Fix bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations
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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Features
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Bugfix
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* ecp_gen_keypair() does more tries to prevent failure because of
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statistics
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* Fix buf in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations
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= PolarSSL 1.3.4 released on 2014-01-27
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Features
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@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
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* (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
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for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
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{
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pad_done |= ( p[i] == 0xFF );
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pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF );
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pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
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}
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@ -160,6 +160,21 @@ void rsa_pkcs1_sign_raw( char *message_hex_string, char *hash_result_string,
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TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) output_str, result_hex_str ) == 0 );
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/* For PKCS#1 v1.5, there is an alternative way to generate signatures */
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if( padding_mode == RSA_PKCS_V15 )
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{
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memset( output, 0x00, 1000 );
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memset( output_str, 0x00, 1000 );
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TEST_ASSERT( rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( &ctx,
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&rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info, RSA_PRIVATE,
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hash_len, hash_result, output ) == 0 );
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hexify( output_str, output, ctx.len );
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TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) output_str, result_hex_str ) == 0 );
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}
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mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 ); mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &G );
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rsa_free( &ctx );
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}
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@ -174,13 +189,15 @@ void rsa_pkcs1_verify_raw( char *message_hex_string, char *hash_result_string,
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unsigned char message_str[1000];
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unsigned char hash_result[1000];
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unsigned char result_str[1000];
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unsigned char output[1000];
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rsa_context ctx;
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size_t hash_len;
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size_t hash_len, olen;
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rsa_init( &ctx, padding_mode, 0 );
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memset( message_str, 0x00, 1000 );
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memset( hash_result, 0x00, 1000 );
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memset( result_str, 0x00, 1000 );
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memset( output, 0x00, sizeof( output ) );
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ctx.len = mod / 8;
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TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.N, radix_N, input_N ) == 0 );
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@ -194,6 +211,22 @@ void rsa_pkcs1_verify_raw( char *message_hex_string, char *hash_result_string,
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TEST_ASSERT( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, NULL, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, POLARSSL_MD_NONE, hash_len, hash_result, result_str ) == correct );
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/* For PKCS#1 v1.5, there is an alternative way to verify signatures */
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if( padding_mode == RSA_PKCS_V15 )
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{
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int ok;
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TEST_ASSERT( rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( &ctx,
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NULL, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC,
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&olen, result_str, output, sizeof( output ) ) == 0 );
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ok = olen == hash_len && memcmp( output, hash_result, olen ) == 0;
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if( correct == 0 )
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TEST_ASSERT( ok == 1 );
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else
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TEST_ASSERT( ok == 0 );
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}
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rsa_free( &ctx );
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}
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/* END_CASE */
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