v8/test/common/assembler-tester.h

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Reland "[turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode" This is a reland of a462a7854a081f4f34bb4c112ee33f3d69efa309 Original change's description: > [turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode > > For checks and assertions (mostly for debug code, like stack alignment > or zero extension), we had two modes: Emit a call to the {Abort} > runtime function (the default), and emit a debug break (used for > testing, enabled via --trap-on-abort). > In wasm, where we cannot just call a runtime function because code must > be isolate independent, we always used the trap-on-abort behaviour. > This causes problems for our fuzzers, which do not catch SIGTRAP, and > hence do not detect debug code failures. > > This CL introduces a third mode ("hard abort"), which calls a C > function via {ExternalReference}. The C function still outputs the > abort reason, but does not print the stack trace. It then aborts via > "OS::Abort", just like the runtime function. > This will allow fuzzers to detect the crash and even find a nice error > message. > > Even though this looks like a lot of code churn, it is actually not. > Most added lines are new tests, and other changes are minimal. > > R=mstarzinger@chromium.org > > Bug: chromium:863799 > Change-Id: I77c58ff72db552d49014614436259ccfb49ba87b > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142163 > Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54592} Bug: chromium:863799 Change-Id: I7729a47b4823a982a8e201df36520aa2b6ef5326 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1146100 Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54656}
2018-07-24 14:12:47 +00:00
// Copyright 2018 the V8 project authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#ifndef V8_TEST_COMMON_ASSEMBLER_TESTER_H_
#define V8_TEST_COMMON_ASSEMBLER_TESTER_H_
#include <memory>
#include "src/codegen/assembler.h"
#include "src/codegen/flush-instruction-cache.h"
#include "src/common/code-memory-access.h"
Reland "[turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode" This is a reland of a462a7854a081f4f34bb4c112ee33f3d69efa309 Original change's description: > [turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode > > For checks and assertions (mostly for debug code, like stack alignment > or zero extension), we had two modes: Emit a call to the {Abort} > runtime function (the default), and emit a debug break (used for > testing, enabled via --trap-on-abort). > In wasm, where we cannot just call a runtime function because code must > be isolate independent, we always used the trap-on-abort behaviour. > This causes problems for our fuzzers, which do not catch SIGTRAP, and > hence do not detect debug code failures. > > This CL introduces a third mode ("hard abort"), which calls a C > function via {ExternalReference}. The C function still outputs the > abort reason, but does not print the stack trace. It then aborts via > "OS::Abort", just like the runtime function. > This will allow fuzzers to detect the crash and even find a nice error > message. > > Even though this looks like a lot of code churn, it is actually not. > Most added lines are new tests, and other changes are minimal. > > R=mstarzinger@chromium.org > > Bug: chromium:863799 > Change-Id: I77c58ff72db552d49014614436259ccfb49ba87b > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142163 > Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54592} Bug: chromium:863799 Change-Id: I7729a47b4823a982a8e201df36520aa2b6ef5326 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1146100 Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54656}
2018-07-24 14:12:47 +00:00
namespace v8 {
namespace internal {
class TestingAssemblerBuffer : public AssemblerBuffer {
public:
Reland "[rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1)" This is a reland of commit 9d31f8663ad72fdf04d15a72d83b54a6ac33b640 There were issues with --future flag implications on M1. Original change's description: > [rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1) > > ... for V8 code space. The feature is currently disabled. > > In order to use fast W^X permission switching we must allocate > executable pages with readable writable executable permissions (RWX). > However, MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon) prohibits further > permission changing of RWX memory pages. This means that the code page > headers must be allocated with RWX permissions too because otherwise > it wouldn't be possible to allocate a large code page over the freed > regular code page and vice versa. > > When enabled, the new machinery works as follows: > > 1) when memory region is reserved for allocating executable pages, the > whole region is committed with RWX permissions and then decommitted, > 2) since reconfiguration of RWX page permissions is not allowed on > MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon), there must be no attempts > to change them, > 3) the request to set RWX permissions in the executable page region > just recommits the pages without changing permissions (see (1), they > were already allocated as RWX and then discarded), > 4) in order to make executable pages inaccessible one must use > OS::DiscardSystemPages() instead of OS::DecommitPages() or > setting permissions to kNoAccess because the latter two are not > allowed by the MacOS (see (2)). > 5) since code space page headers are allocated as RWX pages it's also > necessary