2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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// Copyright 2018 the V8 project authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
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// found in the LICENSE file.
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#ifndef INCLUDE_V8_INTERNAL_H_
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#define INCLUDE_V8_INTERNAL_H_
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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2019-03-19 10:36:40 +00:00
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#include <string.h>
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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#include <type_traits>
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2020-04-27 16:29:03 +00:00
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#include "v8-version.h" // NOLINT(build/include_directory)
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#include "v8config.h" // NOLINT(build/include_directory)
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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namespace v8 {
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2021-07-23 18:29:30 +00:00
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class Array;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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class Context;
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class Data;
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class Isolate;
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2021-07-23 18:29:30 +00:00
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template <typename T>
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class Local;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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namespace internal {
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2019-01-08 09:48:09 +00:00
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class Isolate;
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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typedef uintptr_t Address;
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static const Address kNullAddress = 0;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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/**
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* Configuration of tagging scheme.
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*/
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2018-11-20 16:03:16 +00:00
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const int kApiSystemPointerSize = sizeof(void*);
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const int kApiDoubleSize = sizeof(double);
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2019-03-01 15:34:48 +00:00
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const int kApiInt32Size = sizeof(int32_t);
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2018-11-20 16:03:16 +00:00
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const int kApiInt64Size = sizeof(int64_t);
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2021-04-13 12:12:02 +00:00
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const int kApiSizetSize = sizeof(size_t);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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// Tag information for HeapObject.
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const int kHeapObjectTag = 1;
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const int kWeakHeapObjectTag = 3;
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const int kHeapObjectTagSize = 2;
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const intptr_t kHeapObjectTagMask = (1 << kHeapObjectTagSize) - 1;
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2021-04-06 12:01:44 +00:00
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// Tag information for fowarding pointers stored in object headers.
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// 0b00 at the lowest 2 bits in the header indicates that the map word is a
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// forwarding pointer.
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const int kForwardingTag = 0;
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const int kForwardingTagSize = 2;
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const intptr_t kForwardingTagMask = (1 << kForwardingTagSize) - 1;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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// Tag information for Smi.
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const int kSmiTag = 0;
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const int kSmiTagSize = 1;
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const intptr_t kSmiTagMask = (1 << kSmiTagSize) - 1;
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template <size_t tagged_ptr_size>
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struct SmiTagging;
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2019-05-09 14:15:47 +00:00
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constexpr intptr_t kIntptrAllBitsSet = intptr_t{-1};
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constexpr uintptr_t kUintptrAllBitsSet =
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static_cast<uintptr_t>(kIntptrAllBitsSet);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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// Smi constants for systems where tagged pointer is a 32-bit value.
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template <>
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struct SmiTagging<4> {
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enum { kSmiShiftSize = 0, kSmiValueSize = 31 };
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static constexpr intptr_t kSmiMinValue =
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static_cast<intptr_t>(kUintptrAllBitsSet << (kSmiValueSize - 1));
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static constexpr intptr_t kSmiMaxValue = -(kSmiMinValue + 1);
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static int SmiToInt(const internal::Address value) {
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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int shift_bits = kSmiTagSize + kSmiShiftSize;
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2019-08-23 12:40:12 +00:00
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// Truncate and shift down (requires >> to be sign extending).
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return static_cast<int32_t>(static_cast<uint32_t>(value)) >> shift_bits;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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V8_INLINE static constexpr bool IsValidSmi(intptr_t value) {
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// Is value in range [kSmiMinValue, kSmiMaxValue].
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// Use unsigned operations in order to avoid undefined behaviour in case of
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// signed integer overflow.
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return (static_cast<uintptr_t>(value) -
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static_cast<uintptr_t>(kSmiMinValue)) <=
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(static_cast<uintptr_t>(kSmiMaxValue) -
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static_cast<uintptr_t>(kSmiMinValue));
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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};
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// Smi constants for systems where tagged pointer is a 64-bit value.
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template <>
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struct SmiTagging<8> {
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enum { kSmiShiftSize = 31, kSmiValueSize = 32 };
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2019-05-09 14:15:47 +00:00
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static constexpr intptr_t kSmiMinValue =
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static_cast<intptr_t>(kUintptrAllBitsSet << (kSmiValueSize - 1));
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static constexpr intptr_t kSmiMaxValue = -(kSmiMinValue + 1);
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static int SmiToInt(const internal::Address value) {
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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int shift_bits = kSmiTagSize + kSmiShiftSize;
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// Shift down and throw away top 32 bits.
