[*] Double-down on clang being shit

Core/project.lua

@@ -164,14 +164,19 @@ local function configureProjectErrors()
 
     filter {"toolset:clang"}
         buildoptions {"-fms-extensions"}
-        -- the fucking retard cunts behind clang acknowledge there's a 2x slowdown here.
+        -- The fucking retard cunts behind clang acknowledge there's a 2x slowdown here.
-        -- not only that, GCC optimize("no-stack-protector") is broken, their ms stack guard check doesnt do anything, and there are 
+        -- Not only that, GCC optimize("no-stack-protector") is broken (ive tried other attributes), their ms stack guard check doesnt do anything,
-        -- reports that enabling sanitization actually exposes side channel attacks. thanks freetards. very cool.
+        -- and there are reports that enabling sanitization actually exposes side channel attacks. thanks freetards. very cool.
-        -- all this because you dont trust me to not memcpy a fucking user provided blob with a bad length check in the very few places that
+        -- All this because you dont trust me to not memcpy a fucking user provided blob with a bad length check in the very few places that
-        -- have any reads/writes determined by potentially malicious remote user input. even worse, i've seen what should be nothing more than
+        -- have any load/stores, in or around the stack, as determined by potentially malicious remote/untrusted user input. Even worse, I've seen 
-        -- leaf functions doing atomic bit tests and sets get infected with these shitty checks.
+        -- what should be nothing more than leaf functions doing atomic bit tests and sets get infected with these shitty checks. Meanwhile llvm
-        -- once again you freetards are 20 years behind commercial alternatives, and that's with infinite apple buxs.
+        -- devs are bitching that "NoOoo you're right, this is a bug, LTO shouldn't be stripping stack checks". Even when the compiler knows
-        -- if anything happens because of this, i hope somebody burns down a house of a freetard and shits on their doormat during the escape.
+        -- the stack isnt being accessed and there's no control flow out of its' reach, these moron compiler devs are obsessed with injecting
+        -- their shit checks that wont catch any real exploit chain. I'm so fucking sick of these retard security grifters hung up on "MUH OBERFLOWS" 
+        -- "MUH SAFE LANGS" without being able to define what the fuck their attack vector is or how it's going to be exploited. If we cared about 
+        -- overflow checks, then we'd have mimalloc running in secure mode.
+        -- Once again these twats are 20 years behind commercial alternatives, and that's with infinite apple buxs.
+        -- If anything happens because of this, i hope somebody burns down a house of a freetard or llvm dev, and shits on their doormat during the escape.
         if (not Aurora.Settings.bClangIsNoLongerAPieceOfShitCompiler) then
             buildoptions {"-fno-sanitize=all"}
             buildoptions {"-fno-stack-protector"}
@@ -265,12 +270,12 @@ local function configureProjectForLd(prj)
     --  system libraries are considered before any malcious user-installed libraries could possibly be loaded.
     -- If you're running a broken arse system with missing protected libraries and you run software as write-level groups,
     --  you have bigger issues than my 'lets treat POSIX systems more like NT for cross-compatibility and sanity' assumption.
-    -- If you're worried about ld.so running unsigned code, go complain to glib iq-lets who maintain ld.so and force them
+    -- If you're worried about ld.so running unsigned code, go complain to glibc iq-lets who maintain ld.so and force them
     --  into developing actual .text and .rodata signature validation with respect to a global root-writable certificate,
     --  instead of spreading the ball of responsiblity like hot-fucking-potato in a game of respecting the UNIX :tm: way 
-    --  of doing things (IE, expecting the user to know how to lockdown vendor supplied packages, RO all LD_LIBRARY_PATHs 
+    --  of doing things (eg: expecting the user to know how to lockdown vendor supplied packages, RO all LD_LIBRARY_PATHs 
     --  and other undocumented vendor paths, and do god knows what to harden specific softwares dumped without thought
-    --  across an arahic FHS/XDG tree, while the developers do jack shit to improve stability, maintainablity, and security).
+    --  across an arahic FHS/XDG tree, all the while developers do jack shit to improve stability, maintainablity, and security).
     --
     -- Change my mind (without parroting what some dude said on some forum over a decade ago)
     -- Don't like it? Disable: Aurora.Settings.bForceWin32EscLd