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Adapt ssl_fetch_input() for UDP

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This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2014-03-24 13:13:01 +01:00 committed by Paul Bakker
parent 8a06d9c5d6
commit fe98aceb70
2 changed files with 57 additions and 11 deletions
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4
include/polarssl/ssl.h
View File

@ -1762,10 +1762,6 @@ int ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl_context *ssl );
int ssl_derive_keys( ssl_context *ssl );
int ssl_read_record( ssl_context *ssl );
/**
* \return 0 if successful, POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF on EOF or
* another negative error code.
*/
int ssl_fetch_input( ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want );
int ssl_write_record( ssl_context *ssl );

54
library/ssl_tls.c
View File

@ -1821,6 +1821,13 @@ static int ssl_decompress_buf( ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* Fill the input message buffer
*
* If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are
* available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code
* is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ).
*
* Set ssl->in_left to 0 before calling to start a new record. Apart from
* this, ssl->in_left is an internal variable and should never be read.
*/
int ssl_fetch_input( ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
{
@ -1829,12 +1836,53 @@ int ssl_fetch_input( ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) );
if( nb_want > SSL_BUFFER_LEN - 8 )
if( nb_want > SSL_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->transport == SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %d, nb_want: %d",
ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
/*
* With UDP, we must always read a full datagram.
* Just remember how much we read and avoid reading again if we
* already have enough data.
*/
if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left)
return( 0 );
/*
* A record can't be split accross datagrams. If we need to read but
* are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something
* wrong.
*/
if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
len = SSL_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf );
ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_recv, ssl->in_hdr, len );
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv", ret );
if( ret == 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->in_left = ret;
}
else
#endif
{
while( ssl->in_left < nb_want )
{
len = nb_want - ssl->in_left;
@ -1852,6 +1900,7 @@ int ssl_fetch_input( ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
ssl->in_left += ret;
}
}
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) );
@ -2140,7 +2189,8 @@ int ssl_read_record( ssl_context *ssl )
}
/* Sanity check (outer boundaries) */
if( ssl->in_msglen < 1 || ssl->in_msglen > SSL_BUFFER_LEN - 13 )
if( ssl->in_msglen < 1 ||
ssl->in_msglen > SSL_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t)( ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf ) )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );