This CL changes the poisoning in the interpreter to use the
infrastructure used in the JIT.
This does not change the original flag semantics:
--branch-load-poisoning enables JIT mitigations as before.
--untrusted-code-mitigation enables the interpreter mitigations
(now realized using the compiler back-end), but does not enable
the back-end based mitigations for the Javascript JIT. So in effect
--untrusted-code-mitigation makes the CSA pipeline for bytecode handlers
use the same mechanics (including changed register allocation) that
--branch-load-poisoning enables for the JIT.
Bug: chromium:798964
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: If7f6852ae44e32e6e0ad508e9237f24dec7e5b27
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/928881
Reviewed-by: Ross McIlroy <rmcilroy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Sevcik <jarin@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tobias Tebbi <tebbi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#52243}
1ef6c4374e