to switch between W^X modes when updating the data in the > page headers (i.e. when marking, updating stats, wiring pages in > lists, etc.). The new CodePageHeaderModificationScope class is used > in the respective places. On unrelated configurations it's a no-op. > > The fast permission switching can't be used for V8 configuration with > enabled pointer compression and disabled external code space because > a) the pointer compression cage has to be reserved with MAP_JIT flag > which is too expensive, > b) in case of shared pointer compression cage if the code range will > be deleted while the cage is still alive then attempt to configure > permissions of pages that were previously set to RWX will fail. > > This also CL extends the unmapper unit tests with permissions tracking > for discarded pages. > > Bug: v8:12797 > Change-Id: Idb28cbc481306477589eee9962d2e75167d87c61 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3579303 > Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80238} Bug: v8:12797 Change-Id: I0fe86666f31bad37d7074e217555c95900d2afba Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3610433 Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80259}
2022-04-28 10:14:12 +00:00
TestingAssemblerBuffer(size_t requested, void* address,
JitPermission jit_permission = JitPermission::kNoJit)
: protection_reconfiguration_is_allowed_(true) {
size_t page_size = v8::internal::AllocatePageSize();
size_t alloc_size = RoundUp(requested, page_size);
CHECK_GE(kMaxInt, alloc_size);
reservation_ = VirtualMemory(GetPlatformPageAllocator(), alloc_size,
address, page_size, jit_permission);
CHECK(reservation_.IsReserved());
MakeWritable();
}
Reland "[turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode" This is a reland of a462a7854a081f4f34bb4c112ee33f3d69efa309 Original change's description: > [turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode > > For checks and assertions (mostly for debug code, like stack alignment > or zero extension), we had two modes: Emit a call to the {Abort} > runtime function (the default), and emit a debug break (used for > testing, enabled via --trap-on-abort). > In wasm, where we cannot just call a runtime function because code must > be isolate independent, we always used the trap-on-abort behaviour. > This causes problems for our fuzzers, which do not catch SIGTRAP, and > hence do not detect debug code failures. > > This CL introduces a third mode ("hard abort"), which calls a C > function via {ExternalReference}. The C function still outputs the > abort reason, but does not print the stack trace. It then aborts via > "OS::Abort", just like the runtime function. > This will allow fuzzers to detect the crash and even find a nice error > message. > > Even though this looks like a lot of code churn, it is actually not. > Most added lines are new tests, and other changes are minimal. > > R=mstarzinger@chromium.org > > Bug: chromium:863799 > Change-Id: I77c58ff72db552d49014614436259ccfb49ba87b > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142163 > Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54592} Bug: chromium:863799 Change-Id: I7729a47b4823a982a8e201df36520aa2b6ef5326 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1146100 Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54656}
2018-07-24 14:12:47 +00:00
~TestingAssemblerBuffer() override { reservation_.Free(); }
byte* start() const override {
return reinterpret_cast<byte*>(reservation_.address());
}
Reland "[turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode" This is a reland of a462a7854a081f4f34bb4c112ee33f3d69efa309 Original change's description: > [turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode > > For checks and assertions (mostly for debug code, like stack alignment > or zero extension), we had two modes: Emit a call to the {Abort} > runtime function (the default), and emit a debug break (used for > testing, enabled via --trap-on-abort). > In wasm, where we cannot just call a runtime function because code must > be isolate independent, we always used the trap-on-abort behaviour. > This causes problems for our fuzzers, which do not catch SIGTRAP, and > hence do not detect debug code failures. > > This CL introduces a third mode ("hard abort"), which calls a C > function via {ExternalReference}. The C function still outputs the > abort reason, but does not print the stack trace. It then aborts via > "OS::Abort", just like the runtime function. > This will allow fuzzers to detect the crash and even find a nice error > message. > > Even though this looks like a lot of code churn, it is actually not. > Most added lines are new tests, and other changes are minimal. > > R=mstarzinger@chromium.org > > Bug: chromium:863799 > Change-Id: I77c58ff72db552d49014614436259ccfb49ba87b > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142163 > Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54592} Bug: chromium:863799 Change-Id: I7729a47b4823a982a8e201df36520aa2b6ef5326 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1146100 Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54656}
2018-07-24 14:12:47 +00:00
int size() const override { return static_cast<int>(reservation_.size()); }
std::unique_ptr<AssemblerBuffer> Grow(int new_size) override {
FATAL("Cannot grow TestingAssemblerBuffer");
}
std::unique_ptr<AssemblerBuffer> CreateView() const {
return ExternalAssemblerBuffer(start(), size());
}
void MakeExecutable() {
// Flush the instruction cache as part of making the buffer executable.
// Note: we do this before setting permissions to ReadExecute because on
// some older ARM kernels there is a bug which causes an access error on
// cache flush instructions to trigger access error on non-writable memory.
// See https://bugs.chromium.org/p/v8/issues/detail?id=8157
FlushInstructionCache(start(), size());
Reland "[rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1)" This is a reland of commit 9d31f8663ad72fdf04d15a72d83b54a6ac33b640 There were issues with --future flag implications on M1. Original change's description: > [rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1) > > ... for V8 code space. The feature is currently disabled. > > In order to use fast W^X permission switching we must allocate > executable pages with readable writable executable permissions (RWX). > However, MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon) prohibits further > permission changing of RWX memory pages. This means that the code page > headers must be allocated with RWX permissions too because otherwise > it wouldn't be possible to allocate a large code page over the freed > regular code page and vice versa. > > When enabled, the new machinery works as follows: > > 1) when memory region is reserved for allocating executable pages, the > whole region is committed with RWX permissions and then decommitted, > 2) since reconfiguration of RWX page permissions is not allowed on > MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon), there must be no attempts > to change them, > 3) the request to set RWX permissions in the executable page region > just recommits the pages without changing permissions (see (1), they > were already allocated as RWX and then discarded), > 4) in order to make executable pages inaccessible one must use > OS::DiscardSystemPages() instead of OS::DecommitPages() or > setting permissions to kNoAccess because the latter two are not > allowed by the MacOS (see (2)). > 5) since code space page headers are allocated as RWX pages it's also > necessary to switch between W^X modes when updating the data in the > page headers (i.e. when marking, updating stats, wiring pages in > lists, etc.). The new CodePageHeaderModificationScope class is used > in the respective places. On unrelated configurations it's a no-op. > > The fast permission switching can't be used for V8 configuration with > enabled pointer compression and disabled external code space because > a) the pointer compression cage has to be reserved with MAP_JIT flag > which is too expensive, > b) in case of shared pointer compression cage if the code range will > be deleted while the cage is still alive then attempt to configure > permissions of pages that were previously set to RWX will fail. > > This also CL extends the unmapper unit tests with permissions tracking > for discarded pages. > > Bug: v8:12797 > Change-Id: Idb28cbc481306477589eee9962d2e75167d87c61 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3579303 > Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80238} Bug: v8:12797 Change-Id: I0fe86666f31bad37d7074e217555c95900d2afba Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3610433 Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80259}
2022-04-28 10:14:12 +00:00
if (protection_reconfiguration_is_allowed_) {
bool result = SetPermissions(GetPlatformPageAllocator(), start(), size(),
v8::PageAllocator::kReadExecute);
CHECK(result);
}
}
void MakeWritable() {
Reland "[rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1)" This is a reland of commit 9d31f8663ad72fdf04d15a72d83b54a6ac33b640 There were issues with --future flag implications on M1. Original change's description: > [rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1) > > ... for V8 code space. The feature is currently disabled. > > In order to use fast W^X permission switching we must allocate > executable pages with readable writable executable permissions (RWX). > However, MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon) prohibits further > permission changing of RWX memory pages. This means that the code page > headers must be allocated with RWX permissions too because otherwise > it wouldn't be possible to allocate a large code page over the freed > regular code page and vice versa. > > When enabled, the new machinery works as follows: > > 1) when memory region is reserved for allocating executable pages, the > whole region is committed with RWX permissions and then decommitted, > 2) since reconfiguration of RWX page permissions is not allowed on > MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon), there must be no attempts > to change them, > 3) the request to set RWX permissions in the executable page region > just recommits the pages without changing permissions (see (1), they > were already allocated as RWX and then discarded), > 4) in order to make