffffffffffffc00000000000000000":"3a4d354f02bb5a5e47d39666867f246a":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ffffffffffffffc00000000000000000":"3a4d354f02bb5a5e47d39666867f246a":0:0
AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"db4f1aa530967d6732ce4715eb0ee24b":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"":"db4f1aa530967d6732ce4715eb0ee24b":"ff000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"b69418a85332240dc82492353956ae0c":"":"a303d940ded8f0baff6f75414cac5243":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"b69418a85332240dc82492353956ae0c":"":"a303d940ded8f0baff6f75414cac5243":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-128-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffffffffffffff8000000000000000":"":"32cd652842926aea4aa6137bb2be2b5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffffffffffffff8000000000000000":"":"32cd652842926aea4aa6137bb2be2b5e":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"fffffffffffffffffffff80000000000":"156f07767a85a4312321f63968338a01":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"fffffffffffffffffffff80000000000":"156f07767a85a4312321f63968338a01":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"51719783d3185a535bd75adc65071ce1":"4f354592ff7c8847d2d0870ca9481b7c":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"51719783d3185a535bd75adc65071ce1":"4f354592ff7c8847d2d0870ca9481b7c":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"d2926527e0aa9f37b45e2ec2ade5853ef807576104c7ace3":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dd619e1cf204446112e0af2b9afa8f8c":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"d2926527e0aa9f37b45e2ec2ade5853ef807576104c7ace3":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"dd619e1cf204446112e0af2b9afa8f8c":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffff800000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8dd274bd0f1b58ae345d9e7233f9b8f3":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffff800000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"8dd274bd0f1b58ae345d9e7233f9b8f3":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000000000000000":"":"bb2852c891c5947d2ed44032c421b85f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff000000000000000":"":"bb2852c891c5947d2ed44032c421b85f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"61257134a518a0d57d9d244d45f6498cbc32f2bafc522d79":"":"cfe4d74002696ccf7d87b14a2f9cafc9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"61257134a518a0d57d9d244d45f6498cbc32f2bafc522d79":"":"cfe4d74002696ccf7d87b14a2f9cafc9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:0
AES-192-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"b2099795e88cc158fd75ea133d7e7fbe":"ffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"b2099795e88cc158fd75ea133d7e7fbe":"ffffffffffffffffffffc00000000000":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c1cc358b449909a19436cfbb3f852ef8bcb5ed12ac7058325f56e6099aab1a1c":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"352065272169abf9856843927d0674fd":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c1cc358b449909a19436cfbb3f852ef8bcb5ed12ac7058325f56e6099aab1a1c":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"352065272169abf9856843927d0674fd":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"0b24af36193ce4665f2825d7b4749c98":"a9ff75bd7cf6613d3731c77c3b6d0c04":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"0b24af36193ce4665f2825d7b4749c98":"a9ff75bd7cf6613d3731c77c3b6d0c04":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ffffff80000000000000000000000000":"36aff0ef7bf3280772cf4cac80a0d2b2":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ffffff80000000000000000000000000":"36aff0ef7bf3280772cf4cac80a0d2b2":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"45d089c36d5c5a4efc689e3b0de10dd5":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8000000000000000000000000000":"":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"45d089c36d5c5a4efc689e3b0de10dd5":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"":"edf61ae362e882ddc0167474a7a77f3a":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000000000000000":"":"edf61ae362e882ddc0167474a7a77f3a":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"f8be9ba615c5a952cabbca24f68f8593039624d524c816acda2c9183bd917cb9":"":"a3944b95ca0b52043584ef02151926a8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"f8be9ba615c5a952cabbca24f68f8593039624d524c816acda2c9183bd917cb9":"":"a3944b95ca0b52043584ef02151926a8":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"623a52fcea5d443e48d9181ab32c7421":"761c1fe41a18acf20d241650611d90f1":0:0
AES-256-ECB crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffc000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffc000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"833f71258d53036b02952c76c744f5a1":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"833f71258d53036b02952c76c744f5a1":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7ababc4b3f516c9aafb35f4140b548f9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7ababc4b3f516c9aafb35f4140b548f9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ec52a212f80a09df6317021bc2a9819e":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ec52a212f80a09df6317021bc2a9819e":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d1ccb9b1337002cbac42c520b5d67722":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d1ccb9b1337002cbac42c520b5d67722":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:0
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0:0
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":0:1
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"323994cfb9da285a5d9642e1759b224a":0:1
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":0:1
AES-128-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":0:1
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"3ad78e726c1ec02b7ebfe92b23d9ec34":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffffc000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"df556a33438db87bc41b1752c55e5e49":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"10a58869d74be5a374cf867cfb473859":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6d251e6944b051e04eaa6fb4dbf78465":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-128-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0336763e966d92595a567cc9ce537f5e":"f34481ec3cc627bacd5dc3fb08f273e6":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"833f71258d53036b02952c76c744f5a1":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"6cd02513e8d4dc986b4afe087a60bd0c":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"7ababc4b3f516c9aafb35f4140b548f9":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"e9f065d7c13573587f7875357dfbb16c53489f6a4bd0f7cd":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"0956259c9cd5cfd0181cca53380cde06":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-192-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"275cfc0413d8ccb70513c3859b1d0f72":"1b077a6af4b7f98229de786d7516b639":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"80000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ec52a212f80a09df6317021bc2a9819e":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Encrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #1 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"ddc6bf790c15760d8d9aeb6f9a75fd4e":"80000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #2 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"ffe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"d1ccb9b1337002cbac42c520b5d67722":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #3 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"c47b0294dbbbee0fec4757f22ffeee3587ca4730c3d33b691df38bab076bc558":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"46f2fb342d6f0ab477476fc501242c5f":"00000000000000000000000000000000":0:1
AES-256-CBC crypt Decrypt NIST KAT #4 PSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
test_vec_crypt:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"00000000000000000000000000000000":"5c9d844ed46f9885085e5d6a4f94c7d7":"014730f80ac625fe84f026c60bfd547d":0:1
Cipher Corner Case behaviours
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C