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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return static_cast<int>(static_cast<intptr_t>(value) >> shift_bits);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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V8_INLINE static constexpr bool IsValidSmi(intptr_t value) {
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// To be representable as a long smi, the value must be a 32-bit integer.
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return (value == static_cast<int32_t>(value));
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}
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};
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2019-03-01 15:34:48 +00:00
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#ifdef V8_COMPRESS_POINTERS
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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static_assert(
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2018-11-20 16:03:16 +00:00
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kApiSystemPointerSize == kApiInt64Size,
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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"Pointer compression can be enabled only for 64-bit architectures");
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2019-03-06 10:24:13 +00:00
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const int kApiTaggedSize = kApiInt32Size;
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#else
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const int kApiTaggedSize = kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2018-11-30 12:17:47 +00:00
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#endif
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2020-04-14 12:33:12 +00:00
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constexpr bool PointerCompressionIsEnabled() {
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return kApiTaggedSize != kApiSystemPointerSize;
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}
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V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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constexpr bool SandboxedExternalPointersAreEnabled() {
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#ifdef V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
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2020-05-05 11:29:36 +00:00
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return true;
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#else
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return false;
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#endif
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}
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using ExternalPointer_t = Address;
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V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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// If sandboxed external pointers are enabled, these tag values will be ORed
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// with the external pointers in the external pointer table to prevent use of
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// pointers of the wrong type. When a pointer is loaded, it is ANDed with the
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// inverse of the expected type's tag. The tags are constructed in a way that
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// guarantees that a failed type check will result in one or more of the top
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// bits of the pointer to be set, rendering the pointer inacessible. This
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// construction allows performing the type check and removing GC marking bits
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// from the pointer at the same time.
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2021-05-10 10:08:01 +00:00
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enum ExternalPointerTag : uint64_t {
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kExternalPointerNullTag = 0x0000000000000000,
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2021-08-17 13:42:11 +00:00
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kExternalStringResourceTag = 0x00ff000000000000, // 0b000000011111111
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kExternalStringResourceDataTag = 0x017f000000000000, // 0b000000101111111
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kForeignForeignAddressTag = 0x01bf000000000000, // 0b000000110111111
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kNativeContextMicrotaskQueueTag = 0x01df000000000000, // 0b000000111011111
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kEmbedderDataSlotPayloadTag = 0x01ef000000000000, // 0b000000111101111
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kCodeEntryPointTag = 0x01f7000000000000, // 0b000000111110111
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2020-10-09 09:10:25 +00:00
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};
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2021-05-10 10:08:01 +00:00
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constexpr uint64_t kExternalPointerTagMask = 0xffff000000000000;
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2019-03-01 15:34:48 +00:00
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#ifdef V8_31BIT_SMIS_ON_64BIT_ARCH
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2019-05-09 14:15:47 +00:00
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using PlatformSmiTagging = SmiTagging<kApiInt32Size>;
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2018-12-13 15:13:42 +00:00
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#else
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2019-05-09 14:15:47 +00:00
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using PlatformSmiTagging = SmiTagging<kApiTaggedSize>;
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2018-12-13 15:13:42 +00:00
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#endif
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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2019-09-26 13:51:23 +00:00
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// TODO(ishell): Consinder adding kSmiShiftBits = kSmiShiftSize + kSmiTagSize
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// since it's used much more often than the inividual constants.
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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const int kSmiShiftSize = PlatformSmiTagging::kSmiShiftSize;
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const int kSmiValueSize = PlatformSmiTagging::kSmiValueSize;
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2019-05-09 14:15:47 +00:00
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const int kSmiMinValue = static_cast<int>(PlatformSmiTagging::kSmiMinValue);
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const int kSmiMaxValue = static_cast<int>(PlatformSmiTagging::kSmiMaxValue);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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constexpr bool SmiValuesAre31Bits() { return kSmiValueSize == 31; }
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constexpr bool SmiValuesAre32Bits() { return kSmiValueSize == 32; }
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2018-11-03 00:13:22 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static constexpr internal::Address IntToSmi(int value) {
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return (static_cast<Address>(value) << (kSmiTagSize + kSmiShiftSize)) |
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kSmiTag;
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}
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2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
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// Converts encoded external pointer to address.
