1. The tables array allocated in the CompilationSubCache constructor
was never deallocated. Fixed by adding destructor.
2. The buffer allocated in one of the constructors of the
NoAllocationStringAllocator was never deallocated. It seems that
this class sometimes owns the buffer (if it allocated one itself)
and sometimes doesn't (if it was passed one). Simple fix is to
remove the offending constructor which was never used anyway.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/155917
git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@2520 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
The abstractions have led to bugs because it looks like descriptor
streams are GC safe but they are not.
I have moved the descriptor stream helper functions to descriptor
arrays and I find most of the code just as readable now as it was
before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/149458
git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@2428 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
This issue was raised by Brett Wilson while reviewing my changelist for readability. Craig Silverstein (one of C++ SG maintainers) confirmed that we should declare one namespace per line. Our way of namespaces closing seems not violating style guides (there is no clear agreement on it), so I left it intact.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/115756
git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@2038 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
a reason to stack allocate large chunks of stack space.
- Runtime_GetCFrames used to allocate a frame size of 52040 bytes.
- PreallocatedMemoryThread::Run used to allocate 32784 bytes.
- Fixed StringStream overflow conditions.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/67197
git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@1729 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
Fix for non-empty assertion in debug mode (string representation of empty arguments is a single space, not an empty string).
git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@733 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
Here is a description of the background and design of split window in Chrome and V8:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/Doc?id=chhjkpg_47fwddxbfr
This change list splits the window object into two parts: 1) an inner window object used as the global object of contexts; 2) an outer window object exposed to JavaScript and accessible by the name 'window'. Firefox did it awhile ago, here are some discussions: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Gecko:SplitWindow. One additional benefit of splitting window in Chrome is that accessing global variables don't need security checks anymore, it can improve applications that use many global variables.
V8 support of split window:
There are a small number of changes on V8 api to support split window:
Security context is removed from V8, so does related API functions;
A global object can be detached from its context and reused by a new context;
Access checks on an object template can be turned on/off by default;
An object can turn on its access checks later;
V8 has a new object type, ApiGlobalObject, which is the outer window object type. The existing JSGlobalObject becomes the inner window object type. Security checks are moved from JSGlobalObject to ApiGlobalObject. ApiGlobalObject is the one exposed to JavaScript, it is accessible through Context::Global(). ApiGlobalObject's prototype is set to JSGlobalObject so that property lookups are forwarded to JSGlobalObject. ApiGlobalObject forwards all other property access requests to JSGlobalObject, such as SetProperty, DeleteProperty, etc.
Security token is moved to a global context, and ApiGlobalObject has a reference to its global context. JSGlobalObject has a reference to its global context as well. When accessing properties on a global object in JavaScript, the domain security check is performed by comparing the security token of the lexical context (Top::global_context()) to the token of global object's context. The check is only needed when the receiver is a window object, such as 'window.document'. Accessing global variables, such as 'var foo = 3; foo' does not need checks because the receiver is the inner window object.
When an outer window is detached from its global context (when a frame navigates away from a page), it is completely detached from the inner window. A new context is created for the new page, and the outer global object is reused. At this point, the access check on the DOMWindow wrapper of the old context is turned on. The code in old context is still able to access DOMWindow properties, but it has to go through domain security checks.
It is debatable on how to implement the outer window object. Currently each property access function has to check if the receiver is ApiGlobalObject type. This approach might be error-prone that one may forget to check the receiver when adding new functions. It is unlikely a performance issue because accessing global variables are more common than 'window.foo' style coding.
I am still working on the ARM port, and I'd like to hear comments and suggestions on the best way to support it in V8.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7366
git-svn-id: http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@540 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