623
tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.ccm.data
View File

@ -1,480 +1,863 @@
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"02209f55":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"02209f55":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"9a04c241":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"9a04c241":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"75d582db43ce9b13ab4b6f7f14341330":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"75d582db43ce9b13ab4b6f7f14341330":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"3a65e03af37b81d05acc7ec1bc39deb0":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"3a65e03af37b81d05acc7ec1bc39deb0":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"90156f3f":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"90156f3f":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"88909016":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"88909016":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fb04dc5a44c6bb000f2440f5154364b4":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fb04dc5a44c6bb000f2440f5154364b4":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"5447075bf42a59b91f08064738b015ab":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"5447075bf42a59b91f08064738b015ab":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"a90e8ea44085ced791b2fdb7fd44b5cf0bd7d27718029bb7":"03e1fa6b":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"a90e8ea44085ced791b2fdb7fd44b5cf0bd7d27718029bb7":"03e1fa6b":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"50aafe0578c115c4a8e126ff7b3ccb64dce8ccaa8ceda69f":"23e5d81c":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"50aafe0578c115c4a8e126ff7b3ccb64dce8ccaa8ceda69f":"23e5d81c":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"24ab9eeb0e5508cae80074f1070ee188a637171860881f1f":"2d9a3fbc210595b7b8b1b41523111a8e":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"24ab9eeb0e5508cae80074f1070ee188a637171860881f1f":"2d9a3fbc210595b7b8b1b41523111a8e":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"7ebfda6fa5da1dbffd82dc29b875798fbcef8ba0084fbd24":"63af747cc88a001fa94e060290f209c4":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"7ebfda6fa5da1dbffd82dc29b875798fbcef8ba0084fbd24":"63af747cc88a001fa94e060290f209c4":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4a550134f94455979ec4bf89ad2bd80d25a77ae94e456134":"a3e138b9":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4a550134f94455979ec4bf89ad2bd80d25a77ae94e456134":"a3e138b9":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"118ec53dd1bfbe52d5b9fe5dfebecf2ee674ec983eada654":"091a5ae9":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"118ec53dd1bfbe52d5b9fe5dfebecf2ee674ec983eada654":"091a5ae9":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"6a9a970b9beb2ac1bd4fd62168f8378a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"6a9a970b9beb2ac1bd4fd62168f8378a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"0c56a503aa2c12e87450d45a7b714db980fd348f327c0065":"a65666144994bad0c8195bcb4ade1337":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"0c56a503aa2c12e87450d45a7b714db980fd348f327c0065":"a65666144994bad0c8195bcb4ade1337":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"782e4318":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"782e4318":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"a04f270a":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"a04f270a":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"41b476013f45e4a781f253a6f3b1e530":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"41b476013f45e4a781f253a6f3b1e530":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"f9f018fcd125822616083fffebc4c8e6":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"f9f018fcd125822616083fffebc4c8e6":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"9f69f24f":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"9f69f24f":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"e17afaa4":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"e17afaa4":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"1859ac36a40a6b28b34266253627797a":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"1859ac36a40a6b28b34266253627797a":"":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"edf8b46eb69ac0044116019dec183072":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"edf8b46eb69ac0044116019dec183072":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6be31860ca271ef448de8f8d8b39346daf4b81d7e92d65b3":"38f125fa":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6be31860ca271ef448de8f8d8b39346daf4b81d7e92d65b3":"38f125fa":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4cc57a9927a6bc401441870d3193bf89ebd163f5c01501c7":"28a66b69":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4cc57a9927a6bc401441870d3193bf89ebd163f5c01501c7":"28a66b69":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"b351ab96b2e45515254558d5212673ee6c776d42dbca3b51":"2cf3a20b7fd7c49e6e79bef475c2906f":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"b351ab96b2e45515254558d5212673ee6c776d42dbca3b51":"2cf3a20b7fd7c49e6e79bef475c2906f":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"df1a5285caa41b4bb47f6e5ceceba4e82721828d68427a30":"81d18ca149d6766bfaccec88f194eb5b":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"df1a5285caa41b4bb47f6e5ceceba4e82721828d68427a30":"81d18ca149d6766bfaccec88f194eb5b":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"934f893824e880f743d196b22d1f340a52608155087bd28a":"c25e5329":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"934f893824e880f743d196b22d1f340a52608155087bd28a":"c25e5329":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"f43ba9d834ad85dfab3f1c0c27c3441fe4e411a38a261a65":"59b3b3ee":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"f43ba9d834ad85dfab3f1c0c27c3441fe4e411a38a261a65":"59b3b3ee":"FAIL":"":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"50038b5fdd364ee747b70d00bd36840ece4ea19998123375":"c0a458bfcafa3b2609afe0f825cbf503":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"50038b5fdd364ee747b70d00bd36840ece4ea19998123375":"c0a458bfcafa3b2609afe0f825cbf503":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"78ed8ff6b5a1255d0fbd0a719a9c27b059ff5f83d0c4962c":"390042ba8bb5f6798dab01c5afad7306":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"78ed8ff6b5a1255d0fbd0a719a9c27b059ff5f83d0c4962c":"390042ba8bb5f6798dab01c5afad7306":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"9d4b7f3b":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"9d4b7f3b":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"80745de9":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"80745de9":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"17223038fa99d53681ca1beabe78d1b4":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"17223038fa99d53681ca1beabe78d1b4":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"d0e1eeef4d2a264536bb1c2c1bde7c35":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"d0e1eeef4d2a264536bb1c2c1bde7c35":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fe69ed84":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fe69ed84":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"db7ffc82":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"db7ffc82":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"0c66a8e547ed4f8c2c9a9a1eb5d455b9":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"0c66a8e547ed4f8c2c9a9a1eb5d455b9":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"38757b3a61a4dc97ca3ab88bf1240695":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"38757b3a61a4dc97ca3ab88bf1240695":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"ddc93a54":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"ddc93a54":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"32b649ab56162e55d4148a1292d6a225a988eb1308298273":"b6889036":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"32b649ab56162e55d4148a1292d6a225a988eb1308298273":"b6889036":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"cba4b4aeb85f0492fd8d905c4a6d8233139833373ef188a8":"c5a5ebecf7ac8607fe412189e83d9d20":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"cba4b4aeb85f0492fd8d905c4a6d8233139833373ef188a8":"c5a5ebecf7ac8607fe412189e83d9d20":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"ca62713728b5c9d652504b0ae8fd4fee5d297ee6a8d19cb6":"e699f15f14d34dcaf9ba8ed4b877c97d":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"ca62713728b5c9d652504b0ae8fd4fee5d297ee6a8d19cb6":"e699f15f14d34dcaf9ba8ed4b877c97d":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"042653c674ef2a90f7fb11d30848e530ae59478f1051633a":"34fad277":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"042653c674ef2a90f7fb11d30848e530ae59478f1051633a":"34fad277":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"1902d9769a7ba3d3268e1257395c8c2e5f98eef295dcbfa5":"a35df775":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"1902d9769a7ba3d3268e1257395c8c2e5f98eef295dcbfa5":"a35df775":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671e":"a7ade30a07d185692ab0ebdf4c78cf7a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671e":"a7ade30a07d185692ab0ebdf4c78cf7a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"9a98617fb97a0dfe466be692272dcdaec1c5443a3b51312e":"f042c86363cc05afb98c66e16be8a445":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"9a98617fb97a0dfe466be692272dcdaec1c5443a3b51312e":"f042c86363cc05afb98c66e16be8a445":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"1d089a5f":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"1d089a5f":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"2f46022a":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"2f46022a":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"5280a2137fee3deefcfe9b63a1199fb3":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"5280a2137fee3deefcfe9b63a1199fb3":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"d40a7318c5f2d82f838c0beeefe0d598":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"d40a7318c5f2d82f838c0beeefe0d598":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"5e0eaebd":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"5e0eaebd":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"71b7fc33":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"71b7fc33":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"d07ccf9fdc3d33aa94cda3d230da707c":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"d07ccf9fdc3d33aa94cda3d230da707c":"":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"65fe32b649dc328c9f531584897e85b3":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"65fe32b649dc328c9f531584897e85b3":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"9f6ca4af9b159148c889a6584d1183ea26e2614874b05045":"75dea8d1":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"9f6ca4af9b159148c889a6584d1183ea26e2614874b05045":"75dea8d1":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"84d8212e9cfc2121252baa3b065b1edcf50497b9594db1eb":"d7965825":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"84d8212e9cfc2121252baa3b065b1edcf50497b9594db1eb":"d7965825":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6aab64c4787599d8f213446beadb16e08dba60e97f56dbd1":"4d1d980d6fe0fb44b421992662b97975":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6aab64c4787599d8f213446beadb16e08dba60e97f56dbd1":"4d1d980d6fe0fb44b421992662b97975":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4980b2ee49b1aaf393175f5ab9bae95ec7904557dfa20660":"3c51d36c826f01384100886198a7f6a3":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4980b2ee49b1aaf393175f5ab9bae95ec7904557dfa20660":"3c51d36c826f01384100886198a7f6a3":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"16e543d0e20615ff0df15acd9927ddfe40668a54bb854ccc":"c25e9fce":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"16e543d0e20615ff0df15acd9927ddfe40668a54bb854ccc":"c25e9fce":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"df35b109caf690656ae278bbd8f8bba687a2ce11b105dae9":"8ecedb3e":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"df35b109caf690656ae278bbd8f8bba687a2ce11b105dae9":"8ecedb3e":"FAIL":"":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"c5b0b2ef17498c5570eb335df4588032958ba3d69bf6f317":"8464a6f7fa2b76744e8e8d95691cecb8":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"c5b0b2ef17498c5570eb335df4588032958ba3d69bf6f317":"8464a6f7fa2b76744e8e8d95691cecb8":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":0
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"d1f0518929f4ae2f0543de2a7dfe4bb0110bb3057e524a1c":"06bd6dc2e6bcc3436cffb969ae900388":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"d1f0518929f4ae2f0543de2a7dfe4bb0110bb3057e524a1c":"06bd6dc2e6bcc3436cffb969ae900388":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #1 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"469c90bb":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"469c90bb":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #2 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"46a908ed":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"46a908ed":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #3 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"8207eb14d33855a52acceed17dbcbf6e":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"8207eb14d33855a52acceed17dbcbf6e":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #4 (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"60f8e127cb4d30db6df0622158cd931d":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"60f8e127cb4d30db6df0622158cd931d":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #5 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"8a19a133":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"8a19a133":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #6 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"2e317f1b":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"2e317f1b":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #7 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"97e1a8dd4259ccd2e431e057b0397fcf":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"97e1a8dd4259ccd2e431e057b0397fcf":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #8 (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"5a9596c511ea6a8671adefc4f2157d8b":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"5a9596c511ea6a8671adefc4f2157d8b":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #9 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"64a1341679972dc5869fcf69b19d5c5ea50aa0b5e985f5b7":"22aa8d59":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"64a1341679972dc5869fcf69b19d5c5ea50aa0b5e985f5b7":"22aa8d59":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #10 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"c5b7f802bffc498c1626e3774f1d9f94045dfd8e1a10a202":"77d00a75":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"c5b7f802bffc498c1626e3774f1d9f94045dfd8e1a10a202":"77d00a75":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #11 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"bc51c3925a960e7732533e4ef3a4f69ee6826de952bcb0fd":"374f3bb6db8377ebfc79674858c4f305":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"bc51c3925a960e7732533e4ef3a4f69ee6826de952bcb0fd":"374f3bb6db8377ebfc79674858c4f305":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #12 (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"afa1fa8e8a70e26b02161150556d604101fdf423f332c336":"3275f2a4907d51b734fe7238cebbd48f":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"afa1fa8e8a70e26b02161150556d604101fdf423f332c336":"3275f2a4907d51b734fe7238cebbd48f":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #13 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f412":"3d14fb3f":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f412":"3d14fb3f":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #14 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"bb5425b3869b76856ec58e39886fb6f6f2ac13fe44cb132d":"8d0c0099":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"bb5425b3869b76856ec58e39886fb6f6f2ac13fe44cb132d":"8d0c0099":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #15 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"f0050ad16392021a3f40207bed3521fb1e9f808f49830c42":"3a578d179902f912f9ea1afbce1120b3":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"f0050ad16392021a3f40207bed3521fb1e9f808f49830c42":"3a578d179902f912f9ea1afbce1120b3":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #16 (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"c408190d0fbf5034f83b24a8ed9657331a7ce141de4fae76":"9084607b83bd06e6442eac8dacf583cc":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"c408190d0fbf5034f83b24a8ed9657331a7ce141de4fae76":"9084607b83bd06e6442eac8dacf583cc":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #17 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"92d00fbe":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"92d00fbe":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #18 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"9143e5c4":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"9143e5c4":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #19 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"93af11a08379eb37a16aa2837f09d69d":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"93af11a08379eb37a16aa2837f09d69d":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #20 (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"d19b0c14ec686a7961ca7c386d125a65":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"d19b0c14ec686a7961ca7c386d125a65":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #21 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"866d4227":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"866d4227":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #22 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"94cb1127":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"94cb1127":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #23 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5":"":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5":"":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #24 (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"677a040d46ee3f2b7838273bdad14f16":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"677a040d46ee3f2b7838273bdad14f16":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #25 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"c2fe12658139f5d0dd22cadf2e901695b579302a72fc5608":"3ebc7720":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"c2fe12658139f5d0dd22cadf2e901695b579302a72fc5608":"3ebc7720":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #26 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"94748ba81229e53c38583a8564b23ebbafc6f6efdf4c2a81":"c44db2c9":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"94748ba81229e53c38583a8564b23ebbafc6f6efdf4c2a81":"c44db2c9":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #27 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"3341168eb8c48468c414347fb08f71d2086f7c2d1bd581ce":"1ac68bd42f5ec7fa7e068cc0ecd79c2a":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"3341168eb8c48468c414347fb08f71d2086f7c2d1bd581ce":"1ac68bd42f5ec7fa7e068cc0ecd79c2a":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #28 (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"d543acda712b898cbb27b8f598b2e4438ce587a836e27851":"47c3338a2400809e739b63ba8227d2f9":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"d543acda712b898cbb27b8f598b2e4438ce587a836e27851":"47c3338a2400809e739b63ba8227d2f9":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #29 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"c0ea400b599561e7905b99262b4565d5c3dc49fad84d7c69":"ef891339":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"c0ea400b599561e7905b99262b4565d5c3dc49fad84d7c69":"ef891339":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #30 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"60871e03ea0eb968536c99f926ea24ef43d41272ad9fb7f6":"3d488623":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"60871e03ea0eb968536c99f926ea24ef43d41272ad9fb7f6":"3d488623":"FAIL":"":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #31 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"8d34cdca37ce77be68f65baf3382e31efa693e63f914a781":"367f30f2eaad8c063ca50795acd90203":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"8d34cdca37ce77be68f65baf3382e31efa693e63f914a781":"367f30f2eaad8c063ca50795acd90203":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":0
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #32 (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"516c0095cc3d85fd55e48da17c592e0c7014b9daafb82bdc":"4b41096dfdbe9cc1ab610f8f3e038d16":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"516c0095cc3d85fd55e48da17c592e0c7014b9daafb82bdc":"4b41096dfdbe9cc1ab610f8f3e038d16":"FAIL":"":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"BA737185E719310492F38A5F1251DA55FAFBC949848A0D":"FCAECE746B3DB9AD":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000003020100A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"BA737185E719310492F38A5F1251DA55FAFBC949848A0D":"FCAECE746B3DB9AD":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000004030201A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5D2564BF8EAFE1D99526EC016D1BF0424CFBD2CD62848F33":"60B2295DF24283E8":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000004030201A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5D2564BF8EAFE1D99526EC016D1BF0424CFBD2CD62848F33":"60B2295DF24283E8":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000005040302A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"81F663D6C7787817F9203608B982AD15DC2BBD87D756F79204":"F551D6682F23AA46":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000005040302A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"81F663D6C7787817F9203608B982AD15DC2BBD87D756F79204":"F551D6682F23AA46":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000006050403A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"CAEF1E827211B08F7BD90F08C77288C070A4A0":"8B3A933A63E497A0":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000006050403A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"CAEF1E827211B08F7BD90F08C77288C070A4A0":"8B3A933A63E497A0":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000007060504A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2AD3BAD94FC52E92BE438E827C1023B96A8A7725":"8FA17BA7F331DB09":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000007060504A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2AD3BAD94FC52E92BE438E827C1023B96A8A7725":"8FA17BA7F331DB09":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000008070605A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"FEA5480BA53FA8D3C34422AACE4DE67FFA3BB73BAB":"AB36A1EE4FE0FE28":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000008070605A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"FEA5480BA53FA8D3C34422AACE4DE67FFA3BB73BAB":"AB36A1EE4FE0FE28":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000009080706A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"54532026E54C119A8D36D9EC6E1ED97416C8708C4B5C2C":"ACAFA3BCCF7A4EBF9573":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"00000009080706A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"54532026E54C119A8D36D9EC6E1ED97416C8708C4B5C2C":"ACAFA3BCCF7A4EBF9573":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000A090807A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"8AD19B001A87D148F4D92BEF34525CCCE3A63C6512A6F575":"7388E4913EF14701F441":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000A090807A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"8AD19B001A87D148F4D92BEF34525CCCE3A63C6512A6F575":"7388E4913EF14701F441":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #9
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000B0A0908A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5DB08D62407E6E31D60F9CA2C60474219AC0BE50C0D4A57787":"94D6E230CD25C9FEBF87":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000B0A0908A0A1A2A3A4A5":"0001020304050607":"5DB08D62407E6E31D60F9CA2C60474219AC0BE50C0D4A57787":"94D6E230CD25C9FEBF87":"":"08090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #10
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000C0B0A09A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"DB118CCEC1B8761C877CD8963A67D6F3BBBC5C":"D09299EB11F312F23237":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000C0B0A09A0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"DB118CCEC1B8761C877CD8963A67D6F3BBBC5C":"D09299EB11F312F23237":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #11
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000D0C0B0AA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"7CC83D8DC49103525B483DC5CA7EA9AB812B7056":"079DAFFADA16CCCF2C4E":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000D0C0B0AA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"7CC83D8DC49103525B483DC5CA7EA9AB812B7056":"079DAFFADA16CCCF2C4E":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #12