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V8_EXPORT Address DecodeExternalPointerImpl(const Isolate* isolate,
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2020-10-09 09:10:25 +00:00
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ExternalPointer_t pointer,
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ExternalPointerTag tag);
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2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
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2020-05-13 08:36:23 +00:00
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// {obj} must be the raw tagged pointer representation of a HeapObject
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// that's guaranteed to never be in ReadOnlySpace.
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V8_EXPORT internal::Isolate* IsolateFromNeverReadOnlySpaceObject(Address obj);
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// Returns if we need to throw when an error occurs. This infers the language
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// mode based on the current context and the closure. This returns true if the
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// language mode is strict.
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V8_EXPORT bool ShouldThrowOnError(v8::internal::Isolate* isolate);
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2021-08-09 07:44:18 +00:00
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V8_EXPORT bool CanHaveInternalField(int instance_type);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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/**
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* This class exports constants and functionality from within v8 that
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* is necessary to implement inline functions in the v8 api. Don't
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* depend on functions and constants defined here.
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*/
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class Internals {
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2021-04-06 12:01:44 +00:00
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#ifdef V8_MAP_PACKING
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V8_INLINE static constexpr internal::Address UnpackMapWord(
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internal::Address mapword) {
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// TODO(wenyuzhao): Clear header metadata.
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return mapword ^ kMapWordXorMask;
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}
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#endif
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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public:
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// These values match non-compiler-dependent values defined within
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// the implementation of v8.
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static const int kHeapObjectMapOffset = 0;
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2019-03-01 15:34:48 +00:00
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static const int kMapInstanceTypeOffset = 1 * kApiTaggedSize + kApiInt32Size;
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static const int kStringResourceOffset =
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1 * kApiTaggedSize + 2 * kApiInt32Size;
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2018-11-20 16:03:16 +00:00
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static const int kOddballKindOffset = 4 * kApiTaggedSize + kApiDoubleSize;
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static const int kJSObjectHeaderSize = 3 * kApiTaggedSize;
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static const int kFixedArrayHeaderSize = 2 * kApiTaggedSize;
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static const int kEmbedderDataArrayHeaderSize = 2 * kApiTaggedSize;
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2019-03-06 10:24:13 +00:00
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static const int kEmbedderDataSlotSize = kApiSystemPointerSize;
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V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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#ifdef V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
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2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
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static const int kEmbedderDataSlotRawPayloadOffset = kApiTaggedSize;
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#endif
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2019-10-17 15:58:38 +00:00
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static const int kNativeContextEmbedderDataOffset = 6 * kApiTaggedSize;
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2021-12-04 00:06:11 +00:00
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static const int kStringRepresentationAndEncodingMask = 0x0f;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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static const int kStringEncodingMask = 0x8;
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static const int kExternalTwoByteRepresentationTag = 0x02;
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static const int kExternalOneByteRepresentationTag = 0x0a;
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2018-10-26 13:30:12 +00:00
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static const uint32_t kNumIsolateDataSlots = 4;
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2021-09-20 13:29:46 +00:00
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static const int kStackGuardSize = 7 * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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static const int kBuiltinTier0EntryTableSize = 13 * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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static const int kBuiltinTier0TableSize = 13 * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2018-10-26 13:30:12 +00:00
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2019-08-13 10:37:59 +00:00
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// IsolateData layout guarantees.
