Optimize RSA blinding by caching-updating values
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@ -255,13 +255,27 @@ cleanup:
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#if !defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
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/*
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* Generate blinding values
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* Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of:
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* KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
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* DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’96. Springer
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* Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
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*/
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static int rsa_prepare_blinding( rsa_context *ctx,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
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{
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int ret;
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if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL )
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{
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/* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
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MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) );
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MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) );
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MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) );
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MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) );
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return( 0 );
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}
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/* Unblinding value: Vf = random number */
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MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
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