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000E0D0C0BA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2CD35B8820D23E7AA351B0E92FC79367238B2CC748":"CBB94C2947793D64AF75":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"C0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CACBCCCDCECF":"0000000E0D0C0BA0A1A2A3A4A5":"000102030405060708090A0B":"2CD35B8820D23E7AA351B0E92FC79367238B2CC748":"CBB94C2947793D64AF75":"":"0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #13
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00A970110E1927B160B6A31C1C":"6B7F464507FAE496":"A435D727348DDD22907F7EB8F5FDBB4D939DA6524DB4F6":"4558C02D25B127EE":"":"C6B5F3E6CA2311AEF7472B203E735EA561ADB17D56C5A3"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00A970110E1927B160B6A31C1C":"6B7F464507FAE496":"A435D727348DDD22907F7EB8F5FDBB4D939DA6524DB4F6":"4558C02D25B127EE":"":"C6B5F3E6CA2311AEF7472B203E735EA561ADB17D56C5A3":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #14
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"0083CD8CE0CB42B160B6A31C1C":"986605B43DF15DE7":"8AE052508FBECA932E346F05E0DC0DFBCF939EAFFA3E587C":"867D6E1C48703806":"":"01F6CE6764C574483BB02E6BBF1E0ABD26A22572B4D80EE7"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"0083CD8CE0CB42B160B6A31C1C":"986605B43DF15DE7":"8AE052508FBECA932E346F05E0DC0DFBCF939EAFFA3E587C":"867D6E1C48703806":"":"01F6CE6764C574483BB02E6BBF1E0ABD26A22572B4D80EE7":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #15
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"005F54950B18F2B160B6A31C1C":"48F2E7E1A7671A51":"08B67EE21C8BF26E473E408599E9C0836D6AF0BB18DF55466C":"A80878A790476DE5":"":"CDF1D8406FC2E9014953897005FBFB8BA57276F92404608E08"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"005F54950B18F2B160B6A31C1C":"48F2E7E1A7671A51":"08B67EE21C8BF26E473E408599E9C0836D6AF0BB18DF55466C":"A80878A790476DE5":"":"CDF1D8406FC2E9014953897005FBFB8BA57276F92404608E08":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #16
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00EC600863319AB160B6A31C1C":"DE97DF3B8CBD6D8E5030DA4C":"63B78B4967B19EDBB733CD1114F64EB2260893":"68C354828D950CC5":"":"B005DCFA0B59181426A961685A993D8C43185B"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00EC600863319AB160B6A31C1C":"DE97DF3B8CBD6D8E5030DA4C":"63B78B4967B19EDBB733CD1114F64EB2260893":"68C354828D950CC5":"":"B005DCFA0B59181426A961685A993D8C43185B":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #17
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"0060CFF1A31EA1B160B6A31C1C":"A5EE93E457DF05466E782DCF":"0BC6BBE2A8B909F4629EE6DC148DA44410E18AF4":"3147383276F66A9F":"":"2E20211298105F129D5ED95B93F72D30B2FACCD7"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"0060CFF1A31EA1B160B6A31C1C":"A5EE93E457DF05466E782DCF":"0BC6BBE2A8B909F4629EE6DC148DA44410E18AF4":"3147383276F66A9F":"":"2E20211298105F129D5ED95B93F72D30B2FACCD7":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #18
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"000F85CD995C97B160B6A31C1C":"24AA1BF9A5CD876182A25074":"222AD632FA31D6AF970C345F7E77CA3BD0DC25B340":"A1A3D31F8D4B44B7":"":"2645941E75632D3491AF0FC0C9876C3BE4AA7468C9"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"000F85CD995C97B160B6A31C1C":"24AA1BF9A5CD876182A25074":"222AD632FA31D6AF970C345F7E77CA3BD0DC25B340":"A1A3D31F8D4B44B7":"":"2645941E75632D3491AF0FC0C9876C3BE4AA7468C9":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #19
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00C29B2CAAC4CDB160B6A31C1C":"691946B9CA07BE87":"05B8E1B9C49CFD56CF130AA6251DC2ECC06CCC508FE697":"A0066D57C84BEC182768":"":"070135A6437C9DB120CD61D8F6C39C3EA125FD95A0D23D"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00C29B2CAAC4CDB160B6A31C1C":"691946B9CA07BE87":"05B8E1B9C49CFD56CF130AA6251DC2ECC06CCC508FE697":"A0066D57C84BEC182768":"":"070135A6437C9DB120CD61D8F6C39C3EA125FD95A0D23D":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #20
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"002C6B7595EE62B160B6A31C1C":"D0C54ECB84627DC4":"54CEB968DEE23611575EC003DFAA1CD48849BDF5AE2EDB6B":"7FA775B150ED4383C5A9":"":"C8C0880E6C636E20093DD6594217D2E18877DB264E71A5CC"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"002C6B7595EE62B160B6A31C1C":"D0C54ECB84627DC4":"54CEB968DEE23611575EC003DFAA1CD48849BDF5AE2EDB6B":"7FA775B150ED4383C5A9":"":"C8C0880E6C636E20093DD6594217D2E18877DB264E71A5CC":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #21
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00C53CD4C2AA24B160B6A31C1C":"E285E0E4808CDA3D":"B1404546BF667210CA28E309B39BD6CA7E9FC8285FE698D43C":"D20A02E0BDCAED2010D3":"":"F75DAA0710C4E64297794DC2B7D2A20757B1AA4E448002FFAB"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00C53CD4C2AA24B160B6A31C1C":"E285E0E4808CDA3D":"B1404546BF667210CA28E309B39BD6CA7E9FC8285FE698D43C":"D20A02E0BDCAED2010D3":"":"F75DAA0710C4E64297794DC2B7D2A20757B1AA4E448002FFAB":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #22
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00BEE9267FBADCB160B6A31C1C":"6CAEF9941141570D7C813405":"94C8959C11569A297831A721005857AB61B87A":"2DEA0936B6EB5F625F5D":"":"C238822FAC5F98FF929405B0AD127A4E41854E"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00BEE9267FBADCB160B6A31C1C":"6CAEF9941141570D7C813405":"94C8959C11569A297831A721005857AB61B87A":"2DEA0936B6EB5F625F5D":"":"C238822FAC5F98FF929405B0AD127A4E41854E":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #23
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00DFA8B1245007B160B6A31C1C":"36A52CF16B19A2037AB7011E":"5869E3AAD2447C74E0FC05F9A4EA74577F4DE8CA":"8924764296AD04119CE7":"":"4DBF3E774AD245E5D5891F9D1C32A0AE022C85D7"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"00DFA8B1245007B160B6A31C1C":"36A52CF16B19A2037AB7011E":"5869E3AAD2447C74E0FC05F9A4EA74577F4DE8CA":"8924764296AD04119CE7":"":"4DBF3E774AD245E5D5891F9D1C32A0AE022C85D7":0
Camellia-CCM test vector RFC 5528 #24
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"003B8FD8D3A937B160B6A31C1C":"A4D499F78419728C19178B0C":"4B198156393B0F7796086AAFB454F8C3F034CCA966":"945F1FCEA7E11BEE6A2F":"":"9DC9EDAE2FF5DF8636E8C6DE0EED55F7867E33337D"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM:"D75C2778078CA93D971F96FDE720F4CD":"003B8FD8D3A937B160B6A31C1C":"A4D499F78419728C19178B0C":"4B198156393B0F7796086AAFB454F8C3F034CCA966":"945F1FCEA7E11BEE6A2F":"":"9DC9EDAE2FF5DF8636E8C6DE0EED55F7867E33337D":0
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #1 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"02209f55":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #2 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4ae701103c63deca5b5a3939d7d05992":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"9a04c241":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #3 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"75d582db43ce9b13ab4b6f7f14341330":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #4 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"3a65e03af37b81d05acc7ec1bc39deb0":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #5 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"90156f3f":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #6 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"88909016":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #7 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fb04dc5a44c6bb000f2440f5154364b4":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #8 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"5447075bf42a59b91f08064738b015ab":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #9 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"a90e8ea44085ced791b2fdb7fd44b5cf0bd7d27718029bb7":"03e1fa6b":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #10 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"50aafe0578c115c4a8e126ff7b3ccb64dce8ccaa8ceda69f":"23e5d81c":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #11 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"24ab9eeb0e5508cae80074f1070ee188a637171860881f1f":"2d9a3fbc210595b7b8b1b41523111a8e":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #12 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"7ebfda6fa5da1dbffd82dc29b875798fbcef8ba0084fbd24":"63af747cc88a001fa94e060290f209c4":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #13 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4a550134f94455979ec4bf89ad2bd80d25a77ae94e456134":"a3e138b9":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #14 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d5243":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"118ec53dd1bfbe52d5b9fe5dfebecf2ee674ec983eada654":"091a5ae9":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #15 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"4bfe4e35784f0a65b545477e5e2f4bae0e1e6fa717eaf2cb":"6a9a970b9beb2ac1bd4fd62168f8378a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #16 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"0c56a503aa2c12e87450d45a7b714db980fd348f327c0065":"a65666144994bad0c8195bcb4ade1337":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #17 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"782e4318":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #18 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe4829":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"a04f270a":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #19 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"41b476013f45e4a781f253a6f3b1e530":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #20 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"f9f018fcd125822616083fffebc4c8e6":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #21 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"9f69f24f":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #22 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"e17afaa4":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #23 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"1859ac36a40a6b28b34266253627797a":"":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #24 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"edf8b46eb69ac0044116019dec183072":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #25 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6be31860ca271ef448de8f8d8b39346daf4b81d7e92d65b3":"38f125fa":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #26 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c7571":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4cc57a9927a6bc401441870d3193bf89ebd163f5c01501c7":"28a66b69":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #27 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"b351ab96b2e45515254558d5212673ee6c776d42dbca3b51":"2cf3a20b7fd7c49e6e79bef475c2906f":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #28 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"df1a5285caa41b4bb47f6e5ceceba4e82721828d68427a30":"81d18ca149d6766bfaccec88f194eb5b":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #29 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"934f893824e880f743d196b22d1f340a52608155087bd28a":"c25e5329":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #30 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728c":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"f43ba9d834ad85dfab3f1c0c27c3441fe4e411a38a261a65":"59b3b3ee":"FAIL":"":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #31 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"50038b5fdd364ee747b70d00bd36840ece4ea19998123375":"c0a458bfcafa3b2609afe0f825cbf503":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1
AES-128-CCM test vector NIST #32 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0e":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"78ed8ff6b5a1255d0fbd0a719a9c27b059ff5f83d0c4962c":"390042ba8bb5f6798dab01c5afad7306":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #1 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"9d4b7f3b":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #2 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"c98ad7f38b2c7e970c9b965ec87a08208384718f78206c6c":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"80745de9":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #3 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"":"17223038fa99d53681ca1beabe78d1b4":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #4 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"3796cf51b87266":"":"":"d0e1eeef4d2a264536bb1c2c1bde7c35":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #5 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"fe69ed84":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #6 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"4bb3c4a4f893ad8c9bdc833c325d62b3d3ad1bccf9282a65":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"db7ffc82":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #7 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"":"0c66a8e547ed4f8c2c9a9a1eb5d455b9":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #8 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882":"":"":"38757b3a61a4dc97ca3ab88bf1240695":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #9 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"411986d04d6463100bff03f7d0bde7ea2c3488784378138c":"ddc93a54":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #10 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"19ebfde2d5468ba0a3031bde629b11fd4094afcb205393fa":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"32b649ab56162e55d4148a1292d6a225a988eb1308298273":"b6889036":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #11 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9":"":"cba4b4aeb85f0492fd8d905c4a6d8233139833373ef188a8":"c5a5ebecf7ac8607fe412189e83d9d20":"":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #12 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"31f8fa25827d48":"":"ca62713728b5c9d652504b0ae8fd4fee5d297ee6a8d19cb6":"e699f15f14d34dcaf9ba8ed4b877c97d":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #13 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"042653c674ef2a90f7fb11d30848e530ae59478f1051633a":"34fad277":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #14 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"197afb02ffbd8f699dacae87094d524324576b99844f75e1":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"1902d9769a7ba3d3268e1257395c8c2e5f98eef295dcbfa5":"a35df775":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #15 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"":"a5b7d8cca2069908d1ed88e6a9fe2c9bede3131dad54671e":"a7ade30a07d185692ab0ebdf4c78cf7a":"":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #16 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"49004912fdd7269279b1f06a89":"":"9a98617fb97a0dfe466be692272dcdaec1c5443a3b51312e":"f042c86363cc05afb98c66e16be8a445":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #17 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"1d089a5f":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #18 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"90929a4b0ac65b350ad1591611fe48297e03956f6083e451":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"2f46022a":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #19 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"":"5280a2137fee3deefcfe9b63a1199fb3":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #20 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"a265480ca88d5f":"a2248a882ecbf850daf91933a389e78e81623d233dfd47bf8321361a38f138fe":"":"d40a7318c5f2d82f838c0beeefe0d598":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #21 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"5e0eaebd":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #22 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"6a798d7c5e1a72b43e20ad5c7b08567b12ab744b61c070e2":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"71b7fc33":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #23 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"":"d07ccf9fdc3d33aa94cda3d230da707c":"":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #24 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6":"f6107696edb332b2ea059d8860fee26be42e5e12e1a4f79a8d0eafce1b2278a7":"":"65fe32b649dc328c9f531584897e85b3":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #25 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"9f6ca4af9b159148c889a6584d1183ea26e2614874b05045":"75dea8d1":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #26 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"f9fdca4ac64fe7f014de0f43039c757194d544ce5d15eed4":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"84d8212e9cfc2121252baa3b065b1edcf50497b9594db1eb":"d7965825":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #27 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9":"3796cf51b8726652a4204733b8fbb047cf00fb91a9837e22ec22b1a268f88e2c":"6aab64c4787599d8f213446beadb16e08dba60e97f56dbd1":"4d1d980d6fe0fb44b421992662b97975":"":"a265480ca88d5f536db0dc6abc40faf0d05be7a966977768":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #28 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"fdd2d6f503c915":"5b92394f21ddc3ad49d9b0881b829a5935cb3a4d23e292a62fb66b5e7ab7020e":"4980b2ee49b1aaf393175f5ab9bae95ec7904557dfa20660":"3c51d36c826f01384100886198a7f6a3":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #29 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"16e543d0e20615ff0df15acd9927ddfe40668a54bb854ccc":"c25e9fce":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #30 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"a7aa635ea51b0bb20a092bd5573e728ccd4b3e8cdd2ab33d":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"df35b109caf690656ae278bbd8f8bba687a2ce11b105dae9":"8ecedb3e":"FAIL":"":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #31 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"5a8aa485c316e9403aff859fbb":"a16a2e741f1cd9717285b6d882c1fc53655e9773761ad697a7ee6410184c7982":"c5b0b2ef17498c5570eb335df4588032958ba3d69bf6f317":"8464a6f7fa2b76744e8e8d95691cecb8":"":"8739b4bea1a099fe547499cbc6d1b13d849b8084c9b6acc5":1
AES-192-CCM test vector NIST #32 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:"26511fb51fcfa75cb4b44da75a6e5a0eb8d9c8f3b906f886":"0812757ad0cc4d17c4cfe7a642":"ec6c44a7e94e51a3ca6dee229098391575ec7213c85267fbf7492fdbeee61b10":"d1f0518929f4ae2f0543de2a7dfe4bb0110bb3057e524a1c":"06bd6dc2e6bcc3436cffb969ae900388":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #1 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"469c90bb":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #2 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"eda32f751456e33195f1f499cf2dc7c97ea127b6d488f211ccc5126fbb24afa6":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"46a908ed":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #3 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"":"8207eb14d33855a52acceed17dbcbf6e":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #4 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"d3d5424e20fbec":"":"":"60f8e127cb4d30db6df0622158cd931d":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #5 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"8a19a133":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #6 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"e1b8a927a95efe94656677b692662000278b441c79e879dd5c0ddc758bdc9ee8":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"2e317f1b":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #7 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"":"97e1a8dd4259ccd2e431e057b0397fcf":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #8 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d":"":"":"5a9596c511ea6a8671adefc4f2157d8b":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #9 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"64a1341679972dc5869fcf69b19d5c5ea50aa0b5e985f5b7":"22aa8d59":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #10 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"af063639e66c284083c5cf72b70d8bc277f5978e80d9322d99f2fdc718cda569":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"c5b7f802bffc498c1626e3774f1d9f94045dfd8e1a10a202":"77d00a75":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #11 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c1":"":"bc51c3925a960e7732533e4ef3a4f69ee6826de952bcb0fd":"374f3bb6db8377ebfc79674858c4f305":"":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c98":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #12 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"bfcda8b5a2d0d2":"":"afa1fa8e8a70e26b02161150556d604101fdf423f332c336":"3275f2a4907d51b734fe7238cebbd48f":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #13 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"63e00d30e4b08fd2a1cc8d70fab327b2368e77a93be4f412":"3d14fb3f":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #14 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"f7079dfa3b5c7b056347d7e437bcded683abd6e2c9e069d333284082cbb5d453":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"bb5425b3869b76856ec58e39886fb6f6f2ac13fe44cb132d":"8d0c0099":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #15 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"":"f0050ad16392021a3f40207bed3521fb1e9f808f49830c42":"3a578d179902f912f9ea1afbce1120b3":"":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #16 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=0, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"894dcaa61008eb8fb052c60d41":"":"c408190d0fbf5034f83b24a8ed9657331a7ce141de4fae76":"9084607b83bd06e6442eac8dacf583cc":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #17 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"92d00fbe":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #18 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"1b0e8df63c57f05d9ac457575ea764524b8610ae5164e6215f426f5a7ae6ede4":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"9143e5c4":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #19 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"":"93af11a08379eb37a16aa2837f09d69d":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #20 PSA (P=0, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"78c46e3249ca28":"232e957c65ffa11988e830d4617d500f1c4a35c1221f396c41ab214f074ca2dc":"":"d19b0c14ec686a7961ca7c386d125a65":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #21 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"866d4227":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #22 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"a4bc10b1a62c96d459fbaf3a5aa3face7313bb9e1253e696f96a7a8e36801088":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"94cb1127":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #23 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"":"867b0d87cf6e0f718200a97b4f6d5ad5":"":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #24 PSA (P=0, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5":"89f8b068d34f56bc49d839d8e47b347e6dae737b903b278632447e6c0485d26a":"":"677a040d46ee3f2b7838273bdad14f16":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #25 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"c2fe12658139f5d0dd22cadf2e901695b579302a72fc5608":"3ebc7720":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #26 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"8c5cf3457ff22228c39c051c4e05ed4093657eb303f859a9d4b0f8be0127d88a":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"94748ba81229e53c38583a8564b23ebbafc6f6efdf4c2a81":"c44db2c9":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #27 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c1":"d3d5424e20fbec43ae495353ed830271515ab104f8860c988d15b6d36c038eab":"3341168eb8c48468c414347fb08f71d2086f7c2d1bd581ce":"1ac68bd42f5ec7fa7e068cc0ecd79c2a":"":"78c46e3249ca28e1ef0531d80fd37c124d9aecb7be6668e3":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #28 PSA (P=24, N=7, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"6ba004fd176791":"5a053b2a1bb87e85d56527bfcdcd3ecafb991bb10e4c862bb0751c700a29f54b":"d543acda712b898cbb27b8f598b2e4438ce587a836e27851":"47c3338a2400809e739b63ba8227d2f9":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #29 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"c0ea400b599561e7905b99262b4565d5c3dc49fad84d7c69":"ef891339":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #30 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=4)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"705334e30f53dd2f92d190d2c1437c8772f940c55aa35e562214ed45bd458ffe":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"60871e03ea0eb968536c99f926ea24ef43d41272ad9fb7f6":"3d488623":"FAIL":"":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #31 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"a544218dadd3c10583db49cf39":"3c0e2815d37d844f7ac240ba9d6e3a0b2a86f706e885959e09a1005e024f6907":"8d34cdca37ce77be68f65baf3382e31efa693e63f914a781":"367f30f2eaad8c063ca50795acd90203":"":"e8de970f6ee8e80ede933581b5bcf4d837e2b72baa8b00c3":1
AES-256-CCM test vector NIST #32 PSA (P=24, N=13, A=32, T=16)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:"314a202f836f9f257e22d8c11757832ae5131d357a72df88f3eff0ffcee0da4e":"8fa501c5dd9ac9b868144c9fa5":"5bb40e3bb72b4509324a7edc852f72535f1f6283156e63f6959ffaf39dcde800":"516c0095cc3d85fd55e48da17c592e0c7014b9daafb82bdc":"4b41096dfdbe9cc1ab610f8f3e038d16":"FAIL":"":1