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2021-09-20 13:29:46 +00:00
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static const int kIsolateCageBaseOffset = 0;
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static const int kIsolateStackGuardOffset =
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kIsolateCageBaseOffset + kApiSystemPointerSize;
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static const int kBuiltinTier0EntryTableOffset =
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kIsolateStackGuardOffset + kStackGuardSize;
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static const int kBuiltinTier0TableOffset =
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kBuiltinTier0EntryTableOffset + kBuiltinTier0EntryTableSize;
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static const int kIsolateEmbedderDataOffset =
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kBuiltinTier0TableOffset + kBuiltinTier0TableSize;
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2019-08-13 10:37:59 +00:00
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static const int kIsolateFastCCallCallerFpOffset =
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2021-09-20 13:29:46 +00:00
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kIsolateEmbedderDataOffset + kNumIsolateDataSlots * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2019-08-13 10:37:59 +00:00
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static const int kIsolateFastCCallCallerPcOffset =
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kIsolateFastCCallCallerFpOffset + kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2020-11-18 11:19:56 +00:00
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static const int kIsolateFastApiCallTargetOffset =
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2019-08-13 10:37:59 +00:00
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kIsolateFastCCallCallerPcOffset + kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2021-04-13 12:12:02 +00:00
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static const int kIsolateLongTaskStatsCounterOffset =
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2021-09-20 13:29:46 +00:00
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kIsolateFastApiCallTargetOffset + kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2019-08-13 10:37:59 +00:00
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static const int kIsolateRootsOffset =
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2021-09-20 13:29:46 +00:00
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kIsolateLongTaskStatsCounterOffset + kApiSizetSize;
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2018-10-26 13:30:12 +00:00
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2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
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static const int kExternalPointerTableBufferOffset = 0;
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static const int kExternalPointerTableLengthOffset =
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kExternalPointerTableBufferOffset + kApiSystemPointerSize;
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static const int kExternalPointerTableCapacityOffset =
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kExternalPointerTableLengthOffset + kApiInt32Size;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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static const int kUndefinedValueRootIndex = 4;
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static const int kTheHoleValueRootIndex = 5;
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static const int kNullValueRootIndex = 6;
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static const int kTrueValueRootIndex = 7;
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static const int kFalseValueRootIndex = 8;
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static const int kEmptyStringRootIndex = 9;
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2019-03-01 15:34:48 +00:00
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static const int kNodeClassIdOffset = 1 * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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static const int kNodeFlagsOffset = 1 * kApiSystemPointerSize + 3;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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static const int kNodeStateMask = 0x7;
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static const int kNodeStateIsWeakValue = 2;
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static const int kNodeStateIsPendingValue = 3;
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2021-11-10 22:42:10 +00:00
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static const int kFirstNonstringType = 0x80;
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static const int kOddballType = 0x83;
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static const int kForeignType = 0xcc;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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static const int kJSSpecialApiObjectType = 0x410;
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static const int kJSObjectType = 0x421;
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2021-08-09 07:44:18 +00:00
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static const int kFirstJSApiObjectType = 0x422;
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static const int kLastJSApiObjectType = 0x80A;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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static const int kUndefinedOddballKind = 5;
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static const int kNullOddballKind = 3;
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2019-02-07 13:19:57 +00:00
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// Constants used by PropertyCallbackInfo to check if we should throw when an
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// error occurs.
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static const int kThrowOnError = 0;
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static const int kDontThrow = 1;
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static const int kInferShouldThrowMode = 2;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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// Soft limit for AdjustAmountofExternalAllocatedMemory. Trigger an
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// incremental GC once the external memory reaches this limit.
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static constexpr int kExternalAllocationSoftLimit = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
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2021-04-06 12:01:44 +00:00
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#ifdef V8_MAP_PACKING
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static const uintptr_t kMapWordMetadataMask = 0xffffULL << 48;
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// The lowest two bits of mapwords are always `0b10`
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static const uintptr_t kMapWordSignature = 0b10;
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// XORing a (non-compressed) map with this mask ensures that the two
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// low-order bits are 0b10. The 0 at the end makes this look like a Smi,
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// although real Smis have all lower 32 bits unset. We only rely on these
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// values passing as Smis in very few places.