executable pages inaccessible one must use > OS::DiscardSystemPages() instead of OS::DecommitPages() or > setting permissions to kNoAccess because the latter two are not > allowed by the MacOS (see (2)). > 5) since code space page headers are allocated as RWX pages it's also > necessary to switch between W^X modes when updating the data in the > page headers (i.e. when marking, updating stats, wiring pages in > lists, etc.). The new CodePageHeaderModificationScope class is used > in the respective places. On unrelated configurations it's a no-op. > > The fast permission switching can't be used for V8 configuration with > enabled pointer compression and disabled external code space because > a) the pointer compression cage has to be reserved with MAP_JIT flag > which is too expensive, > b) in case of shared pointer compression cage if the code range will > be deleted while the cage is still alive then attempt to configure > permissions of pages that were previously set to RWX will fail. > > This also CL extends the unmapper unit tests with permissions tracking > for discarded pages. > > Bug: v8:12797 > Change-Id: Idb28cbc481306477589eee9962d2e75167d87c61 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3579303 > Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80238} Bug: v8:12797 Change-Id: I0fe86666f31bad37d7074e217555c95900d2afba Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3610433 Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80259}
2022-04-28 10:14:12 +00:00
if (protection_reconfiguration_is_allowed_) {
bool result = SetPermissions(GetPlatformPageAllocator(), start(), size(),
v8::PageAllocator::kReadWrite);
CHECK(result);
}
}
void MakeWritableAndExecutable() {
bool result = SetPermissions(GetPlatformPageAllocator(), start(), size(),
v8::PageAllocator::kReadWriteExecute);
CHECK(result);
Reland "[rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1)" This is a reland of commit 9d31f8663ad72fdf04d15a72d83b54a6ac33b640 There were issues with --future flag implications on M1. Original change's description: > [rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1) > > ... for V8 code space. The feature is currently disabled. > > In order to use fast W^X permission switching we must allocate > executable pages with readable writable executable permissions (RWX). > However, MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon) prohibits further > permission changing of RWX memory pages. This means that the code page > headers must be allocated with RWX permissions too because otherwise > it wouldn't be possible to allocate a large code page over the freed > regular code page and vice versa. > > When enabled, the new machinery works as follows: > > 1) when memory region is reserved for allocating executable pages, the > whole region is committed with RWX permissions and then decommitted, > 2) since reconfiguration of RWX page permissions is not allowed on > MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon), there must be no attempts > to change them, > 3) the request to set RWX permissions in the executable page region > just recommits the pages without changing permissions (see (1), they > were already allocated as RWX and then discarded), > 4) in order to make executable pages inaccessible one must use > OS::DiscardSystemPages() instead of OS::DecommitPages() or > setting permissions to kNoAccess because the latter two are not > allowed by the MacOS (see (2)). > 5) since code space page headers are allocated as RWX pages it's also > necessary to switch between W^X modes when updating the data in the > page headers (i.e. when marking, updating stats, wiring pages in > lists, etc.). The new CodePageHeaderModificationScope class is used > in the respective places. On unrelated configurations it's a no-op. > > The fast permission switching can't be used for V8 configuration with > enabled pointer compression and disabled external code space because > a) the pointer compression cage has to be reserved with MAP_JIT flag > which is too expensive, > b) in case of shared pointer compression cage if the code range will > be deleted while the cage is still alive then attempt to configure > permissions of pages that were previously set to RWX will fail. > > This also CL extends the unmapper unit tests with permissions tracking > for discarded pages. > > Bug: v8:12797 > Change-Id: Idb28cbc481306477589eee9962d2e75167d87c61 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3579303 > Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80238} Bug: v8:12797 Change-Id: I0fe86666f31bad37d7074e217555c95900d2afba Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3610433 Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80259}
2022-04-28 10:14:12 +00:00
// Once buffer protection is set to RWX it might not be allowed to be
// changed anymore.