4
tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.chachapoly.data
View File

@ -112,11 +112,11 @@ enc_dec_buf_multipart:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256:16:16:-1:16:16:16:16
ChaCha20+Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":"":"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"
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":"":"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":0
ChaCha20+Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 Unauthentic (1st bit flipped)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"6ead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":"FAIL":""
auth_crypt_tv:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:"1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0":"000000000102030405060708":"f33388860000000000004e91":"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":"6ead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38":"FAIL":"":0
Chacha20+Poly1305 RFC 7539 Test Vector #1 (streaming)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C

104
tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.function
View File

@ -542,33 +542,66 @@ exit:
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
void auth_crypt_tv( int cipher_id, data_t * key, data_t * iv,
data_t * ad, data_t * cipher, data_t * tag,
char * result, data_t * clear )
char * result, data_t * clear, int use_psa )
{
/* Takes an AEAD ciphertext + tag and performs a pair
* of AEAD decryption and AEAD encryption. It checks that
* this results in the expected plaintext, and that
* decryption and encryption are inverse to one another. */
int ret;
unsigned char output[267]; /* above + 2 (overwrite check) */
unsigned char my_tag[20];
unsigned char output[300]; /* Temporary buffer for results of
* encryption and decryption. */
unsigned char *output_tag = NULL; /* Temporary buffer for tag in the
* encryption step. */
mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
size_t outlen;
unsigned char *tmp_tag = NULL;
unsigned char *tmp_cipher = NULL;
mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx );
memset( output, 0xFF, sizeof( output ) );
memset( my_tag, 0xFF, sizeof( my_tag ) );
/* Prepare context */
TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) );
TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
(void) use_psa;
#else
if( use_psa == 1 )
{
/* PSA requires that the tag immediately follows the ciphertext. */
tmp_cipher = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cipher->len + tag->len );
TEST_ASSERT( tmp_cipher != NULL );
tmp_tag = tmp_cipher + cipher->len;
memcpy( tmp_cipher, cipher->x, cipher->len );
memcpy( tmp_tag, tag->x, tag->len );
TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ),
tag->len ) );
}
else
#endif
{
tmp_tag = tag->x;
tmp_cipher = cipher->x;
TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) );
}
TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key->x, 8 * key->len,
MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) );
/* decode buffer and check tag->x */
ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len,
cipher->x, cipher->len, output, &outlen,
tag->x, tag->len );
/* make sure we didn't overwrite */
TEST_ASSERT( output[outlen + 0] == 0xFF );
TEST_ASSERT( output[outlen + 1] == 0xFF );
/* Sanity check that we don't use overly long inputs. */
TEST_ASSERT( sizeof( output ) >= cipher->len );
ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len,
tmp_cipher, cipher->len, output, &outlen,
tmp_tag, tag->len );
/* make sure the message is rejected if it should be */
if( strcmp( result, "FAIL" ) == 0 )
@ -587,23 +620,28 @@ void auth_crypt_tv( int cipher_id, data_t * key, data_t * iv,
memset( output, 0xFF, sizeof( output ) );
outlen = 0;
/* Sanity check that we don't use overly long inputs. */
TEST_ASSERT( sizeof( output ) >= clear->len + tag->len );
output_tag = output + clear->len;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &ctx, iv->x, iv->len, ad->x, ad->len,
clear->x, clear->len, output, &outlen,
my_tag, tag->len );
output_tag, tag->len );
TEST_ASSERT( ret == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( outlen == clear->len );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, cipher->x, clear->len ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( my_tag, tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 );
/* make sure we didn't overwrite */
TEST_ASSERT( output[outlen + 0] == 0xFF );
TEST_ASSERT( output[outlen + 1] == 0xFF );
TEST_ASSERT( my_tag[tag->len + 0] == 0xFF );
TEST_ASSERT( my_tag[tag->len + 1] == 0xFF );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, cipher->x, cipher->len ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output_tag, tag->x, tag->len ) == 0 );
exit:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( use_psa == 1 )
{
mbedtls_free( tmp_cipher );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx );
}
/* END_CASE */
@ -648,8 +686,8 @@ exit:
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
void test_vec_crypt( int cipher_id, int operation, char *hex_key,
char *hex_iv, char *hex_input, char *hex_result,
int finish_result )
char *hex_iv, char *hex_input, char *hex_result,
int finish_result, int use_psa )
{
unsigned char key[50];
unsigned char input[16];
@ -669,8 +707,18 @@ void test_vec_crypt( int cipher_id, int operation, char *hex_key,
memset( iv, 0x00, sizeof( iv ) );
/* Prepare context */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
(void) use_psa;
#else
if( use_psa == 1 )
{
TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ), 0 ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
TEST_ASSERT( 0 == mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) );
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_id ) ) );
key_len = unhexify( key, hex_key );
inputlen = unhexify( input, hex_input );

4032
tests/suites/test_suite_cipher.gcm.data
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