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static const int kMapWordXorMask = 0b11;
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#endif
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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V8_EXPORT static void CheckInitializedImpl(v8::Isolate* isolate);
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V8_INLINE static void CheckInitialized(v8::Isolate* isolate) {
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#ifdef V8_ENABLE_CHECKS
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CheckInitializedImpl(isolate);
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#endif
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static bool HasHeapObjectTag(const internal::Address value) {
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return (value & kHeapObjectTagMask) == static_cast<Address>(kHeapObjectTag);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static int SmiValue(const internal::Address value) {
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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return PlatformSmiTagging::SmiToInt(value);
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}
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2018-11-03 00:13:22 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static constexpr internal::Address IntToSmi(int value) {
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return internal::IntToSmi(value);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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V8_INLINE static constexpr bool IsValidSmi(intptr_t value) {
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return PlatformSmiTagging::IsValidSmi(value);
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static int GetInstanceType(const internal::Address obj) {
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typedef internal::Address A;
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2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
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A map = ReadTaggedPointerField(obj, kHeapObjectMapOffset);
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2021-04-06 12:01:44 +00:00
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#ifdef V8_MAP_PACKING
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map = UnpackMapWord(map);
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#endif
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2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
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return ReadRawField<uint16_t>(map, kMapInstanceTypeOffset);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static int GetOddballKind(const internal::Address obj) {
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2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
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return SmiValue(ReadTaggedSignedField(obj, kOddballKindOffset));
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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V8_INLINE static bool IsExternalTwoByteString(int instance_type) {
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2021-12-04 00:06:11 +00:00
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int representation = (instance_type & kStringRepresentationAndEncodingMask);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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return representation == kExternalTwoByteRepresentationTag;
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static uint8_t GetNodeFlag(internal::Address* obj, int shift) {
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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uint8_t* addr = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(obj) + kNodeFlagsOffset;
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return *addr & static_cast<uint8_t>(1U << shift);
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static void UpdateNodeFlag(internal::Address* obj, bool value,
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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int shift) {
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uint8_t* addr = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(obj) + kNodeFlagsOffset;
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uint8_t mask = static_cast<uint8_t>(1U << shift);
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*addr = static_cast<uint8_t>((*addr & ~mask) | (value << shift));
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static uint8_t GetNodeState(internal::Address* obj) {
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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uint8_t* addr = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(obj) + kNodeFlagsOffset;
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return *addr & kNodeStateMask;
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static void UpdateNodeState(internal::Address* obj, uint8_t value) {
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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uint8_t* addr = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(obj) + kNodeFlagsOffset;
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*addr = static_cast<uint8_t>((*addr & ~kNodeStateMask) | value);
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}
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V8_INLINE static void SetEmbedderData(v8::Isolate* isolate, uint32_t slot,
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void* data) {
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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internal::Address addr = reinterpret_cast<internal::Address>(isolate) +
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kIsolateEmbedderDataOffset +
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2018-11-20 16:03:16 +00:00
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slot * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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*reinterpret_cast<void**>(addr) = data;
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}
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V8_INLINE static void* GetEmbedderData(const v8::Isolate* isolate,
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uint32_t slot) {
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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internal::Address addr = reinterpret_cast<internal::Address>(isolate) +
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kIsolateEmbedderDataOffset +
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2018-11-20 16:03:16 +00:00
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slot * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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return *reinterpret_cast<void* const*>(addr);
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}
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2021-04-13 12:12:02 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static void IncrementLongTasksStatsCounter(v8::Isolate* isolate) {
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internal::Address addr = reinterpret_cast<internal::Address>(isolate) +
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kIsolateLongTaskStatsCounterOffset;
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++(*reinterpret_cast<size_t*>(addr));
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}
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static internal::Address* GetRoot(v8::Isolate* isolate, int index) {
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2018-11-20 16:03:16 +00:00
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internal::Address addr = reinterpret_cast<internal::Address>(isolate) +
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kIsolateRootsOffset +
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index * kApiSystemPointerSize;
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return reinterpret_cast<internal::Address*>(addr);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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template <typename T>
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2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static T ReadRawField(internal::Address heap_object_ptr,
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int offset) {
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2018-10-11 23:23:33 +00:00
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internal::Address addr = heap_object_ptr + offset - kHeapObjectTag;
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2019-03-19 10:36:40 +00:00
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#ifdef V8_COMPRESS_POINTERS
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if (sizeof(T) > kApiTaggedSize) {
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// TODO(ishell, v8:8875): When pointer compression is enabled 8-byte size
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// fields (external pointers, doubles and BigInt data) are only
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// kTaggedSize aligned so we have to use unaligned pointer friendly way of
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// accessing them in order to avoid undefined behavior in C++ code.