protection_reconfiguration_is_allowed_ =
!V8_HEAP_USE_PTHREAD_JIT_WRITE_PROTECT &&
protection_reconfiguration_is_allowed_;
}
private:
VirtualMemory reservation_;
Reland "[rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1)" This is a reland of commit 9d31f8663ad72fdf04d15a72d83b54a6ac33b640 There were issues with --future flag implications on M1. Original change's description: > [rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1) > > ... for V8 code space. The feature is currently disabled. > > In order to use fast W^X permission switching we must allocate > executable pages with readable writable executable permissions (RWX). > However, MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon) prohibits further > permission changing of RWX memory pages. This means that the code page > headers must be allocated with RWX permissions too because otherwise > it wouldn't be possible to allocate a large code page over the freed > regular code page and vice versa. > > When enabled, the new machinery works as follows: > > 1) when memory region is reserved for allocating executable pages, the > whole region is committed with RWX permissions and then decommitted, > 2) since reconfiguration of RWX page permissions is not allowed on > MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon), there must be no attempts > to change them, > 3) the request to set RWX permissions in the executable page region > just recommits the pages without changing permissions (see (1), they > were already allocated as RWX and then discarded), > 4) in order to make executable pages inaccessible one must use > OS::DiscardSystemPages() instead of OS::DecommitPages() or > setting permissions to kNoAccess because the latter two are not > allowed by the MacOS (see (2)). > 5) since code space page headers are allocated as RWX pages it's also > necessary to switch between W^X modes when updating the data in the > page headers (i.e. when marking, updating stats, wiring pages in > lists, etc.). The new CodePageHeaderModificationScope class is used > in the respective places. On unrelated configurations it's a no-op. > > The fast permission switching can't be used for V8 configuration with > enabled pointer compression and disabled external code space because > a) the pointer compression cage has to be reserved with MAP_JIT flag > which is too expensive, > b) in case of shared pointer compression cage if the code range will > be deleted while the cage is still alive then attempt to configure > permissions of pages that were previously set to RWX will fail. > > This also CL extends the unmapper unit tests with permissions tracking > for discarded pages. > > Bug: v8:12797 > Change-Id: Idb28cbc481306477589eee9962d2e75167d87c61 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3579303 > Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80238} Bug: v8:12797 Change-Id: I0fe86666f31bad37d7074e217555c95900d2afba Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3610433 Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80259}
2022-04-28 10:14:12 +00:00
bool protection_reconfiguration_is_allowed_;
};
// This scope class is mostly necesasry for arm64 tests running on Apple Silicon
// (M1) which prohibits reconfiguration of page permissions for RWX pages.
// Instead of altering the page permissions one must flip the X-W state by
// calling pthread_jit_write_protect_np() function.
// See RwxMemoryWriteScope for details.
class V8_NODISCARD AssemblerBufferWriteScope final {
public:
explicit AssemblerBufferWriteScope(TestingAssemblerBuffer& buffer)
: buffer_(buffer) {
buffer_.MakeWritable();
}
~AssemblerBufferWriteScope() { buffer_.MakeExecutable(); }
// Disable copy constructor and copy-assignment operator, since this manages
// a resource and implicit copying of the scope can yield surprising errors.
