* No null-check before calling free
* Close memory leak
* No need for double check of privkey validity

Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
This commit is contained in:
Steven Cooreman 2020-07-30 11:36:45 +02:00
parent a2371e53e4
commit 6d839f05bf

View File

@ -691,8 +691,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_import_rsa_key( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
exit:
/* Always free the RSA object */
mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa );
if( rsa != NULL )
mbedtls_free( rsa );
mbedtls_free( rsa );
/* Free the allocated buffer only on error. */
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
@ -726,10 +725,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_ecp_representation( const psa_key_slot_t *slot,
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
size_t data_length = slot->data.key.bytes;
psa_status_t status;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair));
if( ecp == NULL )
return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL;
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) )
{
@ -744,19 +740,27 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_ecp_representation( const psa_key_slot_t *slot,
data_length = slot->data.key.bytes / 2;
}
/* Allocate and initialize a key representation. */
ecp = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair));
if( ecp == NULL )
return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp );
/* Load the group. */
grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( slot->attr.type),
grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( slot->attr.type ),
data_length );
if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
}
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp->grp, grp_id ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
goto exit;
/* Load the key material */
/* Load the key material. */
if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) )
{
/* Load the public value. */
@ -775,7 +779,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_ecp_representation( const psa_key_slot_t *slot,
}
else
{
/* Load the secret value. */
/* Load and validate the secret value. */
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_ecp_read_key( ecp->grp.id,
ecp,
@ -784,11 +788,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_ecp_representation( const psa_key_slot_t *slot,
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
/* Validate the private key. */
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->d ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
}
*p_ecp = ecp;
@ -892,8 +891,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_import_ecp_key( psa_key_slot_t *slot,
exit:
/* Always free the PK object (will also free contained ECP context) */
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp );
if( ecp != NULL )
mbedtls_free( ecp );
mbedtls_free( ecp );
/* Free the allocated buffer only on error. */
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
@ -2003,12 +2001,12 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes(
{
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL;
mbedtls_mpi actual, required;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status = psa_load_rsa_representation( slot, &rsa );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return status;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &required );
ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa,
@ -5592,8 +5590,7 @@ exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_size );
mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh );
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key );
if( their_key != NULL)
mbedtls_free( their_key );
mbedtls_free( their_key );
return( status );
}