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T r;
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memcpy(&r, reinterpret_cast<void*>(addr), sizeof(T));
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return r;
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}
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#endif
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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return *reinterpret_cast<const T*>(addr);
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}
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2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static internal::Address ReadTaggedPointerField(
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internal::Address heap_object_ptr, int offset) {
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#ifdef V8_COMPRESS_POINTERS
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2020-02-13 11:35:54 +00:00
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uint32_t value = ReadRawField<uint32_t>(heap_object_ptr, offset);
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2021-04-05 19:42:59 +00:00
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internal::Address base =
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GetPtrComprCageBaseFromOnHeapAddress(heap_object_ptr);
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return base + static_cast<internal::Address>(static_cast<uintptr_t>(value));
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2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
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#else
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return ReadRawField<internal::Address>(heap_object_ptr, offset);
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#endif
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}
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V8_INLINE static internal::Address ReadTaggedSignedField(
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internal::Address heap_object_ptr, int offset) {
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#ifdef V8_COMPRESS_POINTERS
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2020-02-13 11:35:54 +00:00
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uint32_t value = ReadRawField<uint32_t>(heap_object_ptr, offset);
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return static_cast<internal::Address>(static_cast<uintptr_t>(value));
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2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
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#else
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return ReadRawField<internal::Address>(heap_object_ptr, offset);
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#endif
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}
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V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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V8_INLINE static internal::Isolate* GetIsolateForSandbox(
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2020-05-13 08:36:23 +00:00
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internal::Address obj) {
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
|
2020-05-13 08:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return internal::IsolateFromNeverReadOnlySpaceObject(obj);
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
// Not used in non-sandbox mode.
|
|
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
V8_INLINE static Address DecodeExternalPointer(
|
2020-10-09 09:10:25 +00:00
|
|
|
const Isolate* isolate, ExternalPointer_t encoded_pointer,
|
|
|
|
ExternalPointerTag tag) {
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
|
2020-10-09 09:10:25 +00:00
|
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|
return internal::DecodeExternalPointerImpl(isolate, encoded_pointer, tag);
|
2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
|
|
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#else
|
|
|
|
return encoded_pointer;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-05 11:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
V8_INLINE static internal::Address ReadExternalPointerField(
|
2020-10-09 09:10:25 +00:00
|
|
|
internal::Isolate* isolate, internal::Address heap_object_ptr, int offset,
|
|
|
|
ExternalPointerTag tag) {
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
|
2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
internal::ExternalPointer_t encoded_value =
|
|
|
|
ReadRawField<uint32_t>(heap_object_ptr, offset);
|
2020-05-05 11:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
// We currently have to treat zero as nullptr in embedder slots.
|
2020-10-09 09:10:25 +00:00
|
|
|
return encoded_value ? DecodeExternalPointer(isolate, encoded_value, tag)
|
|
|
|
: 0;
|
2020-09-29 13:40:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return ReadRawField<Address>(heap_object_ptr, offset);
|
2020-05-05 11:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V8_COMPRESS_POINTERS
|
2019-03-06 10:24:13 +00:00
|
|
|
// See v8:7703 or src/ptr-compr.* for details about pointer compression.
|
2021-04-05 19:42:59 +00:00
|
|
|
static constexpr size_t kPtrComprCageReservationSize = size_t{1} << 32;
|
|
|
|
static constexpr size_t kPtrComprCageBaseAlignment = size_t{1} << 32;
|
2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-05 19:42:59 +00:00
|
|
|
V8_INLINE static internal::Address GetPtrComprCageBaseFromOnHeapAddress(
|
2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
|
|
|
internal::Address addr) {
|
2021-04-05 19:42:59 +00:00
|
|
|
return addr & -static_cast<intptr_t>(kPtrComprCageBaseAlignment);
|
2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-06 10:24:13 +00:00
|
|
|
V8_INLINE static internal::Address DecompressTaggedAnyField(
|
2020-02-13 11:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
internal::Address heap_object_ptr, uint32_t value) {
|
2021-04-05 19:42:59 +00:00
|
|
|
internal::Address base =
|
|
|
|
GetPtrComprCageBaseFromOnHeapAddress(heap_object_ptr);
|
|
|
|
return base + static_cast<internal::Address>(static_cast<uintptr_t>(value));
|
2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-05-05 11:29:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-27 09:49:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif // V8_COMPRESS_POINTERS
|
2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
constexpr bool SandboxIsEnabled() {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef V8_SANDBOX
|
2021-08-11 14:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
// SandboxedPointers are guaranteed to point into the sandbox. This is achieved
|
|
|
|
// for example by storing them as offset rather than as raw pointers.
|
|
|
|
using SandboxedPointer_t = Address;
|
Use CagedPointers for ArrayBuffer backing stores
This CL turns references to ArrayBuffer backing stores from
JSArrayBuffers, JSTypedArrays, and JSDataViews into CagedPointers
when those are enabled.
