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PK: change pk_verify arguments (md_info "optional")

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This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2013-08-17 14:36:32 +02:00
parent ab46694558
commit f73da02962
4 changed files with 36 additions and 27 deletions
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13
include/polarssl/pk.h
View File

@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#include "config.h"
#include "md.h"
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
#include "rsa.h"
#endif
@ -123,8 +125,8 @@ typedef struct
int (*can_do)( pk_type_t type );
/** Verify signature */
int (*verify_func)( void *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
int (*verify_func)( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len );
/** Allocate a new context */
@ -203,16 +205,17 @@ int pk_can_do( pk_context *ctx, pk_type_t type );
* \brief Verify signature
*
* \param ctx PK context to use
* \param md_alg Hash algorithm used
* \param hash Hash of the message to sign
* \param md_info Information about the hash function used
* \param hash_len Hash length
* \param sig Signature to verify
* \param sig_len Signature length
*
* \return 0 on success (signature is valid),
* or a specific error code.
*/
int pk_verify( pk_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
int pk_verify( pk_context *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len );
/**

10
library/pk.c
View File

@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int pk_init_ctx( pk_context *ctx, const pk_info_t *info )
*/
int pk_can_do( pk_context *ctx, pk_type_t type )
{
/* null of NONE context can't do anything */
/* null or NONE context can't do anything */
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL )
return( 0 );
@ -120,14 +120,16 @@ int pk_can_do( pk_context *ctx, pk_type_t type )
/*
* Verify a signature
*/
int pk_verify( pk_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
int pk_verify( pk_context *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, hash, md_info, sig, sig_len ) );
return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg,
hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len ) );
}
/*

34
library/pk_wrap.c
View File

@ -58,15 +58,15 @@ static size_t rsa_get_size( const void * ctx )
return( 8 * ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len );
}
static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
if( sig_len != ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
return( rsa_pkcs1_verify( (rsa_context *) ctx,
RSA_PUBLIC, md_info->type, 0, hash, sig ) );
RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, hash_len, hash, sig ) );
}
static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void )
@ -128,19 +128,20 @@ static size_t eckey_get_size( const void *ctx )
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
/* Forward declaration */
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len );
#endif
static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
#if !defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
((void) ctx);
((void) md_alg);
((void) hash);
((void) md_info);
((void) hash_len);
((void) sig);
((void) sig_len);
@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
ecdsa_init( &ecdsa );
ret = ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ||
ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, hash, md_info, sig, sig_len );
ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len );
ecdsa_free( &ecdsa );
@ -203,13 +204,14 @@ static int eckeydh_can_do( pk_type_t type )
type == POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH );
}
static int eckeydh_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
static int eckeydh_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
((void) ctx);
((void) md_alg);
((void) hash);
((void) md_info);
((void) hash_len);
((void) sig);
((void) sig_len);
@ -234,12 +236,14 @@ static int ecdsa_can_do( pk_type_t type )
return( type == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA );
}
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, const md_info_t *md_info,
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
((void) md_alg);
return( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ctx,
hash, md_info->size, sig, sig_len ) );
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) );
}
static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void )

6
library/x509parse.c
View File

@ -3429,7 +3429,7 @@ static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca,
md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash );
if( pk_can_do( &ca->pk, crl_list->sig_pk ) == 0 ||
pk_verify( &ca->pk, hash, md_info,
pk_verify( &ca->pk, crl_list->sig_md, hash, md_info->size,
crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
@ -3546,7 +3546,7 @@ static int x509parse_verify_top(
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
if( pk_can_do( &trust_ca->pk, child->sig_pk ) == 0 ||
pk_verify( &trust_ca->pk, hash, md_info,
pk_verify( &trust_ca->pk, child->sig_md, hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
trust_ca = trust_ca->next;
@ -3623,7 +3623,7 @@ static int x509parse_verify_child(
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
if( pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) == 0 ||
pk_verify( &parent->pk, hash, md_info,
pk_verify( &parent->pk, child->sig_md, hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;