From 051e453cade38055920013747478e9139d6d9b11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamie Reece Wilson Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 04:13:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] [*] Double-down on clang being shit --- Core/project.lua | 27 ++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/Core/project.lua b/Core/project.lua index a4e5e1f..f7d8f55 100644 --- a/Core/project.lua +++ b/Core/project.lua @@ -164,14 +164,19 @@ local function configureProjectErrors() filter {"toolset:clang"} buildoptions {"-fms-extensions"} - -- the fucking retard cunts behind clang acknowledge there's a 2x slowdown here. - -- not only that, GCC optimize("no-stack-protector") is broken, their ms stack guard check doesnt do anything, and there are - -- reports that enabling sanitization actually exposes side channel attacks. thanks freetards. very cool. - -- all this because you dont trust me to not memcpy a fucking user provided blob with a bad length check in the very few places that - -- have any reads/writes determined by potentially malicious remote user input. even worse, i've seen what should be nothing more than - -- leaf functions doing atomic bit tests and sets get infected with these shitty checks. - -- once again you freetards are 20 years behind commercial alternatives, and that's with infinite apple buxs. - -- if anything happens because of this, i hope somebody burns down a house of a freetard and shits on their doormat during the escape. + -- The fucking retard cunts behind clang acknowledge there's a 2x slowdown here. + -- Not only that, GCC optimize("no-stack-protector") is broken (ive tried other attributes), their ms stack guard check doesnt do anything, + -- and there are reports that enabling sanitization actually exposes side channel attacks. thanks freetards. very cool. + -- All this because you dont trust me to not memcpy a fucking user provided blob with a bad length check in the very few places that + -- have any load/stores, in or around the stack, as determined by potentially malicious remote/untrusted user input. Even worse, I've seen + -- what should be nothing more than leaf functions doing atomic bit tests and sets get infected with these shitty checks. Meanwhile llvm + -- devs are bitching that "NoOoo you're right, this is a bug, LTO shouldn't be stripping stack checks". Even when the compiler knows + -- the stack isnt being accessed and there's no control flow out of its' reach, these moron compiler devs are obsessed with injecting + -- their shit checks that wont catch any real exploit chain. I'm so fucking sick of these retard security grifters hung up on "MUH OBERFLOWS" + -- "MUH SAFE LANGS" without being able to define what the fuck their attack vector is or how it's going to be exploited. If we cared about + -- overflow checks, then we'd have mimalloc running in secure mode. + -- Once again these twats are 20 years behind commercial alternatives, and that's with infinite apple buxs. + -- If anything happens because of this, i hope somebody burns down a house of a freetard or llvm dev, and shits on their doormat during the escape. if (not Aurora.Settings.bClangIsNoLongerAPieceOfShitCompiler) then buildoptions {"-fno-sanitize=all"} buildoptions {"-fno-stack-protector"} @@ -265,12 +270,12 @@ local function configureProjectForLd(prj) -- system libraries are considered before any malcious user-installed libraries could possibly be loaded. -- If you're running a broken arse system with missing protected libraries and you run software as write-level groups, -- you have bigger issues than my 'lets treat POSIX systems more like NT for cross-compatibility and sanity' assumption. - -- If you're worried about ld.so running unsigned code, go complain to glib iq-lets who maintain ld.so and force them + -- If you're worried about ld.so running unsigned code, go complain to glibc iq-lets who maintain ld.so and force them -- into developing actual .text and .rodata signature validation with respect to a global root-writable certificate, -- instead of spreading the ball of responsiblity like hot-fucking-potato in a game of respecting the UNIX :tm: way - -- of doing things (IE, expecting the user to know how to lockdown vendor supplied packages, RO all LD_LIBRARY_PATHs + -- of doing things (eg: expecting the user to know how to lockdown vendor supplied packages, RO all LD_LIBRARY_PATHs -- and other undocumented vendor paths, and do god knows what to harden specific softwares dumped without thought - -- across an arahic FHS/XDG tree, while the developers do jack shit to improve stability, maintainablity, and security). + -- across an arahic FHS/XDG tree, all the while developers do jack shit to improve stability, maintainablity, and security). -- -- Change my mind (without parroting what some dude said on some forum over a decade ago) -- Don't like it? Disable: Aurora.Settings.bForceWin32EscLd