CagedPointers cannot generally represent nullptr, as NULL usually lies
outside the cage. As such, nullptr backing stores are replaced with a
special empty backing store value, which, in the current implementation,
points to the end of the cage, right in front of the trailing guard
regions. Due to this, it is no longer correct to compare a backing store
pointer against nullptr.
Bug: chromium:1218005
Change-Id: I4a6c7a82aabb4debcb6bb2babe4035ba2da8e79f
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3244419
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakob Gruber <jgruber@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Leszek Swirski <leszeks@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78218}
2021-12-02 09:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef V8_SANDBOX_IS_AVAILABLE
|
2021-10-12 20:00:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-13 09:35:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#define GB (1ULL << 30)
|
|
|
|
#define TB (1ULL << 40)
|
|
|
|
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
// Size of the sandbox, excluding the guard regions surrounding it.
|
|
|
|
constexpr size_t kSandboxSizeLog2 = 40; // 1 TB
|
|
|
|
constexpr size_t kSandboxSize = 1ULL << kSandboxSizeLog2;
|
2021-08-11 14:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
// Required alignment of the sandbox. For simplicity, we require the
|
2021-08-11 14:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
// size of the guard regions to be a multiple of this, so that this specifies
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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// the alignment of the sandbox including and excluding surrounding guard
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// regions. The alignment requirement is due to the pointer compression cage
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// being located at the start of the sandbox.
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constexpr size_t kSandboxAlignment = Internals::kPtrComprCageBaseAlignment;
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// Sandboxed pointers are stored inside the heap as offset from the sandbox
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// base shifted to the left. This way, it is guaranteed that the offset is
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// smaller than the sandbox size after shifting it to the right again. This
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// constant specifies the shift amount.
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constexpr uint64_t kSandboxedPointerShift = 64 - kSandboxSizeLog2;
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// Size of the guard regions surrounding the sandbox. This assumes a worst-case
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// scenario of a 32-bit unsigned index used to access an array of 64-bit
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// values.
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constexpr size_t kSandboxGuardRegionSize = 32ULL * GB;
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static_assert((kSandboxGuardRegionSize % kSandboxAlignment) == 0,
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"The size of the guard regions around the sandbox must be a "
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2021-08-11 14:18:28 +00:00
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"multiple of its required alignment.");
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V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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// Minimum size of the sandbox, excluding the guard regions surrounding it. If
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// the virtual memory reservation for the sandbox fails, its size is currently
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// halved until either the reservation succeeds or the minimum size is reached.
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// A minimum of 32GB allows the 4GB pointer compression region as well as the
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// ArrayBuffer partition and two 10GB WASM memory cages to fit into the
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// sandbox. 32GB should also be the minimum possible size of the userspace
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// address space as there are some machine configurations with only 36 virtual
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// address bits.
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constexpr size_t kSandboxMinimumSize = 32ULL * GB;
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static_assert(kSandboxMinimumSize <= kSandboxSize,
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"The minimal size of the sandbox must be smaller or equal to the "
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"regular size.");
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// On OSes where reserving virtual memory is too expensive to reserve the
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// entire address space backing the sandbox, notably Windows pre 8.1, we create
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// a partially reserved sandbox that doesn't actually reserve most of the
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// memory, and so doesn't have the desired security properties as unrelated
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// memory allocations could end up inside of it, but which still ensures that
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// objects that should be located inside the sandbox are allocated within
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// kSandboxSize bytes from the start of the sandbox. The minimum size of the
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// region that is actually reserved for such a sandbox is specified by this
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// constant and should be big enough to contain the pointer compression cage as
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// well as the ArrayBuffer partition.