38
tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data
View File

@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ PK utils: ECDSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:192:24:"ECDSA"
PK PSA utilities: setup/free, info functions, unsupported operations
pk_psa_utils:
RSA verify test vector #1 (good)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
pk_rsa_verify_test_vec:"206ef4bf396c6087f8229ef196fd35f37ccb8de5efcdb238f20d556668f114257a11fbe038464a67830378e62ae9791453953dac1dbd7921837ba98e84e856eb80ed9487e656d0b20c28c8ba5e35db1abbed83ed1c7720a97701f709e3547a4bfcabca9c89c57ad15c3996577a0ae36d7c7b699035242f37954646c1cd5c08ac":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:1024:16:"e28a13548525e5f36dccb24ecb7cc332cc689dfd64012604c9c7816d72a16c3f5fcdc0e86e7c03280b1c69b586ce0cd8aec722cc73a5d3b730310bf7dfebdc77ce5d94bbc369dc18a2f7b07bd505ab0f82224aef09fdc1e5063234255e0b3c40a52e9e8ae60898eb88a766bdd788fe9493d8fd86bcdd2884d5c06216c65469e5":16:"3":"5abc01f5de25b70867ff0c24e222c61f53c88daf42586fddcd56f3c4588f074be3c328056c063388688b6385a8167957c6e5355a510e005b8a851d69c96b36ec6036644078210e5d7d326f96365ee0648882921492bc7b753eb9c26cdbab37555f210df2ca6fec1b25b463d38b81c0dcea202022b04af5da58aa03d77be949b7":0
@ -38,6 +41,38 @@ EC(DSA) verify test vector #2 (bad)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"046FDD3028FA94A863CD4F78DBFF8B3AA561FC6D9CCBBCA88E0AE6FA437F5415F957542D0717FF8B84562DAE99872EF841":"546869732073686F756C64206265207468652068617368206F662061206D6573736167652E00":"30350218185B2A7FB5CD9C9A8488B119B68B47D6EC833509CE9FA1FF021900FB7D259A744A2348BD45D241A39DC915B81CC2084100FA25":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"3046022100faecc085c6c5362b91ff1fd6dd77da80bc071bee9ff1ac0ef9509c017f13267c022100a7d0b908c938d3dd6c6a9cdc5b0a4a4ee455c519c1ff6cda959806b7e7461ba0":0
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 255
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30450220639f36215b2ff09bb2beb871e122de74c8d5e29ce8a105aa2b95661f42803e72022100becd8f81b2c186f9d5d2c92378d7b9452ce6de231b0c8d17bac2d8537d2331fd":0
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 248
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30450220009109f967f9082abc9c46e5ea07936529b82023a1a49b872c046f430983db2602210085f0b1960d61f8d75109b5b7ff991d3171320d2ab547104f864048455a965090":0
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(r) = 247
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"3044021f461786833b50247b07194da6cedbd3caefbcd19c73b6283ccff5097cd0d73b022100d85d20b0b8c3b596eb1cdb0381e681fa0a8bccde4e89c139020af3b0f88e099c":0
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30450220639f36215b2ff09bb2beb871e122de74c8d5e29ce8a105aa2b95661f42803e72022100becd8f81b2c186f9d5d2c92378d7b9452ce6de231b0c8d17bac2d8537d2331fd":0
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 255
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"304402206ae26950c606d08fe5e1682efdccfb3a7213ca46bd523ffd20c4213fe1400d3402207612106ada7055926167650b257da7f4c42c190b8aa9e3b680f8751fe90c63a5":0
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 248
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"3045022100fd4d718ab483827492e10b89745fad100d2dd257102b99aff179ee596a569f1f022000a1b777e32a8b4909763b615b805e59194e6196eb05719287a36eb5f17aa485":0
EC(DSA) verify test vector: good, bitlen(s) = 247
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
pk_ec_test_vec:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855":"30430220685a6994daa6a14e4411b5267edc2a00beee907f2dddd956b2a5a1df791c15f8021f675db4538c000c734489ac737fddd5a739c5a23cd6c6eceea70c286ca4fac9":0
ECDSA sign-verify
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
pk_sign_verify:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:0
@ -185,3 +220,6 @@ pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75
ECDSA restartable sign/verify: ECKEY, max_ops=250
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
pk_sign_verify_restart:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721":"60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6":"7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299":MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:"test":"3045022100f1abb023518351cd71d881567b1ea663ed3efcf6c5132b354f28d3b0b7d383670220019f4113742a2b14bd25926b49c649155f267e60d3814b4c0cc84250e46f0083":250:2:64
PSA wrapped sign
pk_psa_sign:

163
tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function
View File

@ -62,6 +62,45 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func( void *ctx )
return( ((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#define PK_PSA_INVALID_SLOT 0 /* guaranteed invalid */
/*
* Generate a key in a free key slot and return this key slot,
* or PK_PSA_INVALID_SLOT if no slot was available.
* The key uses NIST P-256 and is usable for signing with SHA-256.
*/
psa_key_slot_t pk_psa_genkey( void )
{
psa_key_slot_t key;
const int curve = PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1;
const psa_key_type_t type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(curve);
const size_t bits = 256;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
/* find a free key slot */
if( PSA_SUCCESS != mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot( &key ) )
return( PK_PSA_INVALID_SLOT );
/* set up policy on key slot */
psa_key_policy_init( &policy );
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN,
PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) );
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_set_key_policy( key, &policy ) )
return( PK_PSA_INVALID_SLOT );
/* generate key */
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_generate_key( key, type, bits, NULL, 0 ) )
return( PK_PSA_INVALID_SLOT );
return( key );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@ -69,6 +108,77 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func( void *ctx )
* END_DEPENDENCIES
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
void pk_psa_utils( )
{
mbedtls_pk_context pk, pk2;
psa_key_slot_t key;
const char * const name = "Opaque";
const size_t bitlen = 256; /* harcoded in genkey() */
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
unsigned char b1[1], b2[1];
size_t len;
mbedtls_pk_debug_item dbg;
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk2 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( &pk, 0 ) ==
MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
key = pk_psa_genkey();
TEST_ASSERT( key != 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( &pk, key ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE );
TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pk), name ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &pk ) == bitlen );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_get_len( &pk ) == bitlen / 8 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) == 1 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) == 1 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) == 0 );
/* unsupported operations: verify, decrypt, encrypt */
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, md_alg,
b1, sizeof( b1), b2, sizeof( b2 ) )
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_decrypt( &pk, b1, sizeof( b1 ),
b2, &len, sizeof( b2 ),
NULL, NULL )
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &pk, b1, sizeof( b1 ),
b2, &len, sizeof( b2 ),
NULL, NULL )
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
/* unsupported functions: check_pair, debug */
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup( &pk2,
mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_check_pair( &pk, &pk2 )
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_debug( &pk, &dbg )
== MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
/* test that freeing the context does not destroy the key */
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_SUCCESS == psa_get_key_information( key, NULL, NULL ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_SUCCESS == psa_destroy_key( key ) );
exit:
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk ); /* redundant except upon error */
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk2 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void pk_utils( int type, int size, int len, char * name )
{
@ -246,7 +356,8 @@ void pk_ec_test_vec( int type, int id, data_t * key, data_t * hash,
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &eckey->grp, &eckey->Q,
key->x, key->len ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
// MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 is a dummy - it is ignored, but has to be other than MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
hash->x, hash->len, sig->x, sig->len ) == ret );
exit:
@ -662,3 +773,53 @@ exit:
mbedtls_pk_free( &rsa ); mbedtls_pk_free( &alt );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
void pk_psa_sign( )
{
mbedtls_pk_context pk;
psa_key_slot_t key;
unsigned char hash[50], sig[100], pkey[100];
size_t sig_len, klen = 0;
/*
* This tests making signatures with a wrapped PSA key:
* - generate a fresh PSA key
* - wrap it in a PK context and make a signature this way
* - extract the public key
* - parse it to a PK context and verify the signature this way
*/
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof hash );
memset( sig, 0, sizeof sig );
memset( pkey, 0, sizeof pkey );
key = pk_psa_genkey();
TEST_ASSERT( key != 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( &pk, key ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_sign( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
hash, sizeof hash, sig, &sig_len,
NULL, NULL ) == 0 );
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_SUCCESS == psa_export_public_key(
key, pkey, sizeof( pkey ), &klen ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_SUCCESS == psa_destroy_key( key ) );
mbedtls_pk_init( &pk );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &pk, pkey, klen ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_pk_verify( &pk, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
hash, sizeof hash, sig, sig_len ) == 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_pk_free( &pk );
}
/* END_CASE */

1848
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

4066
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

18
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
PSA validate entropy injection: good, minimum size
validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
PSA validate entropy injection: good, max size
validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
PSA validate entropy injection: bad, too big
validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE+1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS
PSA validate entropy injection: bad, too small using MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM
validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM-1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS
PSA validate entropy injection: bad, too small using MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE
validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE-1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS
PSA validate entropy injection: before and after crypto_init
run_entropy_inject_with_crypto_init:

97
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include <stdint.h>
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_prot_internal_storage.h"
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h"
/* Calculating the minimum allowed entropy size in bytes */
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
* depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
* END_DEPENDENCIES
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void validate_entropy_seed_injection( int seed_length_a,
int expected_status_a,
int seed_length_b,
int expected_status_b )
{
psa_its_status_t its_status;
psa_status_t status;
uint8_t output[32] = { 0 };
uint8_t zeros[32] = { 0 };
uint8_t *seed = NULL;
int i;
int seed_size;
if( seed_length_a > seed_length_b )
{
seed_size = seed_length_a;
}
else
{
seed_size = seed_length_b;
}
ASSERT_ALLOC( seed, seed_size );
/* fill seed with some data */
for( i = 0; i < seed_size; ++i )
{
seed[i] = i;
}
its_status = psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID );
TEST_ASSERT( ( its_status == PSA_ITS_SUCCESS ) ||
( its_status == PSA_ITS_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND ) );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, seed_length_a );
TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_a );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, seed_length_b );
TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_b );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output,
sizeof( output ) ) );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, zeros, sizeof( output ) ) != 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_free( seed );
psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void run_entropy_inject_with_crypto_init( )
{
psa_its_status_t its_status;
psa_status_t status;
int i;
uint8_t seed[MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE] = { 0 };
/* fill seed with some data */
for( i = 0; i < sizeof( seed ); ++i )
{
seed[i] = i;
}
its_status = psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID );
TEST_ASSERT( ( its_status == PSA_ITS_SUCCESS ) ||
( its_status == PSA_ITS_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND ) );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
its_status = psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID );
TEST_EQUAL( its_status, PSA_ITS_SUCCESS );
status = psa_crypto_init( );
TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
status = psa_crypto_init( );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
/* The seed is written by nv_seed callback functions therefore the injection will fail */
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
exit:
psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */

587
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.data Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"":"da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"a8":"99f2aa95e36f95c2acb0eaf23998f030638f3f15"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"3000":"f944dcd635f9801f7ac90a407fbc479964dec024"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"42749e":"a444319e9b6cc1e8464c511ec0969c37d6bb2619"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"9fc3fe08":"16a0ff84fcc156fd5d3ca3a744f20a232d172253"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"b5c1c6f1af":"fec9deebfcdedaf66dda525e1be43597a73a1f93"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"ec29561244ede706b6eb30a1c371d74450a105c3f9735f7fa9fe38cf67f304a5736a106e92e17139a6813b1c81a4f3d3fb9546ab4296fa9f722826c066869edacd73b2548035185813e22634a9da44000d95a281ff9f264ecce0a931222162d021cca28db5f3c2aa24945ab1e31cb413ae29810fd794cad5dfaf29ec43cb38d198fe4ae1da2359780221405bd6712a5305da4b1b737fce7cd21c0eb7728d08235a9011":"970111c4e77bcc88cc20459c02b69b4aa8f58217"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"0423dc76a8791107d14e13f5265b343f24cc0f19"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #9
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"6692a71d73e00f27df976bc56df4970650d90e45"
PSA hash finish: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #10
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"11863b483809ef88413ca9b0084ac4a5390640af"
PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f"
PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"ff":"e33f9d75e6ae1369dbabf81b96b4591ae46bba30b591a6b6c62542b5"
PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"984c":"2fa9df9157d9e027cfbc4c6a9df32e1adc0cbe2328ec2a63c5ae934e"
PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede"
PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"e5e09924":"fd19e74690d291467ce59f077df311638f1c3a46e510d0e49a67062d"
PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"21ebecb914":"78f4a71c21c694499ce1c7866611b14ace70d905012c356323c7c713"
PSA hash finish: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"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":"1302149d1e197c41813b054c942329d420e366530f5517b470e964fe"
PSA hash finish: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
PSA hash finish: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"bd":"68325720aabd7c82f30f554b313d0570c95accbb7dc4b5aae11204c08ffe732b"
PSA hash finish: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"5fd4":"7c4fbf484498d21b487b9d61de8914b2eadaf2698712936d47c3ada2558f6788"
PSA hash finish: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803"
PSA hash finish: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"c98c8e55":"7abc22c0ae5af26ce93dbb94433a0e0b2e119d014f8e7f65bd56c61ccccd9504"
PSA hash finish: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"81a723d966":"7516fb8bb11350df2bf386bc3c33bd0f52cb4c67c6e4745e0488e62c2aea2605"
PSA hash finish: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"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":"4109cdbec3240ad74cc6c37f39300f70fede16e21efc77f7865998714aad0b5e"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"":"38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"ab":"fb94d5be118865f6fcbc978b825da82cff188faec2f66cb84b2537d74b4938469854b0ca89e66fa2e182834736629f3d"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"7c27":"3d80be467df86d63abb9ea1d3f9cb39cd19890e7f2c53a6200bedc5006842b35e820dc4e0ca90ca9b97ab23ef07080fc"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"31f5ca":"78d54b943421fdf7ba90a7fb9637c2073aa480454bd841d39ff72f4511fc21fb67797b652c0c823229342873d3bef955"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"7bdee3f8":"8bdafba0777ee446c3431c2d7b1fbb631089f71d2ca417abc1d230e1aba64ec2f1c187474a6f4077d372c14ad407f99a"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"8f05604915":"504e414bf1db1060f14c8c799e25b1e0c4dcf1504ebbd129998f0ae283e6de86e0d3c7e879c73ec3b1836c3ee89c2649"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"665da6eda214":"4c022f112010908848312f8b8f1072625fd5c105399d562ea1d56130619a7eac8dfc3748fd05ee37e4b690be9daa9980"
PSA hash finish: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"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":"cba9e3eb12a6f83db11e8a6ff40d1049854ee094416bc527fea931d8585428a8ed6242ce81f6769b36e2123a5c23483e"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"":"cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"8f":"e4cd2d19931b5aad9c920f45f56f6ce34e3d38c6d319a6e11d0588ab8b838576d6ce6d68eea7c830de66e2bd96458bfa7aafbcbec981d4ed040498c3dd95f22a"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"e724":"7dbb520221a70287b23dbcf62bfc1b73136d858e86266732a7fffa875ecaa2c1b8f673b5c065d360c563a7b9539349f5f59bef8c0c593f9587e3cd50bb26a231"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"de4c90":"33ce98281045a5c4c9df0363d8196f1d7dfcd5ee46ac89776fd8a4344c12f123a66788af5bd41ceff1941aa5637654b4064c88c14e00465ab79a2fc6c97e1014"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"a801e94b":"dadb1b5a27f9fece8d86adb2a51879beb1787ff28f4e8ce162cad7fee0f942efcabbf738bc6f797fc7cc79a3a75048cd4c82ca0757a324695bfb19a557e56e2f"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"94390d3502":"b6175c4c4cccf69e0ce5f0312010886ea6b34d43673f942ae42483f9cbb7da817de4e11b5d58e25a3d9bd721a22cdffe1c40411cc45df1911fa5506129b69297"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"49297dd63e5f":"1fcc1e6f6870859d11649f5e5336a9cd16329c029baf04d5a6edf257889a2e9522b497dd656bb402da461307c4ee382e2e89380c8e6e6e7697f1e439f650fa94"
PSA hash finish: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"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":"8e4bc6f8b8c60fe4d68c61d9b159c8693c3151c46749af58da228442d927f23359bd6ccd6c2ec8fa3f00a86cecbfa728e1ad60b821ed22fcd309ba91a4138bc9"
PSA hash finish: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD2:"":"8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773"
PSA hash finish: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD2:"61":"32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1"
PSA hash finish: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD2:"616263":"da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb"
PSA hash finish: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD2:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0"
PSA hash finish: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD2:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b"
PSA hash finish: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD2:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd"
PSA hash finish: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD2:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8"
PSA hash finish: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD4:"":"31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0"
PSA hash finish: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD4:"61":"bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24"
PSA hash finish: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD4:"616263":"a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d"
PSA hash finish: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD4:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b"
PSA hash finish: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD4:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9"
PSA hash finish: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD4:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4"
PSA hash finish: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD4:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536"
PSA hash finish: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD5:"":"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
PSA hash finish: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD5:"61":"0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661"
PSA hash finish: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD5:"616263":"900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72"
PSA hash finish: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD5:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0"
PSA hash finish: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD5:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b"
PSA hash finish: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD5:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f"
PSA hash finish: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_MD5:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"":"9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"61":"0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"616263":"8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6162636462636465636465666465666765666768666768696768696a68696a6b696a6b6c6a6b6c6d6b6c6d6e6c6d6e6f6d6e6f706e6f7071":"12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189"
PSA hash finish: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_finish:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb"
PSA hash verify: SHA-1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"bd":"9034aaf45143996a2b14465c352ab0c6fa26b221"
PSA hash verify: SHA-224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"bd":"b1e46bb9efe45af554363449c6945a0d6169fc3a5a396a56cb97cb57"
PSA hash verify: SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"bd":"68325720aabd7c82f30f554b313d0570c95accbb7dc4b5aae11204c08ffe732b"
PSA hash verify: SHA-384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"bd":"4372e38a92a28b5d2c391e62452a86d50e0267228be176c77d2402effe9fa50de407bbb851b37d5904aba2dede74da2a"
PSA hash verify: SHA-512
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"bd":"296e2267d74c278daaaa940d17b0cfb74a5083f8e069726d8c841cbe596e0431cb7741a5b50f71666cfd54bacb7b00aea891499cf4ef6a03c8a83fe37c3f7baf"
PSA hash verify: MD2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_MD2:"bd":"8c9c17665d25b35fc413c41805c679cf"
PSA hash verify: MD4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_MD4:"bd":"18c33f97297efe5f8a732258289fda25"
PSA hash verify: MD5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_MD5:"bd":"abae57cb562ecf295b4a37a76efe61fb"
PSA hash verify: RIPEMD160
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_verify:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"bd":"5089265ee5d9af75d12dbf7ea2f27dbdee435b37"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"":"da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"a8":"99f2aa95e36f95c2acb0eaf23998f030638f3f15"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"3000":"f944dcd635f9801f7ac90a407fbc479964dec024"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"42749e":"a444319e9b6cc1e8464c511ec0969c37d6bb2619"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"9fc3fe08":"16a0ff84fcc156fd5d3ca3a744f20a232d172253"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"b5c1c6f1af":"fec9deebfcdedaf66dda525e1be43597a73a1f93"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"ec29561244ede706b6eb30a1c371d74450a105c3f9735f7fa9fe38cf67f304a5736a106e92e17139a6813b1c81a4f3d3fb9546ab4296fa9f722826c066869edacd73b2548035185813e22634a9da44000d95a281ff9f264ecce0a931222162d021cca28db5f3c2aa24945ab1e31cb413ae29810fd794cad5dfaf29ec43cb38d198fe4ae1da2359780221405bd6712a5305da4b1b737fce7cd21c0eb7728d08235a9011":"970111c4e77bcc88cc20459c02b69b4aa8f58217"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"0423dc76a8791107d14e13f5265b343f24cc0f19"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #9
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"6692a71d73e00f27df976bc56df4970650d90e45"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-1 Test Vector NIST CAVS #10
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:"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":"11863b483809ef88413ca9b0084ac4a5390640af"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"":"d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"ff":"e33f9d75e6ae1369dbabf81b96b4591ae46bba30b591a6b6c62542b5"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"984c":"2fa9df9157d9e027cfbc4c6a9df32e1adc0cbe2328ec2a63c5ae934e"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"50efd0":"b5a9820413c2bf8211fbbf5df1337043b32fa4eafaf61a0c8e9ccede"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"e5e09924":"fd19e74690d291467ce59f077df311638f1c3a46e510d0e49a67062d"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"21ebecb914":"78f4a71c21c694499ce1c7866611b14ace70d905012c356323c7c713"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-224 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:"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":"1302149d1e197c41813b054c942329d420e366530f5517b470e964fe"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"":"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"bd":"68325720aabd7c82f30f554b313d0570c95accbb7dc4b5aae11204c08ffe732b"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"5fd4":"7c4fbf484498d21b487b9d61de8914b2eadaf2698712936d47c3ada2558f6788"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"b0bd69":"4096804221093ddccfbf46831490ea63e9e99414858f8d75ff7f642c7ca61803"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"c98c8e55":"7abc22c0ae5af26ce93dbb94433a0e0b2e119d014f8e7f65bd56c61ccccd9504"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"81a723d966":"7516fb8bb11350df2bf386bc3c33bd0f52cb4c67c6e4745e0488e62c2aea2605"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-256 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:"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":"4109cdbec3240ad74cc6c37f39300f70fede16e21efc77f7865998714aad0b5e"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"":"38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"ab":"fb94d5be118865f6fcbc978b825da82cff188faec2f66cb84b2537d74b4938469854b0ca89e66fa2e182834736629f3d"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"7c27":"3d80be467df86d63abb9ea1d3f9cb39cd19890e7f2c53a6200bedc5006842b35e820dc4e0ca90ca9b97ab23ef07080fc"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"31f5ca":"78d54b943421fdf7ba90a7fb9637c2073aa480454bd841d39ff72f4511fc21fb67797b652c0c823229342873d3bef955"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"7bdee3f8":"8bdafba0777ee446c3431c2d7b1fbb631089f71d2ca417abc1d230e1aba64ec2f1c187474a6f4077d372c14ad407f99a"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"8f05604915":"504e414bf1db1060f14c8c799e25b1e0c4dcf1504ebbd129998f0ae283e6de86e0d3c7e879c73ec3b1836c3ee89c2649"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"665da6eda214":"4c022f112010908848312f8b8f1072625fd5c105399d562ea1d56130619a7eac8dfc3748fd05ee37e4b690be9daa9980"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-384 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:"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":"cba9e3eb12a6f83db11e8a6ff40d1049854ee094416bc527fea931d8585428a8ed6242ce81f6769b36e2123a5c23483e"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"":"cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"8f":"e4cd2d19931b5aad9c920f45f56f6ce34e3d38c6d319a6e11d0588ab8b838576d6ce6d68eea7c830de66e2bd96458bfa7aafbcbec981d4ed040498c3dd95f22a"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"e724":"7dbb520221a70287b23dbcf62bfc1b73136d858e86266732a7fffa875ecaa2c1b8f673b5c065d360c563a7b9539349f5f59bef8c0c593f9587e3cd50bb26a231"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"de4c90":"33ce98281045a5c4c9df0363d8196f1d7dfcd5ee46ac89776fd8a4344c12f123a66788af5bd41ceff1941aa5637654b4064c88c14e00465ab79a2fc6c97e1014"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"a801e94b":"dadb1b5a27f9fece8d86adb2a51879beb1787ff28f4e8ce162cad7fee0f942efcabbf738bc6f797fc7cc79a3a75048cd4c82ca0757a324695bfb19a557e56e2f"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"94390d3502":"b6175c4c4cccf69e0ce5f0312010886ea6b34d43673f942ae42483f9cbb7da817de4e11b5d58e25a3d9bd721a22cdffe1c40411cc45df1911fa5506129b69297"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"49297dd63e5f":"1fcc1e6f6870859d11649f5e5336a9cd16329c029baf04d5a6edf257889a2e9522b497dd656bb402da461307c4ee382e2e89380c8e6e6e7697f1e439f650fa94"
PSA hash multi part: SHA-512 Test Vector NIST CAVS #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:"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":"8e4bc6f8b8c60fe4d68c61d9b159c8693c3151c46749af58da228442d927f23359bd6ccd6c2ec8fa3f00a86cecbfa728e1ad60b821ed22fcd309ba91a4138bc9"
PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"":"8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773"
PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"61":"32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1"
PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"616263":"da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb"
PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0"
PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b"
PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd"
PSA hash multi part: MD2 Test vector RFC1319 #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD2:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8"
PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"":"31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0"
PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"61":"bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24"
PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"616263":"a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d"
PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b"
PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9"
PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4"
PSA hash multi part: MD4 Test vector RFC1320 #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD4:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536"
PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"":"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"61":"0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661"
PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"616263":"900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72"
PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0"
PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b"
PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f"
PSA hash multi part: MD5 Test vector RFC1321 #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_MD5:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"":"9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"61":"0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #3
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"616263":"8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6d65737361676520646967657374":"5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a":"f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #6
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"6162636462636465636465666465666765666768666768696768696a68696a6b696a6b6c6a6b6c6d6b6c6d6e6c6d6e6f6d6e6f706e6f7071":"12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839":"b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189"
PSA hash multi part: RIPEMD160 Test vector from paper #8
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_multi_part:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930":"9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb"

