mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function
Gilles Peskine 6beb327a5e external_rng_failure_sign: more robust buffer management
Don't microoptimize memory usage in tests: use separate buffers for
the input and the output. Allocate the input buffer dynamically
because the size is a parameter of the test case. Allocate the output
buffer dynamically because it's generally good practice in tests so
that a memory sanitizer can detect a buffer overflow.

Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2021-01-06 20:16:26 +01:00

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/* BEGIN_HEADER */
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <psa/crypto.h>
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h"
/* Calculating the minimum allowed entropy size in bytes */
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C)
#include <stdio.h>
#else
#include <psa/internal_trusted_storage.h>
#endif
/* Remove the entropy seed file. Since the library does not expose a way
* to do this (it would be a security risk if such a function was ever
* accessible in production), implement this functionality in a white-box
* manner. */
psa_status_t remove_seed_file( void )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C)
if( remove( "00000000ffffff52.psa_its" ) == 0 )
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
else
return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST );
#else
return( psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID ) );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */
/* END_HEADER */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
void external_rng_failure_generate( )
{
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE );
psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, 128 );
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
uint8_t output[1];
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output, sizeof( output ) ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) );
mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng( );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY,
psa_generate_random( output, sizeof( output ) ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY,
psa_generate_key( &attributes, &key ) );
exit:
psa_destroy_key( key );
PSA_DONE( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
void external_rng_failure_sign( int key_type, data_t *key_data, int alg,
int input_size_arg )
{
/* This test case is only expected to pass if the signature mechanism
* requires randomness, either because it is a randomized signature
* or because the implementation uses blinding. */
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type );
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN );
psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, alg );
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
size_t input_size = input_size_arg;
uint8_t *input = NULL;
uint8_t *signature = NULL;
size_t signature_size = PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE;
size_t signature_length;
ASSERT_ALLOC( input, input_size );
ASSERT_ALLOC( signature, signature_size );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
&key ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_sign_hash( key, alg,
input, input_size,
signature, signature_size,
&signature_length ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) );
mbedtls_test_disable_insecure_external_rng( );
/* Import the key again, because for RSA Mbed TLS caches blinding values
* in the key object and this could perturb the test. */
PSA_ASSERT( psa_import_key( &attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len,
&key ) );
TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY,
psa_sign_hash( key, alg,
input, input_size,
signature, signature_size,
&signature_length ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key ) );
exit:
psa_destroy_key( key );
PSA_DONE( );
mbedtls_free( input );
mbedtls_free( signature );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */
void validate_entropy_seed_injection( int seed_length_a,
int expected_status_a,
int seed_length_b,
int expected_status_b )
{
psa_status_t status;
uint8_t output[32] = { 0 };
uint8_t zeros[32] = { 0 };
uint8_t *seed = NULL;
int i;
int seed_size;
if( seed_length_a > seed_length_b )
{
seed_size = seed_length_a;
}
else
{
seed_size = seed_length_b;
}
ASSERT_ALLOC( seed, seed_size );
/* fill seed with some data */
for( i = 0; i < seed_size; ++i )
{
seed[i] = i;
}
status = remove_seed_file( );
TEST_ASSERT( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ||
( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, seed_length_a );
TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_a );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, seed_length_b );
TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status_b );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_generate_random( output,
sizeof( output ) ) );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( output, zeros, sizeof( output ) ) != 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_free( seed );
remove_seed_file( );
PSA_DONE( );
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */
void run_entropy_inject_with_crypto_init( )
{
psa_status_t status;
size_t i;
uint8_t seed[MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE] = { 0 };
/* fill seed with some data */
for( i = 0; i < sizeof( seed ); ++i )
{
seed[i] = i;
}
status = remove_seed_file( );
TEST_ASSERT( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ||
( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
status = remove_seed_file( );
TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_crypto_init( );
TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY );
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
status = psa_crypto_init( );
PSA_ASSERT( status );
PSA_DONE( );
/* The seed is written by nv_seed callback functions therefore the injection will fail */
status = mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
exit:
remove_seed_file( );
PSA_DONE( );
}
/* END_CASE */