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constexpr size_t kSandboxMinimumReservationSize = 8ULL * GB;
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static_assert(kSandboxMinimumSize > Internals::kPtrComprCageReservationSize,
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"The sandbox must be larger than the pointer compression cage "
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"contained within it.");
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static_assert(kSandboxMinimumReservationSize >
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2021-10-13 09:35:15 +00:00
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Internals::kPtrComprCageReservationSize,
|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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"The minimum reservation size for a sandbox must be larger than "
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"the pointer compression cage contained within it.");
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// For now, even if the sandbox is enabled, we still allow backing stores to be
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// allocated outside of it as fallback. This will simplify the initial rollout.
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// However, if sandboxed pointers are also enabled, we must always place
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// backing stores inside the sandbox as they will be referenced though them.
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#ifdef V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
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constexpr bool kAllowBackingStoresOutsideSandbox = false;
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2021-08-24 19:12:19 +00:00
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#else
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V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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constexpr bool kAllowBackingStoresOutsideSandbox = true;
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#endif // V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
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2021-08-24 19:12:19 +00:00
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2021-10-13 09:35:15 +00:00
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#undef GB
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#undef TB
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|
V8 Sandbox rebranding
This CL renames a number of things related to the V8 sandbox.
Mainly, what used to be under V8_HEAP_SANDBOX is now under
V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS, while the previous V8 VirtualMemoryCage
is now simply the V8 Sandbox:
V8_VIRTUAL_MEMORY_CAGE => V8_SANDBOX
V8_HEAP_SANDBOX => V8_SANDBOXED_EXTERNAL_POINTERS
V8_CAGED_POINTERS => V8_SANDBOXED_POINTERS
V8VirtualMemoryCage => Sandbox
CagedPointer => SandboxedPointer
fake cage => partially reserved sandbox
src/security => src/sandbox
This naming scheme should simplify things: the sandbox is now the large
region of virtual address space inside which V8 mainly operates and
which should be considered untrusted. Mechanisms like sandboxed pointers
are then used to attempt to prevent escapes from the sandbox (i.e.
corruption of memory outside of it). Furthermore, the new naming scheme
avoids the confusion with the various other "cages" in V8, in
particular, the VirtualMemoryCage class, by dropping that name entirely.
Future sandbox features are developed under their own V8_SANDBOX_X flag,
and will, once final, be merged into V8_SANDBOX. Current future features
are sandboxed external pointers (using the external pointer table), and
sandboxed pointers (pointers guaranteed to point into the sandbox, e.g.
because they are encoded as offsets). This CL then also introduces a new
build flag, v8_enable_sandbox_future, which enables all future features.
Bug: v8:10391
Change-Id: I5174ea8f5ab40fb96a04af10853da735ad775c96
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.v8.try:v8_linux64_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng,v8_linux_arm64_sim_heap_sandbox_dbg_ng
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/3322981
Reviewed-by: Hannes Payer <hpayer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Achenbach <machenbach@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Samuel Groß <saelo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#78384}
2021-12-15 13:39:15 +00:00
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#endif // V8_SANDBOX_IS_AVAILABLE
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2021-08-11 14:18:28 +00:00
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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// Only perform cast check for types derived from v8::Data since
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// other types do not implement the Cast method.
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template <bool PerformCheck>
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struct CastCheck {
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template <class T>
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static void Perform(T* data);
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};
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template <>
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template <class T>
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void CastCheck<true>::Perform(T* data) {
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T::Cast(data);
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}
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template <>
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template <class T>
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void CastCheck<false>::Perform(T* data) {}
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template <class T>
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V8_INLINE void PerformCastCheck(T* data) {
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2020-08-31 10:36:52 +00:00
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CastCheck<std::is_base_of<Data, T>::value &&
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2020-09-09 03:25:22 +00:00
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!std::is_same<Data, std::remove_cv_t<T>>::value>::Perform(data);
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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}
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2019-09-18 11:04:58 +00:00
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// A base class for backing stores, which is needed due to vagaries of
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// how static casts work with std::shared_ptr.
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class BackingStoreBase {};
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2021-12-13 16:25:42 +00:00
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// The maximum value in enum GarbageCollectionReason, defined in heap.h.
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// This is needed for histograms sampling garbage collection reasons.
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constexpr int kGarbageCollectionReasonMaxValue = 25;
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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} // namespace internal
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2021-07-23 18:29:30 +00:00
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2018-09-07 09:03:35 +00:00
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} // namespace v8
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#endif // INCLUDE_V8_INTERNAL_H_
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