AssemblerBufferWriteScope(const AssemblerBufferWriteScope&) = delete;
AssemblerBufferWriteScope& operator=(const AssemblerBufferWriteScope&) =
delete;
private:
RwxMemoryWriteScopeForTesting rwx_write_scope_;
TestingAssemblerBuffer& buffer_;
};
static inline std::unique_ptr<TestingAssemblerBuffer> AllocateAssemblerBuffer(
size_t requested = v8::internal::AssemblerBase::kDefaultBufferSize,
void* address = nullptr,
Reland "[rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1)" This is a reland of commit 9d31f8663ad72fdf04d15a72d83b54a6ac33b640 There were issues with --future flag implications on M1. Original change's description: > [rwx][mac] Support fast W^X permission switching on Apple Silicon (M1) > > ... for V8 code space. The feature is currently disabled. > > In order to use fast W^X permission switching we must allocate > executable pages with readable writable executable permissions (RWX). > However, MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon) prohibits further > permission changing of RWX memory pages. This means that the code page > headers must be allocated with RWX permissions too because otherwise > it wouldn't be possible to allocate a large code page over the freed > regular code page and vice versa. > > When enabled, the new machinery works as follows: > > 1) when memory region is reserved for allocating executable pages, the > whole region is committed with RWX permissions and then decommitted, > 2) since reconfiguration of RWX page permissions is not allowed on > MacOS on ARM64 ("Apple M1"/Apple Silicon), there must be no attempts > to change them, > 3) the request to set RWX permissions in the executable page region > just recommits the pages without changing permissions (see (1), they > were already allocated as RWX and then discarded), > 4) in order to make executable pages inaccessible one must use > OS::DiscardSystemPages() instead of OS::DecommitPages() or > setting permissions to kNoAccess because the latter two are not > allowed by the MacOS (see (2)). > 5) since code space page headers are allocated as RWX pages it's also > necessary to switch between W^X modes when updating the data in the > page headers (i.e. when marking, updating stats, wiring pages in > lists, etc.). The new CodePageHeaderModificationScope class is used > in the respective places. On unrelated configurations it's a no-op. > > The fast permission switching can't be used for V8 configuration with > enabled pointer compression and disabled external code space because > a) the pointer compression cage has to be reserved with MAP_JIT flag > which is too expensive, > b) in case of shared pointer compression cage if the code range will > be deleted while the cage is still alive then attempt to configure > permissions of pages that were previously set to RWX will fail. > > This also CL extends the unmapper unit tests with permissions tracking > for discarded pages. > > Bug: v8:12797 > Change-Id: Idb28cbc481306477589eee9962d2e75167d87c61 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3579303 > Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80238} Bug: v8:12797 Change-Id: I0fe86666f31bad37d7074e217555c95900d2afba Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3610433 Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#80259}
2022-04-28 10:14:12 +00:00
JitPermission jit_permission = JitPermission::kMapAsJittable) {
return std::make_unique<TestingAssemblerBuffer>(requested, address,
jit_permission);
Reland "[turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode" This is a reland of a462a7854a081f4f34bb4c112ee33f3d69efa309 Original change's description: > [turboassembler] Introduce hard-abort mode > > For checks and assertions (mostly for debug code, like stack alignment > or zero extension), we had two modes: Emit a call to the {Abort} > runtime function (the default), and emit a debug break (used for > testing, enabled via --trap-on-abort). > In wasm, where we cannot just call a runtime function because code must > be isolate independent, we always used the trap-on-abort behaviour. > This causes problems for our fuzzers, which do not catch SIGTRAP, and > hence do not detect debug code failures. > > This CL introduces a third mode ("hard abort"), which calls a C > function via {ExternalReference}. The C function still outputs the > abort reason, but does not print the stack trace. It then aborts via > "OS::Abort", just like the runtime function. > This will allow fuzzers to detect the crash and even find a nice error > message. > > Even though this looks like a lot of code churn, it is actually not. > Most added lines are new tests, and other changes are minimal. > > R=mstarzinger@chromium.org > > Bug: chromium:863799 > Change-Id: I77c58ff72db552d49014614436259ccfb49ba87b > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142163 > Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54592} Bug: chromium:863799 Change-Id: I7729a47b4823a982a8e201df36520aa2b6ef5326 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1146100 Reviewed-by: Michael Starzinger <mstarzinger@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Clemens Hammacher <clemensh@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#54656}
2018-07-24 14:12:47 +00:00
}
} // namespace internal
} // namespace v8
#endif // V8_TEST_COMMON_ASSEMBLER_TESTER_H_