96
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_hash.function Normal file
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/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include <stdint.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
#include "spm/psa_defs.h"
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
* depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
* END_DEPENDENCIES
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void hash_finish( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
unsigned char actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
size_t actual_hash_length;
psa_hash_operation_t operation;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
input->x, input->len ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation,
actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ),
&actual_hash_length ) );
ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_hash->x, expected_hash->len,
actual_hash, actual_hash_length );
exit:
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void hash_verify( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
psa_hash_operation_t operation;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
input->x,
input->len ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_verify( &operation,
expected_hash->x,
expected_hash->len ) );
exit:
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void hash_multi_part( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
unsigned char actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
size_t actual_hash_length;
psa_hash_operation_t operation;
uint32_t len = 0;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
do
{
memset( actual_hash, 0, sizeof( actual_hash ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
input->x, len ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
input->x + len, input->len - len ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation,
actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ),
&actual_hash_length ) );
ASSERT_COMPARE( expected_hash->x, expected_hash->len,
actual_hash, actual_hash_length );
} while( len++ != input->len );
exit:
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */

56
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.data Normal file
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Create NV seed file
create_nv_seed:
PSA init/deinit
init_deinit:2
PSA deinit without init
deinit_without_init:0
PSA deinit twice
deinit_without_init:1
No random without init
validate_module_init_generate_random:0
No key slot access without init
validate_module_init_key_based:0
No random after deinit
validate_module_init_generate_random:1
No key slot access after deinit
validate_module_init_key_based:1
Custom entropy sources: all standard
custom_entropy_sources:0x0000ffff:PSA_SUCCESS
Custom entropy sources: none
custom_entropy_sources:0:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
Fake entropy: never returns anything
fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:0:0:0:0:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
Fake entropy: less than the block size
fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:-1:-1:-1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
Fake entropy: one block eventually
fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:0:0:0:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS
Fake entropy: one block in two steps
fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:1:-1:-1:PSA_SUCCESS
Fake entropy: more than one block in two steps
fake_entropy_source:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:-1:-1:PSA_SUCCESS
NV seed only: less than minimum
entropy_from_nv_seed:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM - 1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
NV seed only: less than one block
entropy_from_nv_seed:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE - 1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
NV seed only: just enough
entropy_from_nv_seed:ENTROPY_MIN_NV_SEED_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS
Recreate NV seed file
create_nv_seed:

284
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_init.function Normal file
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/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include <stdint.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
#include "spm/psa_defs.h"
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/* Some tests in this module configure entropy sources. */
#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h"
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h"
#define ENTROPY_MIN_NV_SEED_SIZE \
MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)
typedef struct
{
size_t threshold; /* Minimum bytes to make mbedtls_entropy_func happy */
size_t max_steps;
size_t *length_sequence;
size_t step;
} fake_entropy_state_t;
static int fake_entropy_source( void *state_arg,
unsigned char *output, size_t len,
size_t *olen )
{
fake_entropy_state_t *state = state_arg;
size_t i;
if( state->step >= state->max_steps )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
*olen = MIN( len, state->length_sequence[state->step] );
for( i = 0; i < *olen; i++ )
output[i] = i;
++state->step;
return( 0 );
}
#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_PLATFORM 0x00000001
#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_TIMING 0x00000002
#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_HAVEGE 0x00000004
#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_HARDWARE 0x00000008
#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_NV_SEED 0x00000010
#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAKE 0x40000000
static uint32_t custom_entropy_sources_mask;
static fake_entropy_state_t fake_entropy_state;
/* This is a modified version of mbedtls_entropy_init() from entropy.c
* which chooses entropy sources dynamically. */
static void custom_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx )
{
ctx->source_count = 0;
memset( ctx->source, 0, sizeof( ctx->source ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
#endif
ctx->accumulator_started = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR)
mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx->accumulator );
#else
mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C)
mbedtls_havege_init( &ctx->havege_data );
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY)
if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_PLATFORM )
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_TIMING )
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C)
if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_HAVEGE )
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_havege_poll, &ctx->havege_data,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_HARDWARE )
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_NV_SEED )
{
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0;
}
else
{
/* Skip the NV seed even though it's compiled in. */
ctx->initial_entropy_run = 1;
}
#endif
if( custom_entropy_sources_mask & ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAKE )
mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx,
fake_entropy_source, &fake_entropy_state,
fake_entropy_state.threshold,
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG );
}
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
* depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
* END_DEPENDENCIES
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
void create_nv_seed( )
{
static unsigned char seed[ENTROPY_MIN_NV_SEED_SIZE];
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nv_seed_write( seed, sizeof( seed ) ) >= 0 );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void init_deinit( int count )
{
psa_status_t status;
int i;
for( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
status = psa_crypto_init( );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
status = psa_crypto_init( );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void deinit_without_init( int count )
{
int i;
for( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void validate_module_init_generate_random( int count )
{
psa_status_t status;
uint8_t random[10] = { 0 };
int i;
for( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
status = psa_crypto_init( );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
status = psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) );
TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void validate_module_init_key_based( int count )
{
psa_status_t status;
uint8_t data[10] = { 0 };
int i;
for( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
status = psa_crypto_init( );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
status = psa_import_key( 1, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA, data, sizeof( data ) );
TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void custom_entropy_sources( int sources_arg, int expected_init_status_arg )
{
psa_status_t expected_init_status = expected_init_status_arg;
uint8_t random[10] = { 0 };
custom_entropy_sources_mask = sources_arg;
PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources(
custom_entropy_init, mbedtls_entropy_free ) );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_crypto_init( ), expected_init_status );
if( expected_init_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) ) );
exit:
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void fake_entropy_source( int threshold,
int amount1,
int amount2,
int amount3,
int amount4,
int expected_init_status_arg )
{
psa_status_t expected_init_status = expected_init_status_arg;
uint8_t random[10] = { 0 };
size_t lengths[4];
fake_entropy_state.threshold = threshold;
fake_entropy_state.step = 0;
fake_entropy_state.max_steps = 0;
if( amount1 >= 0 )
lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount1;
if( amount2 >= 0 )
lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount2;
if( amount3 >= 0 )
lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount3;
if( amount4 >= 0 )
lengths[fake_entropy_state.max_steps++] = amount4;
fake_entropy_state.length_sequence = lengths;
custom_entropy_sources_mask = ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAKE;
PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources(
custom_entropy_init, mbedtls_entropy_free ) );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_crypto_init( ), expected_init_status );
if( expected_init_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) ) );
exit:
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
void entropy_from_nv_seed( int seed_size_arg,
int expected_init_status_arg )
{
psa_status_t expected_init_status = expected_init_status_arg;
uint8_t random[10] = { 0 };
uint8_t *seed = NULL;
size_t seed_size = seed_size_arg;
ASSERT_ALLOC( seed, seed_size );
TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_nv_seed_write( seed, seed_size ) >= 0 );
custom_entropy_sources_mask = ENTROPY_SOURCE_NV_SEED;
PSA_ASSERT( mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources(
custom_entropy_init, mbedtls_entropy_free ) );
TEST_EQUAL( psa_crypto_init( ), expected_init_status );
if( expected_init_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( random, sizeof( random ) ) );
exit:
mbedtls_free( seed );
mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( );
}
/* END_CASE */

423
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data Normal file
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Hash: MD2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_MD2:16
Hash: MD4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_MD4:16
Hash: MD5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_MD5:16
Hash: RIPEMD160
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:20
Hash: SHA-1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_1:20
Hash: SHA-2 SHA-224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_224:28
Hash: SHA-2 SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_256:32
Hash: SHA-2 SHA-384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_384:48
Hash: SHA-2 SHA-512
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_512:64
Hash: SHA-2 SHA-512/224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_256
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224:28
Hash: SHA-2 SHA-512/256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_256
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256:32
Hash: SHA-3 SHA3-224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:28
Hash: SHA-3 SHA3-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:32
Hash: SHA-3 SHA3-384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:48
Hash: SHA-3 SHA3-512
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hash_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:64
MAC: HMAC-MD2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD2_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_MD2 ):16:64
MAC: HMAC-MD4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD4_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_MD4 ):16:64
MAC: HMAC-MD5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD5_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_MD5 ):16:64
MAC: HMAC-RIPEMD160
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ):20:64
MAC: HMAC-SHA-1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ):20:64
MAC: HMAC-SHA-224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ):28:64
MAC: HMAC-SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):32:64
MAC: HMAC-SHA-384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ):48:128
MAC: HMAC-SHA-512
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ):64:128
MAC: HMAC-SHA-512/224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_256
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ):28:128
MAC: HMAC-SHA-512/256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:MBEDTLS_SHA512_256
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ):32:128
MAC: HMAC-SHA3-224
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ):28:144
MAC: HMAC-SHA3-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ):32:136
MAC: HMAC-SHA3-384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ):48:104
MAC: HMAC-SHA3-512
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
hmac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ):64:72
MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-128
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128
MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-192
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192
MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256
MAC: CBC_MAC-3DES
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:8:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192
MAC: CMAC-AES-128
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128
MAC: CMAC-AES-192
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192
MAC: CMAC-AES-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256
MAC: CMAC-3DES
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:8:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:192
MAC: GMAC-AES-128
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128
MAC: GMAC-AES-192
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:192
MAC: GMAC-AES-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
mac_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GMAC:ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC:16:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:256
Cipher: ARC4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C
cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ARC4:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER
Cipher: CTR
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CTR:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER
Cipher: CFB
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CFB:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER
Cipher: OFB
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_OFB:ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER
Cipher: CBC-nopad
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0
Cipher: CBC-PKCS#7
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7:0
Cipher: XTS
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
cipher_algorithm:PSA_ALG_XTS:0
AEAD: CCM
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CCM_C
aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_CCM:0:16
AEAD: GCM
depends_on:MBEDTLS_GCM_C
aead_algorithm:PSA_ALG_GCM:0:16
Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
Asymmetric signature: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
Asymmetric signature: RSA PSS SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_PSS
Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + randomized DSA SHA-256 using SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_DSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_DSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA
Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + deterministic DSA using SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_DSA_DETERMINISTIC
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_DSA | ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA | ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC
Asymmetric signature: randomized ECDSA (no hashing)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA
Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + randomized ECDSA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA
Asymmetric signature: SHA-256 + deterministic DSA using SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
asymmetric_signature_algorithm:PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_ECDSA | ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA | ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC
Asymmetric encryption: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
asymmetric_encryption_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0
Asymmetric encryption: RSA OAEP using SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
asymmetric_encryption_algorithm:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP
Key derivation: HKDF using SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
key_derivation_algorithm:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):ALG_IS_HKDF
Key selection: raw
key_selection_algorithm:PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW:0
Key agreement: FFDH, raw output
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DHM_C
key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_FFDH( PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW ):ALG_IS_FFDH:PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW
Key agreement: FFDH, HKDF using SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DHM_C
key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_FFDH( PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_FFDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
Key agreement: ECDH, raw output
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDH( PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW ):ALG_IS_ECDH:PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW
Key agreement: ECDH, HKDF using SHA-256
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
key_agreement_algorithm:PSA_ALG_ECDH( PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ):ALG_IS_ECDH:PSA_ALG_HKDF( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
Key type: raw data
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
Key type: HMAC
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
Key type: secret for key derivation
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
Key type: AES
depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
Key type: DES
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
Key type: Camellia
depends_on:MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
Key type: ARC4
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ARC4_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4:KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
Key type: RSA public key
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY | KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA
Key type: RSA key pair
depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR | KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA
Key type: DSA public key
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DSA_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY:KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY | KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA
Key type: DSA key pair
depends_on:MBEDTLS_DSA_C
key_type:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEYPAIR:KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR | KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA
ECC key types: sect163k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT163K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1:163
ECC key types: sect163r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT163R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1:163
ECC key types: sect163r2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT163R2_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2:163
ECC key types: sect193r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT193R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1:193
ECC key types: sect193r2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT193R2_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2:193
ECC key types: sect233k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT233K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1:233
ECC key types: sect233r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT233R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1:233
ECC key types: sect239k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT239K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1:239
ECC key types: sect283k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT283K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1:283
ECC key types: sect283r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT283R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1:283
ECC key types: sect409k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT409K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1:409
ECC key types: sect409r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT409R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1:409
ECC key types: sect571k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT571K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1:571
ECC key types: sect571r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECT571R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1:571
ECC key types: secp160k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP160K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1:160
ECC key types: secp160r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP160R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1:160
ECC key types: secp160r2
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP160R2_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2:160
ECC key types: secp192k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1:192
ECC key types: secp192r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1:192
ECC key types: secp224k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1:224
ECC key types: secp224r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1:224
ECC key types: secp256k1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1:256
ECC key types: secp256r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1:256
ECC key types: secp384r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1:384
ECC key types: secp521r1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1:521
ECC key types: Brainpool P256R1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1:256
ECC key types: Brainpool P384R1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1:384
ECC key types: Brainpool P512R1
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1:512
ECC key types: Curve25519
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519:255
ECC key types: Curve448
depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
ecc_key_types:PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448:448

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/* BEGIN_HEADER */
/* Test macros that provide metadata about algorithms and key types.
* This test suite only contains tests that don't require executing
* code. Other test suites validate macros that require creating a key
* and using it. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
#include "spm/psa_defs.h"
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/* Flags for algorithm classification macros. There is a flag for every
* algorithm classification macro PSA_ALG_IS_xxx except for the
* category test macros, which are hard-coded in each
* category-specific function. The name of the flag is the name of the
* classification macro without the PSA_ prefix. */
#define ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED ( 1u << 0 )
#define ALG_IS_HMAC ( 1u << 1 )
#define ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC ( 1u << 2 )
#define ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER ( 1u << 3 )
#define ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN ( 1u << 4 )
#define ALG_IS_RSA_PSS ( 1u << 5 )
#define ALG_IS_DSA ( 1u << 6 )
#define ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC ( 1u << 7 )
#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA ( 1u << 8 )
#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA ( 1u << 9 )
#define ALG_IS_ECDSA ( 1u << 10 )
#define ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC ( 1u << 11 )
#define ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA ( 1u << 12 )
#define ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA ( 1u << 13 )
#define ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP ( 1u << 14 )
#define ALG_IS_HKDF ( 1u << 15 )
#define ALG_IS_FFDH ( 1u << 16 )
#define ALG_IS_ECDH ( 1u << 17 )
/* Flags for key type classification macros. There is a flag for every
* key type classification macro PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_xxx except for some that
* are tested as derived from other macros. The name of the flag is
* the name of the classification macro without the PSA_ prefix. */
#define KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED ( 1u << 0 )
#define KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED ( 1u << 1 )
#define KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY ( 1u << 2 )
#define KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR ( 1u << 3 )
#define KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA ( 1u << 4 )
#define KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA ( 1u << 5 )
#define KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC ( 1u << 6 )
#define TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( flag, alg, flags ) \
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_##flag( alg ) == !! ( ( flags ) & flag ) )
void algorithm_classification( psa_algorithm_t alg, unsigned flags )
{
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_HMAC, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RSA_PSS, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_DSA, alg, flags );
if ( PSA_ALG_IS_DSA( alg ) )
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_ECDSA, alg, flags );
if ( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) )
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP, alg, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( ALG_IS_HKDF, alg, flags );
exit: ;
}
void key_type_classification( psa_key_type_t type, unsigned flags )
{
/* Macros tested based on the test case parameter */
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED, type, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED, type, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY, type, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR, type, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA, type, flags );
TEST_CLASSIFICATION_MACRO( KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC, type, flags );
/* Macros with derived semantics */
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( type ),
( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ||
PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR( type ) ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEYPAIR( type ),
( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) &&
PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR( type ) ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( type ),
( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) &&
PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) );
exit: ;
}
void mac_algorithm_core( psa_algorithm_t alg, int classification_flags,
psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits,
size_t length )
{
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
/* Length */
TEST_EQUAL( length, PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) );
exit: ;
}
void aead_algorithm_core( psa_algorithm_t alg, int classification_flags,
size_t tag_length )
{
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
/* Tag length */
TEST_EQUAL( tag_length, PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) );
exit: ;
}
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
* depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
* END_DEPENDENCIES
*/
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void hash_algorithm( int alg_arg, int length_arg )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
size_t length = length_arg;
psa_algorithm_t hmac_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC( alg );
psa_algorithm_t rsa_pkcs1v15_sign_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg );
psa_algorithm_t rsa_pss_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS( alg );
psa_algorithm_t dsa_alg = PSA_ALG_DSA( alg );
psa_algorithm_t deterministic_dsa_alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA( alg );
psa_algorithm_t ecdsa_alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( alg );
psa_algorithm_t deterministic_ecdsa_alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( alg );
psa_algorithm_t rsa_oaep_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP( alg );
psa_algorithm_t hkdf_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF( alg );
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, 0 );
/* Dependent algorithms */
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( hmac_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( rsa_pkcs1v15_sign_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( rsa_pss_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( dsa_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( deterministic_dsa_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( ecdsa_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( deterministic_ecdsa_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH( rsa_oaep_alg ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( hkdf_alg ), alg );
/* Hash length */
TEST_EQUAL( length, PSA_HASH_SIZE( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( length <= PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void mac_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags,
int length_arg,
int key_type_arg, int key_bits_arg )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
size_t length = length_arg;
size_t n;
size_t key_type = key_type_arg;
size_t key_bits = key_bits_arg;
mac_algorithm_core( alg, classification_flags,
key_type, key_bits, length );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ), alg );
TEST_ASSERT( length <= PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE );
/* Truncated versions */
for( n = 1; n <= length; n++ )
{
psa_algorithm_t truncated_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, n );
mac_algorithm_core( truncated_alg, classification_flags,
key_type, key_bits, n );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg ), alg );
/* Check that calling PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC twice gives the length
* of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller than
* the inner length). */
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( truncated_alg, 1 ),
PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, 1 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( truncated_alg, length - 1 ),
PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length - 1) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( truncated_alg, length ),
PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length ) );
}
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void hmac_algorithm( int alg_arg,
int length_arg,
int block_size_arg )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg );
size_t block_size = block_size_arg;
size_t length = length_arg;
size_t n;
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( hash_alg ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ), alg );
TEST_ASSERT( block_size <= PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE );
test_mac_algorithm( alg_arg, ALG_IS_HMAC, length,
PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( length ) );
for( n = 1; n <= length; n++ )
{
psa_algorithm_t truncated_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, n );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( truncated_alg ), hash_alg );
}
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void cipher_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void aead_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags,
int tag_length_arg )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
size_t tag_length = tag_length_arg;
size_t n;
aead_algorithm_core( alg, classification_flags, tag_length );
/* Truncated versions */
for( n = 1; n <= tag_length; n++ )
{
psa_algorithm_t truncated_alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( alg, n );
aead_algorithm_core( truncated_alg, classification_flags, n );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH( truncated_alg ),
alg );
/* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH twice gives
* the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is
* smaller than the inner length). */
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( truncated_alg, 1 ),
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( alg, 1 ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( truncated_alg, tag_length - 1 ),
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( alg, tag_length - 1) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( truncated_alg, tag_length ),
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( alg, tag_length ) );
}
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void asymmetric_signature_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void asymmetric_encryption_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void key_derivation_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
/* Check combinations with key agreements */
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ), alg );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void key_selection_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
/* Check combinations with key agreements */
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_ECDH( alg ) ), alg );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( PSA_ALG_FFDH( alg ) ), alg );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void key_agreement_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags,
int post_alg_arg )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg;
psa_algorithm_t actual_post_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg );
psa_algorithm_t expected_post_alg = post_alg_arg;
/* Algorithm classification */
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) );
TEST_ASSERT( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( alg ) );
algorithm_classification( alg, classification_flags );
/* Shared secret derivation properties */
TEST_ASSERT( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( actual_post_alg ) ||
PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION( actual_post_alg ) );
TEST_EQUAL( actual_post_alg, expected_post_alg );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void key_type( int type_arg, int classification_flags )
{
psa_key_type_t type = type_arg;
key_type_classification( type, classification_flags );
/* For asymmetric types, check the corresponding pair/public type */
if( classification_flags & KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY )
{
psa_key_type_t pair_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEYPAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY( type );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR( pair_type ), type );
key_type_classification( pair_type,
( classification_flags
& ~KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY )
| KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR( type ), type );
}
if( classification_flags & KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR )
{
psa_key_type_t public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR( type );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEYPAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY( public_type ), type );
key_type_classification( public_type,
( classification_flags
& ~KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR )
| KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEYPAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY( type ), type );
}
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void ecc_key_types( int curve_arg, int curve_bits_arg )
{
psa_ecc_curve_t curve = curve_arg;
size_t curve_bits = curve_bits_arg;
psa_key_type_t public_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve );
psa_key_type_t pair_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR( curve );
test_key_type( public_type, KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC | KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY );
test_key_type( pair_type, KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC | KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE( public_type ), curve );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE( pair_type ), curve );
/* Validate that the bit size is less than the maximum ECC bit size
* in this implementation. There's no parameter that should be equal
* to curve_bits and can be validated without creating a key. */
TEST_ASSERT( curve_bits <= PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS );
}
/* END_CASE */

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tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
PSA Storage format data for storage
format_storage_data_check:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION
PSA Storage parse stored data
parse_storage_data_check:"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":"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_SUCCESS
PSA Storage parse stored data wrong version, should fail
parse_storage_data_check:"505341004b455900ffffffff000001700100000000000012620200003082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc3020301000102818100874bf0ffc2f2a71d14671ddd0171c954d7fdbf50281e4f6d99ea0e1ebcf82faa58e7b595ffb293d1abe17f110b37c48cc0f36c37e84d876621d327f64bbe08457d3ec4098ba2fa0a319fba411c2841ed7be83196a8cdf9daa5d00694bc335fc4c32217fe0488bce9cb7202e59468b1ead119000477db2ca797fac19eda3f58c1024100e2ab760841bb9d30a81d222de1eb7381d82214407f1b975cbbfe4e1a9467fd98adbd78f607836ca5be1928b9d160d97fd45c12d6b52e2c9871a174c66b488113024100c5ab27602159ae7d6f20c3c2ee851e46dc112e689e28d5fcbbf990a99ef8a90b8bb44fd36467e7fc1789ceb663abda338652c3c73f111774902e840565927091024100b6cdbd354f7df579a63b48b3643e353b84898777b48b15f94e0bfc0567a6ae5911d57ad6409cf7647bf96264e9bd87eb95e263b7110b9a1f9f94acced0fafa4d024071195eec37e8d257decfc672b07ae639f10cbb9b0c739d0c809968d644a94e3fd6ed9287077a14583f379058f76a8aecd43c62dc8c0f41766650d725275ac4a1024100bb32d133edc2e048d463388b7be9cb4be29f4b6250be603e70e3647501c97ddde20a4e71be95fd5e71784e25aca4baf25be5738aae59bbfe1c997781447a2b24":"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA Storage parse too big data, should fail
parse_storage_data_check:"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":"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA Storage parse bad magic, should fail
parse_storage_data_check:"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":"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA Storage parse not enough magic, should fail
parse_storage_data_check:"505341004b4559":"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
# Not specific to files, but only run this test in an environment where the maximum size could be reached.
Save maximum size persistent raw key
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
save_large_persistent_key:0:PSA_SUCCESS
Save larger than maximum size persistent raw key, should fail
save_large_persistent_key:1:PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
Persistent key destroy
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
persistent_key_destroy:1:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"deadbeef"
Persistent key destroy missing key
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
persistent_key_destroy:1:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"deadbeef"
Persistent key import
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
persistent_key_import:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:"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":PSA_SUCCESS
Persistent key import garbage data, should fail
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
persistent_key_import:1:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:"11111111":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
import/export persistent raw key: 0 byte
import_export_persistent_key:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:0:0
import/export persistent raw key: 1 byte
import_export_persistent_key:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:0
import/export persistent key RSA public key: good, 1024-bit
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
import_export_persistent_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:0
import/export persistent key RSA keypair: good, 1024-bit
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
import_export_persistent_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:1024:0
import/export persistent raw key file not exist: 1 byte
import_export_persistent_key:"2a":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:1
import/export persistent key RSA public key file not exist: 1024-bit
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
import_export_persistent_key:"30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb5c2b13c7fe5a654aa8aa2470b541ee1feb0b12d25c79711531249e1129628042dbbb6c120d1443524ef4c0e6e1d8956eeb2077af12349ddeee54483bc06c2c61948cd02b202e796aebd94d3a7cbf859c2c1819c324cb82b9cd34ede263a2abffe4733f077869e8660f7d6834da53d690ef7985f6bc30203010001":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:1024:1
import/export persistent key RSA keypair file not exist: 1024-bit
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
import_export_persistent_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:1024:1
PSA import/export-persistent symmetric key: 16 bytes
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_C:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
import_export_persistent_key:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:0

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